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Abstract
Amidst modernity’s expanding electronic social matrix, this cultural-historical
inquiry explores the technological construction of human being (e.g., cyborgs) and
sociality in the America Online cyberscape. A two-tiered critical-hermeneutic method
enables exploration of the broad rationalizing historical narrative and the localized play
of virtual discursive practices impacting human meaning construction, selfhood, and
social practice. A third and fourth tier of inquiry occasions integration of
“psychological” meanings found in research participant experiential descriptions and
interviews. This four-tier interplay reveals a bodily ethic enabling participants to modify
subjectifying Internet practices toward meaningful social ends. Otherwise, eclipsed
interpretive bodily powers contribute to “undecidability” about meaning constructions
and identities. Despite multiple identity solicitations, normalization of objectified and
schizoid being, and “panoptic” e-surveillance, participants pursued genuine and
personally satisfying encounters.
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Naming the “things that are absent” is breaking the
spell of the things that are; moreover it is an ingression
of a different order of things into the established one – “le
commencement d’un monde.”
Herbert Marcuse
One-Dimensional Man
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Introduction:
The Subject and Sociality as Configured by Modernity and the Internet
A few bytes beyond the cusp of the twenty-first century, Western culture
increasingly finds itself held within the sway of a cyberspace-human nexus. This
entwinement has yet to be articulated in a manner that attends to the relationship between
discourses of modernity and first person accounts of experience. The following
culturally informed inquiry seeks to accomplish just that – it seeks to address the
reciprocal transformations always already occurring when one’s being in the world is
infused with the possibilities afforded by Internet sociality. In the words of Kenneth
Gergen (1991), “As we become increasingly conjoined with our social surroundings, we
come to reflect those surroundings” (p.49). The cultural-historical setting for exploring
the impact of reliance upon basic forms of Internet sociality appears to be optimal
inasmuch as the explosion of the 3D Web revolution heralded by software architects of
the 1990s remains largely unrealized (e.g., Kushner, 2004; Hunter & Lastowka, 2003;
Ronnblom, 2002).
Catching sight of the recent historical context of lived out transformations
informed by Internet use can be, in the words of Michel Foucault (1978), a way of
providing a “history of the present” – a way of contributing to a chronicle of subjective
transformations which stand as the effects of contemporary historical force-relations.
When we are able to gaze back upon the historical shifts that coincide with the mobile
productions of power and knowledge, Foucault suggests that “things appear in a very
different light” (p.17). Thus the production of subjects and the meanings they live are
understood differently in the light of the interplay of force-relations. Similarly, Martin
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Heidegger (1962) understands the historical situation Dasein (the human way of being
there) finds itself thrown into as participating in Dasein’s disclosure. Dasein as “futural
. . . is in the process of having-been, [and] can by handing down to itself the possibility it
has inherited, takes over its own throwness . . .” (p. 437). Here, Heidegger also
recognizes the import of history. In addition, Heidegger understands that an awareness of
the future (e.g., one’s mortality) can motivate an effort to retrieve the freedom to choose
and act through the appropriation of marginalized possibilities associated with one’s
culturally relevant heritage; a potent prescription for a cultural therapeutic which admits
the return of “repressed” contexts into human science narratives. It is my presupposition
that these “repressed” contexts inform human experiences of self, styles of embodiment,
social practices, and beliefs about truth and reality. In any case, we see that both
philosophers think about history as bound up with the present. One significant way in
which they differ, however, is in the methodological approach each thinker employs in
appropriating the past. Whereas Foucault prefers a micro-analytic of discontinuous
power relations, Heidegger adopts a macrocosmic analysis of the teleological Enframing
of Western culture. Any effort to integrate the interpretive stance of Heidegger’s
hermeneutic project with Foucault’s genealogical project in a practical manner requires
some explication.
A review of theoretical support for engaging in a psycho-cultural-historical study
informed by a critical-hermeneutics will be articulated in the methodological portion of
this research project. At this point, however, I wish to remark that while Foucault and
Heidegger are rarely paired methodologically, this qualitative research project will stand
as an exploratory heuristic, or rather, a concretization of the fruitful possibilities
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associated with the coupling of Foucauldian and Heideggerian praxis. Accordingly, I
will outline below a methodological approach to combining broad narratives of history
(cf. Heidegger) with Foucault’s emphasis on the “history of the present” – or rather, with
Foucault’s emphasis on efforts to chronicle the competing cultural practices and
discourses which vie to inscribe bodies, beliefs, and social practices. In addition, I will
incorporate Heidegger’s “hermeneutic circle” as a means to expanding research
participant lived understandings of their Internet based experience. Thus, I will not focus
on obtaining an objective understanding of research participant experience. Instead, I
will begin my qualitative inquiry with research participant preunderstandings of their
experience as a starting point for resituating and reinterpreting their protocols.
To begin, I will apply Foucauldian and Heideggerian thought by first reading
“protocols,” or first-person experiential accounts, and interpreting them in a manner
which identifies each research participant’s lived concatenation of meanings. Second, I
will interview each research participant in a manner that will allow their life-situated
meanings to be lifted out from average everyday understandings of language and
meaning. Lifting out new significations from the language used by research participants
will, of course, require an interpretive attentiveness to the plurivocal nature of language –
an attentiveness to the way in which connotative, non-literal, imaginative, and lifesituated contexts are always already bound up with literal understandings of language.
After doing so, I will then “circle” back and integrate the interpretations made in Steps 1
and 2 into a person-centered narrative of research participant’s lived meanings. The
Continental thinker, Calvin Schrag (1989), quotes Heidegger in a manner that lends
support to methodological efforts to privilege a place for the perspective of the person or
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‘subject:’ “Philosophy must perhaps start from the ‘subject’ and return to the ‘subject’ in
its ultimate questions, and yet, it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly subjectivistic
manner” (p. 10). Schrag also quotes the decontructionist, Jacque Derrida: “The subject
is absolutely indispensable. I don’t destroy the subject; I situate it. That is to say, I
believe that a certain level of experience and of philosophical and scientific discourse one
cannot get along without the notion of the subject” (p. 129). Said differently, inquiries
into meaning are meant to decentralize the authority of the ‘subject’ in the meaningmaking process, not to erase the relevance of the ‘subject.’ In decentering the ‘subject,
other contributions to meaning production can then be imported from the margins of
consideration into the relative center of the interpretive process.
Thus, I will next shift from a methodological emphasis upon the experience of the
person or ‘subject’ to an analysis of technology. Accordingly, in Step 3, I will interpret
the parameters associated with each research participant’s Internet site of communication
in a way that identifies forces motivating particular social practices. Fourth, I will pursue
a culturally and historically informed interpretive perspective by reading and interpreting
selected texts which elaborate on Western narratives regarding modern technology –
Western narratives which provide a background for understanding the experience of the
Internet. I will then circle back from Step 4 to Step 3 and integrate the two
interpretations into a technocultural-historical narrative. Finally, I will fashion a
situated global narrative of Internet subjectivity and sociality by integrating the
person-centered narrative and the technocultural-historical narrative into a unified
critical-hermeneutic account. The situated global narrative will therefore stand as an
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instantiation of how person-centered and cultural-historical processes contribute to the
construction of meaning, experience, and social actions.
In summary, the hermeneutic circle will be the interpretive device occasioning a
synthesis of the four steps leading up to the situated global narrative. Step 3 will
concretize the critical contribution to the interpretive process insofar as discursive
practices converging upon the local sites of Internet communication will be identified.
The four major steps comprising this critical-hermeneutic approach are reviewed below:
1) A descriptive-interpretive meaning analysis of each research participant’s
lived out meanings;
2) An interpretive analysis of interview material from research participants
regarding their understanding of life-situated meanings embedded in their
respective experiential descriptions. This analysis will also attend to the nonliteral meanings and life-situated contexts inextricably linked to language
usage.
3) An analysis of the locally situated forces influencing value formations and/or
social practices insofar as they are associated with the Internet site of
communication identified by each research participant.
4) A thematic analysis of landmark texts that elucidates the cultural-historical
backdrop of modern technology and its place in human existence
Partial justification for the achievement of this kind of situated global narrative is
founded upon the presupposition that while meaning and experiential phenomenon
appear within the holistic backdrop of discourse, meaning and experience cannot be
reduced exclusively to discursive production. Thus, my attentiveness to each research
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participant’s experiential description and interview is intended to reserve a narrative
place for the unique, creative, or marginalized meanings lived out by each person. Such
moments of creativity might be instantiated as practices linked to motivations
unsupported by the web of discourses encircling them.
That said, I as a human science researcher, contend that by taking into account
technocultural dreams of the future, a current profile of technoculture, and the historical
horizons of technoculture, we can enrich current understanding about the kind of subjects
we become amidst the embrace of Internet communication. By way of prologue to
articulating this empirical-critical-hermeneutic project, I will first attempt to lay bare
some of the contemporary representations already implicated in cyberculture rhetoric.
Literature Review
Images of the Future Handed Down from the Twentieth Century
Sometimes one can draw upon enduring cultural artifacts in order to inspire
imaginal understanding of ambiguous experiences. In doing so, Edward Murray (1986)
tells us that imagination, or “imaginizing,” can become an occasion for human being to
light up the scene of life. Said differently, imaginizing invites the horizon or ever-present
backdrop of the cultural imagination to reveal itself in a more differentiated manner. For
Murray, human beings are “bequeathed” the foundation of culture and tradition - and
thereupon the human being often uncritically “builds and functions” throughout everyday
existence. In order to articulate the kind of life imagined for us by culture, Murray
remarks that “having embodied the culture and traditions of our people, we can
imaginatively distance ourselves from such and in due time move toward an authentic
owning or even repudiation of the customs, values, or mores” (p. 69). In doing so,
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imaginizing speaks in an ornate non-literal tongue by hovering near the site of frozen
dominant discourses. Dwelling in this way allows for the retrieval of previously eclipsed
ambiguities at the heart of things. In the parlance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Madison,
1981), these kinds of “creative speech acts” (cf. epideictic) can issue forth new meanings
in the cultural world. New sounds and perspectives are thereby “torn” from language
insofar as the muted “intention to signify” is allowed to struggle to articulate its situated
offering. Bearing witness to the productive human power of imaginizing may then allow
for disenfranchised meanings to come into presence – to emerge more fully into
audibility and visibility. Indeed, this modest research inquiry acknowledges the pictorial
basis of language (viz., Egyptian hieroglyphics, ideograms of 15th century China and 6th
century Mesoamerica). And, as David Abram argues, acknowledgement of image can
become the condition of possibility for revivifying sensual human powers for knowing
the estranged “earthly world around us”(p. 94).
To that end, I will begin by identifying and dialoguing with a few of the
prevailing metaphors Western culture lives by in the next three sections. That is to say, I
will start by invoking a movement toward a more differentiated understanding of digitally
influenced metaphors which infuse average everyday existence.
The Cyborg. In the seminal essay “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway
(1991) characterizes this emerging inseparability of human and machine with the
compelling metaphor of the “cyborg.” “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” (p.
149). The potent image of Haraway’s cyborg neatly maps onto modernity’s burgeoning
proliferation of computer-outfitted persons opting to jack into computer-generated
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structures of reality via the Internet. Haraway’s feminist treatise, however, muses upon
such couplings as transgressive and irreverent: “The cyborg is resolutely committed to
partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity. It is oppositional, utopian, and completely
without innocence” (p.151). That is to say that when one is ‘cyborged,’ preconceptions
about what is natural and what is possible are radically called into question. Still quoting
Haraway:
Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect
its father to save it through a restoration of the garden . . . The cyborg would
not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream
of returning to dust . . . The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that
they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism,
not to mention state socialism. But illegitimate offspring are exceedingly
unfaithful to their origins. Their fathers, after all, are inessential.
(p.151)
As Haraway argues above for cyborg uniqueness, resistance, and “pleasure in the
confusion of boundaries” (p. 150), we can ask ourselves what it is to be confused in this
way; what is it to be simultaneously fused and con-fused?
Fusus, to be fused, means to pour or blend (Misch, 1999). Through the thorough
mixing of two disparate substances, merger into something new is made possible. In this
way, perhaps the fusion of human being with Internet technology gives rise to the
blurring of boundaries – a disavowal of differences in order to enhance compatibility.
Con-fusion, standing before or with fusion, may reflect the way in which the
undifferentiated state of what is near/far, real/imaginary, public/private, vital/fantastical,
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and human/machine is encountered by the cyborg without protest. In this disorienting
realm of previously unthought and unimagined transgressions of traditional thresholds,
there can be a continuum of experiences ranging from pleasurable immersion to
precipitous risk. One’s attentiveness to an ongoing explicit dialogue with this unexplored
terrain may help illuminate the “way,” that is, the emerging horizon of possibilities. But,
while cyborgs may entertain their fascination with the novelty of unexplored frontiers,
they may do well to remember that attempting to be “exceedingly unfaithful” to origins
still implies the presence of that which is repudiated. New fusions may not fully erase, as
Haraway would have it, the way in which one is bound up with “mud . . . . militarism and
. . . capitalism.”
“2001.” In a distinctive contrast to Haraway’s celebration of “blasphemy,” Joel
Achenbach’s (2000) millennial New Year’s Eve article in the Washington Post laments
some of the emblematic images found in Stanley Kubrick and Arthur Clarke’s film,
“2001: A Space Odyssey.”
The technology in “2001” – like much technology today – is
dehumanizing. The characters have been sapped of personality. Several
astronauts are in suspended animation, a state from which they are doomed
never to awake. Throughout the movie the food dispensed by machines is
disgusting to contemplate – The Future [sic] is intensely unappetizing.
Using a “picture phone,” the characters can communicate across
great distances of space, but it is hollow communication, innately cold,
burdened with platitudes. We see a man wishing his daughter happy
birthday, but he tells her he can’t be at her party. He has to go to the
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Moon. Technology is supposed to ease the pain of separation, but it
also makes it possible. Today we are wired to global-spanning networks.
We can send countless e-mails, work the phone nonstop, even stay in
touch with wireless gadgets – and never pause long enough to have what
amounts to a real conversation.
Are we masters of our technology – or slaves to it? (p. B5)
Achenbach’s disenchantment is as much about Kubrick and Clarke’s dystopian prophetic
images of homeless, insular, disengagement as with the “wired” state of post-millennial
relationships. Where Achenbach expresses distress over a putative decline in “real”
encounters, the reader is left to infer that by “real” Achenbach equates direct physical
communication with a vital and energized way of being with the other. And yet, a literal
and metaphorical protest pervades Achenbach’s characterization of “2001” and its
lukewarm passion for tête à tête, embodied relations. Achenbach seems to sense that
such relations end up pervaded by an implicit understanding that something else trumps
the importance of direct human encounter – the Moon awaits! And yet, what might the
importance of the Moon mean? In this particular instance, it appears that destination
Moon is not inspired by some enchanting quixotic quest; it is not inspired by an epic
(space) odyssey in the spirit of Homer’s Odysseus - but rather, the lunar trip fulfills the
requirements of the state. The journey is a work related trip – a functional activity - and a
dispassionate one at that. Kubrick and Clarke seem to have poignantly framed the
emotional/emotionless life of a family by situating its configuration within the context of
work, virtual communication, and separation.
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“The Matrix.” A third contemporary image rounds out this introduction. In Joel
Silver’s (1999) cyberfuture production of the sequel bound film, “The Matrix,” the
audience is brought to the ultra-cool limits of simulation ecstasy. The directors transport
the sedentary spectators into the visually and acoustically stunning future world where
infants have been permanently and unknowingly wired into computer-generated
simulations of Earth by tyrannical Artificial Intelligence machines. A small band of
renegade revolutionary hackers are aware of this deception. Collectively, they are able to
travel back and forth between the simulated world and the post-apocalyptic earth. They
do this with full knowledge that the virtual world is more outlandishly real than, for
instance, Jean Baudriallard’s (1983) “hyperreality.” For Baudrillard the “real” has
become a hyperreal world where simulations not only constitute “reality,” they also lack
any intelligible referent to the “desert of the real” – a desert which is exemplified in
extreme form by the desolate and despoiled planet Earth of “The Matrix.” Thus, in “The
Matrix,” the price of virtual life is the loss of recognition that simulation (simulacra) are
maps of a territory which stylishly and ecstatically entrance the masses such that they fail
to see that, “[s]imulation is . . . the generation by models of a real without origin or
reality: a hyperreal” (p. 2).
Throughout “The Matrix,” the monotony of the “real” world pales in comparison
to virtual “life.” The revolutionary hackers’ computer generated doppelgangers, divested
of their all-to-human physical bodies, perform tantalizing, earth-defying, posthuman
martial arts stunts thrilling the moviegoers with special effects which surpass the
audiences’ theretofore wildest fantasies. Nevertheless, the hackers stand opposed to this
mesmerizing illusion, relentlessly attempting to liberate the masses in the name of
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restoring the freedom to choose between inhabiting a virtual world or facing the stark
reality of a severely decayed planet. In a telling scene midway through the film one of
the hackers, Cypher, foreshadows awareness of this all-important choice. The Judas-like
Cypher ultimately opts to betray his freedom fighting comrades. During a clandestine
meeting with the Artificial Intelligence constructs at an upscale virtual restaurant, Cypher
eats a sumptuous steak while aptly summarizing his compelling rationale for being
reinserted “into” the Matrix and forgetting his life outside the Matrix: “I know this steak
doesn’t really exist. I know that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain
that it is juicy and delicious. After nine years, you know what I realize? (Cypher gives
an ecstatic sigh while chewing his simulated steak) Ignorance is bliss” (Silver, 1999).
What is at ‘stake,’ so to speak, for Cypher appears to be a resounding echo of a
lived virtual dilemma: Should one be concerned with the difference between cyberdreaming that one is happy and contented over against one’s being awake and conscious
of “real” (dis)satisfaction? Moreover, why not plug into virtual happiness if the “real” is
so unappealing? If the “real” is analogous to “electrical signals interpreted by your
brain” (Silver, 1999) and there is no guarantee of existence outside those signals (cf.
solipsism), then what is the danger of living “inside” a computer-generated program?
In some ways, cultural icons like that of “The Matrix,” “2001,” and the cyborg
amplify a dilemma often evoked by radically new and pervasive technologies - nostalgia
for the “real” over against visionary rhapsodies calling the polis forward into potentially
liberating frontiers. “The Matrix” seems to suggest that a dystopian stance toward the
gigantic pervasiveness of virtual technologies is called for. And while “2001” may
remind us of the potential loss of our humanity, Haraway’s cyborg metaphor references a
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call to emancipatory transgression and transcendence. For these reasons, this study
grounds an understanding of the effects of Internet life through interpretation of
experiential reports which are understood against the backdrop of cultural, historical, and
‘imaginatively’ informed perspectives.
The Scope of the Virtual Mis-en-Scène. Twenty-first century human beings
find themselves ensconced in digital technologies that either mediate or replace corporeal
encounters. The proliferation of human interchanges with their mechanized counterparts
include voice mail, pagers, fax machines, wireless Palms, Personal Digital Assistants
(PDAs) with connectivity, Web-ready mobile phones, Internet Instant Messaging, picture
email, streaming video/audio – to name a few (e.g., Marshal, 2002; Captain, 2002;
Rykens, 2002; Rivlin, 2001; Csatari, 2001). Institutionalized trends involving
communication technology and human interaction are also evident. According to Edward
Cornish (1996) the technosocial movement toward “real time” distance learning classes,
virtual corporations that rely on mobile communication technology, online shopping, and
electronic-town meetings are among the many cultural signs that the human technology
interface has become pervasively entwined in human affairs. Manifold versions of
communication technology have become Western civilization’s desideratum. From the
viewpoint of cultural commentator, Mark Slouka (1995), humanity has become
“wrapped” in technology. As the North American population converges en masse onto
the electronic frontier - framed by the likes of America Online (AOL), The Microsoft
Network (MSN), and Netscape - it may be that the rhythms of nature recede in the face of
the pervasive technological rhythms of “point and click,” “send,” and “you’ve got mail.”
According to Don Tapscot (1998) in Growing Up Digital: The Rise of the Net
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Generation, the Internet is providing the occasion for a “communication revolution”
through its impact on the plugged-in Net-Generation (N-Gen). The N-Genners comprise
30 percent of the population in the United States; the largest generational cohort to date.
This group represents the offspring of the Baby Boomers (29 percent). Hence, they are
often referred to as the Baby Boom Echo. Tapscot argues that the N-Genners (5-25 years
old), are the first cohort to have grown up with the Net as part of its milieu, or at least
with digital technology as a familiar part of their world. Among other considerations,
Tapscot claims that Net communication technology dissolves traditional notions of
authority. For instance, as Netgen kids outpace adults in their knowledge of the Internet,
they have also become more self-reliant and sophisticated in networking through
personalized home pages and audio/video broadcasting. “Increasingly, young people are
the masters of the interactive environment and their fate in it” (p. 26). In addition, the
movement away from the passivity associated with television viewing, to the more
interactive quality of the Net has given rise to a generation of youth who are in the words
of Sherry Turkle, “empower[ed] . . . to confront, learn, and deal with . . . issues in a
constructive way” (p. 126). Patterns of subjectivity and sociality are undergoing
metamorphosis in the new millennium.
My interest, therefore, is in forging a culturally situated psychological inquiry into
the burgeoning expansion of the Internet, as a communication technology. This research
is geared toward filling a relative absence of literature which critically examines
experiential reports of subjectivity and sociality as an effect of barely visible discourses
of Western culture.
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As a way of attending to issues of power and enframing, this literature review is
organized around psychological, techno-cultural, continental, and critical thought
pertinent to electronically mediated relations (EMRs). In order to complement or even
offset the current speculative theory and objective research, this inquiry offers a criticalhermeneutic perspective providing experience-near renderings of EMR’s as a culturally
situated phenomenon. I therefore suggest that research participant experiential
descriptions will provide insight into both the lived experience and the referential
“matrix” of those engaged in Internet relations.
Before proceeding with a discussion of EMR’s, the where and who of Internet
communication must be clarified. Popular culture and technoculture literature refer to the
where of communication as “cyberspace.” Paradoxically, the place of cyberspace is both
a somewhere and a nowhere; and though we may associate cyberspace with the computer
screen, the sense of Internet spatiality seems to both include and transcend notions of
screenal reality.
Cyberspace Explored. The term cyberspace, was first introduced in William
Gibson’s (1984) cybercult classic, Neuromancer. In this seminal cyberpunk vision of the
future, Gibson refers to cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination.” Gibson’s ethereal
rendering suggests that human encounter through the Internet rests upon a mutual
agreement to ‘meet in’ an unworldly imaginary domain. Human beings leave Earth and
join others in the disincarnate realm of fantasy.
Robert Romanyshyn (1994) further augments the metaphorical understanding of
cyberspace by suggesting that the astronaut body readied for departure from Earth has
now become the cybernaut launched to the “inner space” sea of digitized images. For
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Romanyshyn, both of these metaphorically lived bodies are no longer animated by full
sensual immersion in the world. Each lived-out bodily orientation has been severed from
its earthly context. As such, both bodies are poised to explore realms which transcend
immediate physical surroundings. Romanyshyn laments that the body, decontextualized
from its immediate world, becomes a functional tool, a spectator, which in effect narrows
its sensual hold on the world to visual perception. According to Romanyshyn, the
cultural-historical understanding of the body as an anatomical object signified the
culmination of the dream of technological consciousness “to distance itself from the
world and from the flesh that ties us to the world” (p. 94). By extension, Romanyshyn
observes, that our age is now marked by cyberspace dreams where a new analogue to the
astronaut body has emerged in the guise of the “dream body.” The sign of the dream
body represents a dis-integration into a cybernaut that “does not dwell in the things that
surround it . . . the cyberbody haunts the things of its virtual world” (p. 95). Furthermore,
it exists with “a mind independent of the biology of bodies” (96). In either case, both of
the metaphorically lived bodies are not “ensouled” for Romanyshyn. Each lived-out
body has, instead, incarnated the (programmed) technological dream or ‘soul’ of its era
thereby risking the loss of a “sense of home.” For Romanyshyn, cyberspace becomes in
effect another occasion for leaving one’s senses and inhabiting denatured dream worlds.
A third and perhaps more concrete view characterizes cyberspace as set of images
generated by computer technology, or rather, software generated representations which
substitute for “reality” (Gelerneter, 1991). Here the imaginal aspect is conspicuously
absent and replaced by an emphasis on the materiality of the electronic environment.
Differences aside, Kevin Robins (1995) would likely agree that all three perspectives
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implicitly or explicitly support the notion that cyberspace solicits the computer user to
turn “a blind eye on the world we live in” (p. 135).
In average everyday EMR practice, the Internet opens onto several interactive
domains. Specifically, netizens can be found communing in a variety of configured
social spaces. A vast array of topical, interest driven, romantic, or cybersex interactions
comprise the burgeoning number of chat rooms available to those interested in text-based
modes of relating. Other text-based environments, like MUDs (multi-user domains),
invite game playing and linguistic constructions with one or more online persona. Or,
one can access a virtual community replete with images of cityscapes and self
constructed avatars of oneself and one’s electronic interlocutors. In effect, the online
user can entertain the belief that he or she has “stepped through” the screen into textbased or visual landscapes where relational narratives are co-designed, abruptly severed,
or seemingly precluded by a teeming swirl of disconnected declarative outbursts. Amidst
these scenarios, relationships or communities endure or dissolve depending on the nature
of commitment enacted by its participants.
In light of the cyberspace discussion hitherto, it appears that cyberspace is a
liminal term that simultaneously gestures toward the concrete words and images framed
by technological hardware, while also pointing to the imaginal space solicited by the
shroud of Internet distance and incorporeality.
Digital Subjectivity. The next question to be addressed involves the who of
Netspace communication. Many Net enthusiasts and academics have designated this who
with the name of the ambiguous figure known as “cyborg.” The term cyborg was first
introduced in 1960 by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (1960), two researchers
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involved in medical investigations for the United States space program. Clynes and
Kline proposed to develop a project with the express purpose of integrating humans with
machines. Their objective was to optimize the body’s capacity to survive in alien
environments; in particular, to survive environments associated with space travel.
Mechanical enhancements of the flesh were designed to provide automatic or
“unconscious regulation of the cyborg’s homeostatic functions vis à vis unfavorable deep
space conditions. For some cyborg commentators (e.g., Halacy, 1965; Tomas, 1995), the
erstwhile human, now partially altered or “enhanced,” finds itself freed from factical
limitations on its way to becoming a “superman” or “superwoman.”
By contrast, Haraway appropriated the cyborg image into her “informatics of
domination” and reconfigured its meaning into a metaphor for the feminist subversion of
oppressive identity constructions. Haraway envisioned the cyborg as enabling an
oppositional form of consciousness at the forefront of movement toward a post-gender
world. The cyborg became a figure committed to perversity and the transgression of
totalizing political inscriptions of nature (and the female body). For Haraway, then, the
sign of the cyborg was to be extended beyond its coding as a solution to the Clynes and
Kline body-outer space dilemma. The focus was, instead, to be shifted to seizing
oppressive technological tools in order to “interface in nearly infinite, polymorphous
ways” (p. 163). Historical constructions of the body could then be overcome by weaving
together new social networks which provide possibilities for being freed from dominant
discourses. Recrafting identities and bodies becomes an active and productive stance for
Haraway. “The cyborg is not subject to Foucault’s biopolitics, the cyborg simulates
politics, a much more potent field of operations’ (p. 163). Whether or not Haraway’s
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subversive stance is a part of Internet sociality will be called into question by the research
protocols employed in this study.
Haraway’s perspective is certainly not the only way to understand humanmachine fusions. Thus, I will now proceed to elucidate a variety of representative
perspectives on embodiment and subjectivity. I hope to broaden or “deepen” the
referential context in which the cyborg subject can be located. This contextualization
will include discussion of the physiological perspective, technocultural perspective,
psychological perspective, Continental perspective, and a critical theory perspective.
The Physiological Perspective
In Fred Evans’ (1993) Psychology and Nihilism, he sets out upon a genealogical
study of the cybernetic organization of the human “mind.” In short, Evans argues that
cognitive psychology adopts a computer model of mind as the ideal description of mental
activity. Evans claims that the cognitive sciences have reduced mental actions to
computational processes. Moreover, cognitivism arose from the hegemony of rationality
which contributed to spawning the machine model of consciousness – a model that
effectively denies or devalues other modalities of human existence. Where Evans locates
a field of discourses signifying consciousness as cybernetically organized, I suggest that
the medical field has analogously propagated an understanding of the anatomical body as
machine-like.
Upon consultation of the classic text of the biological sciences, Gray’s Anatomy
(Williams, Warwick, Dyson, & Bannister, 1989), it becomes evident that the natural
science study of the anatomical body centers its attention on both the structural form and
the biological processes which comprise the human anatomy. With regard to biological
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processes, the reader is instructed that the organic body is fundamentally a cellular
organism. The human body begins as a single cell; it matures towards infancy through
the multiplication and differentiation of cells; and finally, it approaches mortality not
long after cellular duplication comes to a halt. The biological end of cellular division is
referred to as the Hayflick Limit (Travis, 1998). When human cells have divided on
average, fifty times, the cellular clock comes to a halt. Thus, mortal human destiny is
posited as genetically coded – finitude, in the form of the Hayflick Limit, is largely
preprogrammed. That is to say, the anatomical biological clock places limits on
longevity; and within those Hayflick parameters we can acknowledge our bodily
dependence on the external environment for sustaining life long enough to exhaust the
limits of our biological clock. The organism’s capacity for ongoing interaction with its
environment serves not only as an occasion for survival, but also as a significant support
for the reproduction and maintenance of structural integrity (e.g., skeletal structure).
In addition, the reader learns that physiology is the wellspring from which the
epiphenomenon of consciousness emerges. The nervous system, which is comprised of
bioelectrical networks of communication, enables the organism to detect and adaptively
respond to fluctuations in internal homeostasis. In scenarios where environmental stimuli
affect changes in internal states, behaviors are understood as mere communicative
responses designed to alter the organism’s response to the stimulus. Consciousness thus
becomes a secondary effect of tension states that serve to trigger behaviors aimed at
reestablishing optimal bodily equilibrium. This materialist premise conflates biomechanical processes with an understanding of “mind” in such a way that the “contents”
of mind merely reflect the data of machine-like interactions with the environment.
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The naturalist view of the factical human body outlined thus far suggests that
physiological discourse posits human behavior, communication, and consciousness as
linked to the experience of bodily disequilibrium. This mechanistic view constructs
human embodiment as dependent upon environmental resources in such a way that
adaptive responses are merely a montage of wide ranging “instinctual” coping styles.
In a positive sense, the medical discourse implicitly acknowledges a fundamental
relationship between mind/body and person/world. There is a profile of experiential truth
here. To be sure, as human beings we do sometimes explicitly acknowledge our
organismic susceptibility and vulnerability to environmental fluctuations (e.g., blight,
extreme temperature change). As such, we are reminded that the project of survival
compellingly solicits our attentiveness to basic biological processes (e.g., eating,
sleeping, hygiene). However, the “survival instinct” will inevitably be thwarted and we
will eventually encounter our finitude – if not through the contingency of existence or
disease, then through exhausting our predetermined cellular Hayflick Limit. This implies
that the mind presides over a factically flawed body and that human embodiment is lived
as a vulnerable body in relation to its world. Do such dualistic assumptions about
mind/body and nonunitary assumptions about person/world relatedness inform the
contours of human existence? We will eventually examine how these beliefs may be
implicated in one’s participation in EMRs. Furthermore, we will ask whether the notions
of dualism and person/world separateness can be supplemented or even modified by a
human anthropology of lived experience. But first, we will continue to pursue the
implications of mapping the human body through the codings derived from machine
metaphors.
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Among the consequences of objectifying the human body as an organic machine
includes the temptation to view inorganic machines as virtually compatible counterparts
of human physiology. Following from this discourse, the cyborg can be understood as
the seamless marriage of two functionally equivalent forms of matter. Indeed, Shankar
Vedantam (2001) reported on groundbreaking research out of the Max Planck Institute
for Biochemistry (MPIB) in Germany where multiple brain cells from snails have been
successfully meshed with silicon chips thereby forming a “part-mechanical, part-living
electronic circuit.” The preeminent goal of researching this interface between biology
and technology is to develop prosthetics which function as a more responsive extension
of the human nervous system (e.g., artificial retinas) than the limited computational
functionality of silicon chips. Given the MPIB objective of overcoming mechanical
circuit insufficiency, it is interesting to note that the assumption of body-machine
equivalence is not a founding principle of the MPIB project. Quite the contrary, organic
embodiment is seen as much more versatile:
Nerve cells in the brain find each other, strengthen connections and
build patterns through complex chemical signaling that is driven in
part by the environment . . .
Silicon chips, on the other hand, can perform specific functions
with great reliability and speed, but have limited responsiveness to the
environment and almost no ability to alter themselves according to need.
(p. A3)
A compelling phenomenological explanation of bodily complexity can be found
in Merleau-Ponty’s (1942) work, The Structure of Behavior. Therein, Merleau-Ponty
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provides a rigorous demonstration that the physical order (e.g., ions, chemicals) and the
vital order (e.g., tissue, organs) of human existence are not intelligible without due
consideration given to the human order. It is the human order, in situ, where experiences
of context bound meaning subsume and organize biological functions. Hence, a molar
analysis of embodiment in its relation to environment can shed light upon the failure of
silicon chips, in and of themselves, to achieve the same adaptability and versatility of a
human nerve cell. The silicon chip requires an interface with the context infused vital
and human order. “The idea is to combine the mechanical abilities of electronic circuits
with the extraordinary complexity and intelligence of the human brain” (Vedantam, 2001,
p. A3).
In either case, the existential truth of the biological and the phenomenological
perspectives is that human embodiment is mortal. Naturalist researcher’s may, however,
be in pursuit of research designed to enhance the human body in a way that surpasses its
taken for granted organic limitations. Preoccupations with human exemptions to bodily
finiteness have brought medical researchers to the threshold of “posthuman” possibilities
promising to overcome bodily frailties. Borrowing from Immortality, Ben Bova’s (1998)
upbeat and credulously optimistic overview of biomedical research, one encounters a
fantastical vision:
As the American immunoligist William R. Clark put it, “Death is
not inextricably intertwined with the definition of life.” Just because
human beings have always died does not mean they always will die.
[D]eath from old age, death as the inescapable end of life, will
become a thing of the past, a dark memory of primitive days.
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You might be one of the immortals (p. 3).
Throughout his book, Bova goes on to recount life-extension research breakthroughs
associated with gene therapy, embryonic stem cell research, fetal tissue transplants,
telomeric regeneration, and nanotechnology. For Bova, each of these research domains
holds out the promise that immortality “is within sight” if conservative institutions such
as law and religion give up the need to maintain the status quo. From my perspective, it
follows that where humans are understood to be like machines, or at least as structured
like machines, we may well find that the fantasies of transcending finite existence
continue to abound – whether that be in the form of overcoming everyday limitations, or
in the form of entertaining beliefs that one can shed the mortal coil. The notion that
malfunctioning organic or mechanical body parts (e.g., pacemakers, mechanical hearts,
computer chips that restore vision), can be repaired, replaced, or upgraded ad infinitum
may sustain efforts to promote human-machine fusions.

Do such aspirations partially

inform the current migration onto the electronic frontier?
To be sure, when human being joins with technology, one’s powers can be
extended, but to what degree and toward what meaning? Dreams of immortality
notwithstanding, what else might we consider about the possibilities afforded by humantechnology fusions? Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) cogently underscores a lived
perspective on the relations between humans and technology in The Phenomenology of
Perception. “Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s
natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself
a cultural world” (p. 146). If this is the case, to what sociocultural end might humanity
poise itself when imagining “bodily synthesis” with machines and, moreover, when
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uncritically donning the “bodily auxiliary” of Internet garb? Sigmund Freud (1961)
discussed the implications of human-machine fusions in Civilization and its Discontents.
At the time of its publication, Freud was commenting upon the significance of the
technology of the 1930s. Advanced instruments like the Internet did not exist. Thus, it
might be said that Freud’s words were remarkably prophetic:
Long ago he [sic] formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and
omniscience which he embodies in his gods. To these gods, he attributed
everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes or that was forbidden
to him. One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals.
To-day he has come very close to the attainment of his ideal . . .
Man [sic] has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic god. (pp. 42-43)
In light of Freud’s far-reaching notion of the “prosthetic god,” is it not fair to ask
if Western culture has been seduced into striving for a supracultural ideal which extols a
new mode of being aimed at surpassing bodily finitude (e.g., overcoming space-time
barriers)? By extension, are Internet users implicitly or explicitly gratified by the
experience of making interpersonal connections with others beyond the reach of the
“body’s natural means?” And if so, following Merleau-Ponty, then what cultural world is
projected around humanity? Specifically, as the North Americas becomes E-mericanized
through embracing the transborder (space-time defying) technology of the Internet, is
Western culture in the process of producing a human abode where mediated relationality
is meant to serve as a satisfying substitute for shared bodily presence? In order to address
such a question in this study, it was methodologically productive to expand upon
Merleau-Ponty and Freud by reading research participant protocols and wondering about
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the ways in which EMRs participate in organizing human relatedness to one’s embodied
self and that of embodied others. Where the Internet allows human beings to overcome
the strictures of geography and time, an experientially informed inquiry into the kind of
psychological, social, and cultural world provides grounding for abstract theoretical
speculations about the electronic world projected around humanity. Embarking upon this
kind of inquiry may allow for eclipsed aspects of human existence to be illuminated in a
manner which might more effectively situate naturalist discourse on physiology.
Technocultural Veiw
Just as the cyborg neologism may locate part of its lineage within physiological
discourse, the cultural past of the Internet shares part of its ancestry with the military
industrial complex; specifically with that of the Department of Defense. The
technoculture observer, Mark Dery (1996), recounts how a grant awarded to the
University of California, Los Angeles, led to the spawning of a military communication
network known as ARPANet (a.k.a. the Internet) in 1969. During and after 1983 the
Internet was subdivided into military, civilian, and National Science Foundation
networks. It was not until the 1990s that commercial services like America Online and
Compuserve came into prominence.
Mind-bogglingly, the Internet is itself a part of a still larger complex of
interconnected networks commonly called the Matrix, which also includes
UseNet (a buzzing hive of discussion groups called “newsgroup”), FidoNet
(a constellation of over twenty thousand BBSs scattered over six continents),
and BITNET (Because its Time Network, an academic network) among
others. (pp. 5-6)
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With the then influential magazines like WIRED and Mondo 2000, the anarchic
cyberspace culture found a partial outlet for the recording, recoding, and dissemination of
its birthing process. For instance, with the civilian portion of the Internet free to develop
without direct military purview, the early 1990s became a time when the emerging
commercial space of the Internet was largely unregulated. According to Douglas
Rushkoff in Cyberia: Life in the Trenches of Cyberspace (1994), the new frontier of
cyberspace in the early 1990s attracted virtual reality entrepreneurs, psychedelic
experimenters, underground computer hackers, neo pagans, and other pioneers. The
fringe quality of the first-stage social demographic comprising cyberspace formed a
backcloth for unusual ideas about consciousness and embodiment. The question
concerning transcendence, as a form of E-volution, was pervasive.
Robert Romanyshyn (1989) provided a sober historical account of the relationship
between transcendence, embodiment, and technology in Technology as Symptom and
Dream. Romanyshyn spoke of the body as a social construction. He described the dream
of technology as one which prepared the body to abandon nature, hence, to abandon
earth. Romanyshyn demonstrated how estrangement from the fundamental ground of
nature was perpetuated to such an extent that the human capacity for seeing in a richly
meaningful was eclipsed. For example, the origin of the linear perspective in the art of
fifteenth-century Italy became an occasion for human beings to experience the spectacle
of the world at a distance. Through this detachment the spectator became a passive
participant. The imaginal eye withered while at the same time the world died in the wake
of its newly signified irrelevance. In turn, the body became a “corpse” as its sensuous
attachment to the world was no longer held to be pertinent, and as the anatomical gaze
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took precedence in defining the body. Ironically, the view of the body as corpse – along
with related Cartesian implications - has become hyperbolized in some of the current
mythopoetic rhapsodizing of cyberculture.
In a manner analogous to Romanyshyn’s thought, Dery documented the liberal
contemporary speculation encouraging Net dwellers to embrace the dream of “escape
velocity” – the speed required by one body (e.g., space craft) to overcome the
gravitational pull of a larger body (e.g., planet) and break free from the larger body’s
gravitational pull. This belief has been translated into a project of technological
transcendence where cyberia (an interesting acoustic neighbor to Siberia) is endowed
with the potential to open a space for “mind” to jettison the body and immerse itself into
the global network of cyberspace. Pure Cartesian mind leaves the body and merges with
machine. As a result, the illusion of overcoming corporeal finitude is symbolically
achieved. Immortality is thought to be attained. This subculture folklore, which
denigrates bodily existence, stands in antipodal contrast to Irwin Straus’ (1952)
phenomenological understanding that the “human physique reveals nature” through the
upright posture and its corollary coordination of motility, gesture, and lived body
sensorium. By contrast, the cyberian view of the body is one in which the body is
somehow an impediment to the realization of one’s full potential to transcend finitude.
Simon Perry (1994), professor of Art and Robotics at Carnegie Mellon
University, has addressed the relationship of the embodied computer user’s relation to
sophisticated virtual environments. As software programming increasingly mimics and
“organic” feel and “greater mimesis” in graphic representations, the computer user may
be more inclined to view his or her body as a “meat body.” This meat body operates in
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the limited service of pressing keys in order for action to occur within these compelling
computer generated landscapes. The “mind” wanders across the seductive images of
cyberspace while the body is left to perform mundane keyboard tasks. Here, Perry seems
to echo Romanyshyn and Dery’s sentiment that the computer user’s body reveals itself as
an impediment to full imaginal immersion in cyberrealities. If this is typically the case,
the overcoming of finitude indeed becomes a lived awareness of the body as a nuisance;
as an obstacle to transcendence. Perry may have failed to recognize that the wandering
“mind” in cyberspace implicates the use of vision to perceive images and text; and this
necessity for seeing suggests the profound impossibility of entirely jettisoning
embodiment in cyberspace.
Moreover, it has been suggested that as cyberdenizens become accustomed to
watching worlds through electronic windows, the value of the natural environment has
also been demoted in status (Slouka, 1995). As if prefiguring the dramatic tension
between the real and the virtual in “The Matrix,” Slouka suggests that the first hand
experience of the embodied world pales in comparison to contemporary electronic
simulations of encounter. According to Slouka, an ontological inversion has occurred
where inside has become outside and absence has become presence. It may be no small
coincidence that the denigration of direct encounter on the Internet is analogous to the
military industrial complex privileging of technological advancement over the
preservation of nature. To be sure, a critical-hermeneutic inquiry can be an effective
vehicle for illuminating dualistic inscriptions contributing to the be-coming of the cyborg
figure.
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Psychological Perspective
In Kenneth Gergen’s (1991) The Saturated Self, he announces that, “A new
culture is in the making” based on a competition for relational time (p. 3). According to
Gergen, the proliferation of communication technologies (e.g., electronic communication
technologies) “make it possible to sustain relationships – either directly or indirectly –
with an ever expanding range of other persons. In many respects we are reaching what
may be viewed as a state of social saturation” (p. 3). In light of this social saturation, the
challenges afforded by competition for relational time can initially leave one “numb” and
overcome by “unfulfilled obligations” according to Gergen. In the long run, however,
Gergen suggests that the invitation to immerse oneself in opportunities for global social
connection can give rise to significant psychological and social transformations.
Gergen claims that mild forms of social saturation began in the low-tech
nineteenth century with its reliance on the railroad, the telegraph, and the public postal
service. In the twentieth century, America was introduced to the telephone, the
automobile, the airplane, radio broadcasting, television, and motion pictures. For Gergen
these technological innovations increased the number and broadened the range of
relational others available to the individual. As the self was increasingly populated by
“an infusion of possible identities,” dilemmas of identity followed (p. 6). Romanticist
and modernist notions of the self, as respectively “deep” or “rational,” were called into
question as technologically informed social arrangements highlighted a plurality of
voices and selves clamoring for recognition and legitimacy. This plurality of selves and
differing perspectives subverted notions of certainty and thereby inaugurated a
postmodern awareness that assumptions regarding bounded identity were unfounded.
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Gergen goes on to outline the features of a communal landscape where increasing
involvement in electronically mediated interactions have saturated everyday sociality to
such an extent that a broadened “range of fractional relationships further dissipates family
functions” (p. 180).
In summary, Gergen argues that relational time in the postmodern world is
frequently embedded in technological forms of relating. This accelerating trend is
resulting in increased numbers of fragmented incorporeal relations which are gradually
replacing face-to-face involvement in “deep” connections. Furthermore, exposure to the
burgeoning multiplicity of postmodern perspectives, hitherto unavailable in the preInternet era, has made possible the erosion of the essentialist experience of a core or
“true” self. Instead, people become “fractal selves” who engage in fractal relationships
thereby setting the stage for a diminution of committed relationships and “authentic”
encounters. The need for self-coherence finds itself impeded by technology’s exposure
of the individual to an increased range of perspectives that transcend viewpoints held by
one’ local community. The individual becomes multivoiced on a surface level leading to
a “multiphrenia.” By multiphrenia, Gergen means an expansive “acquisition of multiple
and disparate potentials for being” which has arisen, in apart, from the individual’s
engagement with technologies of relationship (p. 69). Thus, the co-constructive process
gives rise to an individual who is “populated” by many voices and who in turn exploits
technology for its potential to provide increased numbers of relationships. A
multiplication of fractal selves are thereby engaging in fractal relationships which set the
stage for a diminution of committed relationships and “authentic” encounters. For
example, the monogamous lover might become an individual with a number of “friendly
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lovers.” The individual engaged in depthful local community connections could become
the globally linked cyborg networked in “social saturation.”
In contrast to Gergen, Mark Poster (1995) claims that the dream world of
cyberspace can evoke a “narcissistic stupor.” Poster employs Wim Winder’s film, “Until
the End of the World,” where the characters become mesmerized by a technological
device allowing them to view their dreams. Their absorption is so compelling that they
live in utter disregard for the lives of others in the world. As Romanyshyn (1988)
cautions in an earlier work, this loss of corporeal communion can lead to depression; but
not depression qua medical illness. Depression for Romanyshyn signifies a path to be
trodden. It “is a matter of going home . . . it is not an illness to be cured” (p. 227). Here
again, the implication by both Romanyshyn and Poster is that excessive engagement in
virtual spaces may result in a depletion of involvement in one’s shared corporeal world.
Hence, immersion in these simulated representations, may lead to a path-ological
condition which can be overlooked with regard to its potent meaning. Following from
Heidegger (1962), the ensuing depression might be understood as an uncanny mood of
dis-ease signifying that one’s neglected relational possibilities have been passed over in
favor of immersion in a tranquilizing form of alienation from one’s genuine possibilities.
If there are dystopian aspects of cyberspace with the potential to evoke alienation
from one’s own being, it would seem that the task of an Internet culture psychology
would be to demystify the romanticization of the Internet as a tool for transcendence, self
realization, and genuine forms of relating. An understanding of the unsalutary potentials
concealed by overly optimistic marketing and misinformation can serve the psychology
field and Net dwellers in both proactive and reactive ways. Cyborg responses to the
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economic and philosophical discourse on the nature of the self may concretely illuminate
the lived significance of these trends.
Kevin Robins (1995) is a critic of the utopian flights of fancy heralding the
cybertechnology revolution as a domain for glimpsing “heaven” and reviving conviviality
amidst a world gone wrong. Within this context, Robins views cyberspace as an
imaginary realm where cyborgs are invited to dwell in communally constructed fictions.
He argues, however, that the fantasies of cyberspace promote infantile omnipotent
strivings associated with the domination of nature. These fantasies can be particularly
compelling in a world where individuals may feel dis-empowered and perhaps politically
insignificant. The virtual sense of omnipotence solicited by cyberspace engagement
becomes a condition for the possibility of acting upon potentially volatile delusions about
possessing supreme magical powers. When these fantasies are conflated with the crisis
of identity invoked by the ontological reframing of the self as multiple, fluid, and
alterable, identity confusion may set in. Understanding oneself as an unbounded
cyberspace body may engender experiences of fragmentation. As a result, cyberworld
relationships may evidence a deterioration of normative ethics and confusion around
social meaning. It is within this kind of social terrain that Robins envisions regressions to
narcissistic forms of relating as commonplace. Pushed to an extreme, the privileging of
impulsive gratification of wishes and desires may for some evoke overwhelming anxiety
in the face of a postmodern dissolution of identity resulting in a retreat to the hallucinated
omnipotence of childhood.
If and how often some of these cyber scenarios are enacted was a question in this
study. In the foregoing work Robins offers what seems to be a plausible conjecture
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grounded in mainstream psychological theory. This critical-hermeneutic inquiry shifts
the focus away from a theoretical inquiry to an experience-near illumination of the
various subject-world dialogues extant in cyberspace.
Having demythologized the utopian potentials of cyberspace, Robins goes on to
consider generative transformative possibilities. Robins acknowledges Donald
Winnicott’s understanding of imagination as a “potential space” which gives rise to
creative capacities and to creative infantile illusions which work in the service of
“maturation.” For instance, incremental maternal failures to gratify the omnipotent
desires of a child become the occasion for that child to encounter limitations in a
minimally traumatizing manner. The deflation of illusory omnipotence eventually opens
the child to forming interdependent relations with others. Here then, Robins is
acknowledging that the Internet can present itself as an opening onto a Winnicottian
“transitional space” which enhances possibilities for egalitarian relations insofar as the
disincarnate feel of cyberspace does not supplant the understanding that an embodied
other is always implicated in EMRs.
Unlike Robins theoretical approach to understanding virtuality, Sherry Turkle
(1995) provided an interview based cyberculture analysis in her landmark work, Life on
the Screen. Turkle utilized observation, participation, and interview methods in her
investigation into modern day cyborgs. She put together a cultural profile informed by
self-reports of lived out experience. Turkle found that the Internet has become the theater
for individual and collective communication and enactment of fantasy (e.g., intellectual,
romantic, erotic). The cyborg can explore a variety of social possibilities as either a
spectator or participant. Participation in these disembodied social scenes (e.g., WELLs,
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MUDs, MUSEs) affords the netdweller an opportunity to reconstruct a dizzying number
of alternate self (mis)representations. One simply has to create and “project” these
representations onto the “other side” of the screen. The postmodern decentered self is
afforded the opportunity to experiment with previously unexpressed identities (e.g.,
gender swapping). For some of Turkle’s interviewees, the opportunity to “morph”
allowed one to step into and perhaps gain insight into another worldview. As one female
interviewee described it, morphing on the Internet becomes a form of “simulation as
consciousness raising.” Re-representation of oneself holds out transformative
possibilities. Disembodied states expand one’s range of relational possibilities and calls
forth theretofore unlived modes of living one’s identity.
Turkle found that the establishment of relationships in various cyber communities
did not necessarily guarantee happy self-transformations. In the case of Stuart, he
enjoyed a rich fantasy life in one of the interactive MUDs. His involvement in the MUD
eventually led to a “cyberspace marriage.” Even in the face of establishing a “marital”
connection, Stuart felt that despite his lengthy and deep involvement in the MUD he
experienced no alteration of his identity, nor did his relational way of being with
embodied others change. Stuart described his experience as an “addictive waste of time.”
Another interviewee, Robert, described a more fulfilling experience. He found
that involvement in cyberspace relationships shielded him from addictive behaviors in his
everyday life. Moreover, by escaping to a virtual community, Robert found that the
relational opportunities for creative play on the MUD became an important milestone in
his personal development. Robert was subsequently able to develop new ways to
appreciate troublesome aspects of his life.
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Turkle interpreted the divergent experiences of Stuart and Robert through
identification of the different projects each brought to their respective MUD
communities. For instance, Stuart’s preexisting sense of self was “withdrawn,
unappealing, and flawed.” Given Stuart’s tenuous sense of self, Turkle understood his
immersion in MUD relations to be motivated by the attainment of reassuring constancy
and reliability provided by its members. The dependability of the community stood as a
marked contrast to the unpredictable nature of relationships available to Stuart with
embodied others. Thus Stuart was using the MUD to “act out” rather than “work
through” the insecurities and ambiguities pervading his corporal relations. Robert’s
project, however, differed from Stuart’s insofar as Robert’s intention was to apply what
he learned from his EMRs to his life outside the MUD. Turkle thereby concluded that
cyberspace communities could contribute to personal development if one brought the
motivation and capacity to move beyond habitual ways of being.
Turkle’s viewpoint on Robert and Stuart preserves the phenomenological
understanding that there is a co-constitutive process always already operating in person(cyber)world dialectics. Constrictions in living are not merely a product of deterministic
discourses embedded within Internet social spaces. Instead, transformational outcomes
are informed by the ways in which the individual takes up a free relationship to what is
encountered. The world of the Internet can be an occasion for alienation or renewal and
reintegration.
Continental Philosophy Perspective
One way to appropriate a fuller meaning of EMRs is to take a look at the broader
significance of contemporary technology. Heidegger (1977) does this in his essay, “The
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Question Concerning Technology.” Heidegger questions technology in order to
understand its relation to the disclosure of the truth of being. Manifestly, Heidegger is
interested in the “essence” of technology – the way in which things “come to presence”
in an enduring way. Upon reading Heidegger’s text, one begins to understand that
Heidegger is not so much concerned with the hardware of technology, as much as he is
interested in the way disclosure occurs amidst technology.
For Heidegger, the meaning of technology etymologically links back to the early
Greek term, technē. Technē referred not only to the skill of the craftsperson, it also
referenced an aesthetic sensibility. The craftsperson task was to set free, or allow
something to arise “from out of itself” (physis). The efforts of the artisan were
understood as a kind of “bringing-forth” (poiēsis) which allows “the growing things of
nature as well as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts to come at any
given time to their appearance” (p. 11). This coming forth is released or set free in
revealing (alētheia) truth – not as a correct judgment, but as a revealing of the being of a
thing. Upon fuller inquiry then, Heidegger understands the meaning of technology as a
way of revealing the ongoing happening of alētheia.
By contrast, the way of revealing that holds sway in modern technology does not
bring forth in a way that allows poiēsis or the revealing of alētheia to blossom. “The
revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as
such” (p. 14). There exists a “setting-upon” nature in order to expedite the challenging
forth of its energy. “Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to
yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be
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released either for destruction or for peaceful use” (p.15). Modern technology gathers
humankind together in an orderly mode of revealing nature as “standing-reserve.” This
orderly gathering at the heart of modern technology is, for Heidegger, an Enframing (Gestell). By Enframing (Ge-stell), Heidegger means that humankind is set upon to reveal
nature as standing-reserve (Bestand). Thus, the essence of modern technology sends
humankind into a way of revealing “the real” as standing-reserve.
In On the Internet, Hubert Dreyfus (2000) claims that the Internet carries forward
the essence of technology. Despite the unpredictable nature of future Internet uses,
Dreyfus suggests that the essence of the Internet “is to make everything easily accessible
and optimizable” (p. 2). Dreyfus then goes on to consider what might happen if the
Internet became central to everyday living. What would become of human being if a
large part of one’s existence took place in Netspace? I might rephrase the question by
asking, what happens to human being if it participates in an enframing that orders it to
make its relationships “easily accessible and optimizable?” Moreover, how is the
revealing or bringing-forth of the other changed through reliance on EMRs?
When humankind is sent on this way of revealing, Dreyfus notes that the body is
left behind in a manner that disavows its perceptual hold on the world. Dreyfus takes a
cue from Friedrich Nietzsche’s privileging of bodily instincts and passions. From there,
Dreyfus draws upon Merleua-Ponty’s understanding that the body’s “maximum grip” on
the world allows for indeterminacy and ambiguity to become more determinable. In
order to crystallize differentiated perception from out of ambiguous experience, the
appropriation of maximum grip involves a tacking back and forth between specific details
and the broader context. Unfortunately, when one is engaged in Internet exchanges,
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much of the perceptually rich background is lost to the conversational partners. As a
result, the ongoing task of interpreting meaning is significantly hampered. Dreyfus
claims that reliance on email or the telepresence of others contributes to a declining
attentiveness to a fundamental aspect of maximum grip. One’s bodily hold on context
and the immediacy of shared mood is significantly foreclosed from engagement. Thus,
the silent background of one’s ongoing perceptual movement is partially put out of play
in cyberspace relations. This loss might then lead to a diminishing sense of the “reality
of people and things” perhaps leading to a diminution of trust. And with long-term
reliance on EMRs, Eva-Maria Simms (2001) might agree that our situated bodily powers
for disclosure may begin to atrophy after prolonged engagement with the stylized social
order of the Internet. Particularly if one acknowledges the point that the “medium is the
message” – that the Internet’s extension of our senses occasions a numbing of our human
capacities as technology takes over bodily functions in order to increase power and speed
(McLuhan, 1964; Levinson, 1999). Moreover, the experience of poiēsis, or “wild
thinking,” may suffer a loss in power and relevance as its disclosure suffers from a lack
of connection to the full context from which it might arise. The technological Enframing
(Ge-stell) of the imaginal and of meaning may lapse into distortion and frequent
misinterpretation. Said differently, the limited understanding of others as standingreserve may not be the only consequence of the Internet’s essence.
Critical Theory Perspective
In the next section, a rare example of Internet research based upon the critical
thought of Foucault will be reviewed. In order to situate this example of Foucauldian
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research, we will first begin with an extended discussion of Foucault’s perspective on
power and the production of subjectivity.
According to Paul Rabinow (1984) Foucault has positioned himself “close to, but
apart from” thinkers like Heidegger who have addressed the “rationalization and
technological development of the world” (p.13). Foucault’s effort was not to indict
reason per se, but rather to understand its historical effects, limitations, dangers, and its
relation to power. “The relationship between rationalization and the excesses of political
power is evident. And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy and concentration
camps to recognize the existence of such relations” (Foucault, 1983, p. 210). Thus, for
Foucault reason was not to be studied as a grand totalizing force which worked its way
through history with a singular continuous telos. Foucault was sensitized to more
specific considerations:
[I] would suggest another way of investigating the links between
rationalization and power.
It may be wise not to take as a whole the rationalization of society
or culture, but to analyze such a process in several fields, each with
reference to a fundamental experience: madness, illness, death, crime,
sexuality, and so forth. (p. 210)
Rationality was to be studied in relation to various modalities of power which operated
discontinuously within different localized domains (e.g., mental illness, cyberspace).
Foucault thereby sought to develop a revisionist history which recuperated oppressed
knowledges typically barred from admission into discourse by traditional universalizing
historical accounts.
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Taking a cue from Foucault, I go on to “analyze” the evermore “fundamental
experience” of EMR social spaces in order to understand the culturally configured
contours of subjectivity and sociality presently emerging under the moniker of the
cyborg. Further impetus for this research inquiry was gained by noting that although
Foucault was clearly engaged in exploring the horizon of power relations, Foucault
explicitly stated that the keynote of his work was otherwise:
[T]he goal of my work during the past twenty years . . . has not been to
analyze the phenomena of power . . . .
My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects . . .
Thus, it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme
of my research. (pp. 208-209)
In articulating a revisionist history of the modes by which subjects have been created,
Foucault shifted from the traditional understanding of subjectivity as situated in relation
to production toward locating the subject within a framework of mobile and complex
power relations. Moreover, Foucault’s aim was to formulate a way of developing a
concrete understanding of power relations:
. . . a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present
situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice.
It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of
power as a starting point . . . [and] using this resistance as a chemical
catalyst so as to bring to light power relations . . . (pp. 210-211)
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Here, Foucault gestures toward the assertion that resistance can illuminate that
which is resisted. More to the point, resistance references that which attempts to produce
subjects or docile bodies. Thus, under certain conditions of inquiry, the disjunctions
which are brought about by noncompliant practices can make visible discourses which
are intertwined with disciplinary power (1978, 1979). Whereas Heidegger demonstrated
how the referential context of one’s project becomes transparent when taken-for-granted
goal oriented activities become unready-to-hand, or breakdown, Foucault specified how
noncompliant social activities vivify the power relations at play within the local
referential matrix. I would supplement Foucault’s claim that power relations come to
light through instantiations of resistance by adding that compliant social practices or
beliefs, as well as breakdowns in carrying out the injunctions of dominant discourses may
reveal background social structures. For example, in The History of Sexuality, Foucault
studies the mobilization of power when sex is “put into discourse:”
. . . how [discourse] penetrates and controls everyday pleasure –
all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and
invalidation, but also incitement and intensification. (p. 11)
Foucault seeks to specify how the “will to power” negates or supports “the truth” about
sex. Rather than supporting a universalist notion of truth, Foucault explicates the
historically contingent quality of truth as an effect of power. In short, power creates
value; and in the case of The History of Sexuality, power works to assign the meaning and
significance of various sexual practices. Under such conditions, subjects become agents
that carry out valued practices in bodies which have been shaped and marked by power.
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It can then be argued, from the perspective of Hans Kögler (1996), that a reconstruction
of individual behaviors and beliefs can “refer back to what directs and orders praxis”
(p. 31).
How does the power knowledge nexus produce truth? For Foucault, “regulatory”
or “normalizing” judgments are engaged when sex is introduced into discourse. The
domains of medicine, psychiatry, religion, jurisprudence, and so forth, constellate around
a “bio-power” which centers on life by “inciting” disparate sexualities.
Power/knowledge wishes to hear sex being spoken about. In this way, normalizing
judgment can then signify what is deviant or perverse. “Confession frees, but power
reduces one to silence” (p. 60).
Insofar as regulatory discourse about the body is effectively “internalized,” the
subject becomes an efficient site of self-policing. In addition, where the family exists as
an extension of various modes of control by “proliferating, annexing, creating, and
penetrating . . . bodies in increasingly detailed ways” (p. 107), the “deployment of
sexuality” becomes more comprehensively installed in daily life by normalizing
discourse. Under these conditions, power does not attempt to enslave bodies, but rather,
power encourages the affirmation of a certain kind of self. Power acts in a productive
manner. Finally, where bodies are further situated amidst ongoing surveillance beyond
the family (e.g., institutions, administrative machinery), “sexuality [becomes] a set of
effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations . . . Eventually the entire social
body [is] provided with a ‘sexual body’” (p. 127).
In short, Foucault has provided us with a “history of bodies” as they are invested,
produced, and subjected. Can practices of resistance or freedom occur where bodies are
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so thoroughly permeated by nonsubjective intentionalities? Foucault inclines: “The
rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not be sexdesire, but bodies and pleasure” (p. 157). For Foucault, it is the creative enactment of
new bodies and pleasures which enables the subject to surpass its subjection. Where this
was the case in this study, the ways in which the creative power of the imaginary came to
pass in the language of research protocols about EMRs was noted. And in a (cyber)world
where the privative mode of imagination – fantasy – was sometimes solicited, it was also
noted just what it was that came to signify resistance over against compliance. That said,
what follows in this next section is an example of critical research on the Internet which
in part attempts to interpret social practices in a manner that discloses precognitive
background assumptions and the cultural-historical social structures linked to those
assumptions.
Critical Internet Research. In a rare example of Internet research grounded in
Foucault’s work, Alan Aycok (1995), engaged in a Foucauldian based study of the
Internet as a “technology of the self.” In this case, Aycock viewed the Internet as an
instrument for occasioning the social production of identity. Aycock performed a
qualitative content analysis of “several weeks of postings” from the Internet newsgroup
rec.games.chess (rgc) where participants discussed issues pertinent to advancement in
their mastery of the game of chess. “For most of those who post to rgc, the goal of
personal transformation is the formal mastery of chess” (p. 6).
Interpretations of rgc postings were based on Aycock’s Foucauldian inspired
“model of the online fashioning of identity.” Aycock appropriated Foucault’s notion of
“self fashioning” for his interpretive foundation by emphasizing the following: (1) the
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identification of the substance developed by the individual (a deep inner self – indicated
by discussion of skill and strength); (2) the mode of individual subjection to a
disciplinary rule (commitment to particular activities – indicated by knowledge of
techniques, ownership of chess products, etc.); (3) the ethical labor transforming the
substance (discipline or routine employed to transform self – indicated by intensity of
personal chess routines); and, the outcome of self care (the goal of personal
transformation – indicated by mastery of chess). Aycock’s Foucauldian view of Internet
discourse allowed Aycock to locate newsgroup speech acts and social practices as
situated within the disciplinary technologies linked to romanticism and modernism.
Whether an experience of shared freedom prevailed at the rgc. Web site was for Aycock
not just a function of rgc norms embedded in online participant speech acts. Rather,
Aycock indirectly suggested that the framework of Internet surveillance/panopticism
(e.g., mainframe caveats advising authorized users that their activities may be monitored)
was designed to normalize Web site activity by serving as a background form of
discipline.
A corollary to Aycock’s conclusions about the fashioning of a deep inner self can
be found in Discipline and Punish. In this historical account, docile bodies are
reproduced by centering the attention of a new form of power, disciplinary power, on
something other than social practices.
As the prison system evolved over time, the tactics of normalization shifted from
torture, to punishment, and then to discipline. For Foucault, disciplinary practices
attempt to create docile bodies through the imposition of social controls. This historical
form of discipline took as its “object” the representation of the “soul.” The soul was to
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be infused with a set of right beliefs and emotions. In this way, modern forms of power
designated what counted as normal and abnormal. “[M]echanisms of power . . . are
disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him [sic] and to alter him” (p, 199).
Prisons attempted to requalify inmates as normal members of society by investing them
with beliefs which were consonant with the agendas of power. The techniques of such
discipline included observation, surveillance, examination, normalizing judgment, and
panopticism. Foucault described Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon as an architectural
manifestation of an efficient form of disciplinary power. The Panopticon stood in a
prison as a centralized observation tower with a full view of all the inmates who were
housed in isolation from each other. The prisoners were fully visible to the guards. The
guards however, were hidden behind smoked windows. Hence, the prisoners were
unable to discern whether or not they were being surveilled. Foucault explains:
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it,
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his
own subjection. (pp. 202-203)
The unremitting gaze of an invisible power heightens the self-conscious process by which
the surveilled monitors his or her conduct. Here, Foucault strengthens his case for a
nonessentialist view of subjectivity. In this particular instance, bodies are being
subjected through a disciplinary attentiveness to the inner substance of the “soul.”
Without the inmate’s proper attention to modification of the self, mechanisms of
examination, training, and/or further exclusion might be invoked. Rather than severely
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punish the inmate, instead, a sophisticated and detailed examination of the “soul” by
power is employed as a means to rehabilitate and reinsert the prisoner into the larger
social order. Thus, Foucault demonstrates how malleable subjectivity can be when the
body is saturated by the techniques of power.
In this way, Aycock’s study of the rgc Internet newsgroup postings served as an
impetus to read research protocols from a perspective which sustained an interpretive
attentiveness to the workings of power upon deep selves and social practices.
Accordingly, the research method employed in this study, following from Foucault,
maintained openness to the possibility of locating analogous panoptic structures during
EMRs. Consequently, it was interpretively valuable to make note of the moments where
seemingly docile bodies experience the contours of Internet interactivity as problematic.
The kind of clearing for sociality carved out by power was more readily articulated when
subjects thematized relational or experiential discord. The relevance of thematized
disjunctions within an EMR clearing was not to be the only means of disclosing the EMR
horizon. The experiences of fluid, harmonious, or even pleasing EMR interactivity
sometimes reflected a docility which lent itself to the disclosure of the “internalized”
effects of power.
In the article, “Being and Power,” Dreyfus (n.d.b) described Foucauldian power
as a social clearing or positive field of action which produces a reality that informs the
beliefs and actions of social agents. Comparing Heidegger’s thought to Foucault,
Dreyfus remarks, “A culture’s understanding of being allows people and things to show
up as something . . . Thus the understanding of being creates what Heidegger calls a
clearing (Lichtung) . . . [T]he clearing both limits and opens up what can show up and
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what is done” (p. 1). In either case, culturally and historically informed everyday
activities (e.g., Internet praxis) both produce and limit what can be revealed to and about
culturally positioned subjects. Thus, in effect, the social clearing facilitates and
constrains practices of freedom and efforts to expand understanding of everyday
experience. Consequently, Dreyfus wants to underscore that social agents can benefit
from a reflective engagement with their situated experiences. Quoting Dreyfus (n.d.a)
from “Heidegger and Foucault on the Subject, Agency, and Practices,” Dreyfus states,
“[I]t will turn out for both thinkers that each person can modify his or her cultural
practices by openness to embeddedness in them” (p. 1).
How was Dreyfus’ latter claim concretely addressed in this research inquiry into
EMRs? First, the graphic interface design were interpreted in the section concerning
“local site” issues. It was decided that this feature participated in comprising the clearing
– or rather, Internet window - which opened onto possibilities for e-text writing and other
forms of social exchange to occur and have meaning (cf. Johnson 1997; Aarseth, 1997).
Second, it turned out that the “code,” or programmed architecture of the differently
constituted cyber-spaces, was pertinent to the amounts of perceived freedom associated
with Internet practices (Lessig, 1999).
Lawrence Lessig objects to first-generation Internet user thoughts that,
“Cyberspace . . . cannot be regulated.” Instead, Lessig states, “If there is any place that is
constructed, cyberspace is it” (p. 24). Lessig argues that cyberspace codes instantiate
values which are the outcome of diverse concerns found among social norms (e.g.,
stigmas a community embraces), the law (e.g., through legalized punishments), and the
marketplace (e.g., through price structures). As a result, some cyber-spaces are open and
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nonproprietary (no identification needed for access), and others are closed and
proprietary (access is granted with tight control). Behavior becomes more or less
“regulable” insofar as technologies of identity (e.g., cookies, passwords) eliminate
opportunities for user anonymity. Thus in proprietary cyber-spaces, for instance,
monitoring entities are thereby empowered to identify if a violation has occurred and who
engaged in the violation. In a Foucauldian sense, cyberspace users in proprietary cyberspaces become visible whereas the normalizing gaze of power is veiled, even if it is still
acknowledged as a background presence (cf. Panopticon). Even in nonproprietary spaces
a host of constructive forces exist including the social norms imposed by community
sanctions and government attempts to limit computer user privacy by requiring authors of
encryption code to “build into their code a back door through which the government
could gain access” (p. 49) thereby nullifying aspects of privacy associated with
encryption.
Philosophical Grounding of the Method
In early phenomenological psychology research, the research participant protocols
were interpreted in a manner which assumed that human beings constructed meaning
unidirectionally, and that researchers could bracket their assumptions in order to access
the essential structure of each participant’s lived-experience (Giorgi, 1975, Wertz, 1983).
The maintenance of researcher “fidelity” to experiential phenomena, as lived through by
research participants, served as a guiding tenet. The emphasis upon phenomenological
faithfulness to lived experience was, still, however, beholden to assumptions pertaining to
the subject’s centrality in constructing lived meanings. In contrast, this study jettisons
any assumption which equates the event of signification as residing exclusively within
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the constructive power of a meaning-giving subject. By challenging the notion of human
exclusivity in constructing meaning I am not, instead, adopting a structuralist stance
which eviscerates humanity of its signifying powers and thereby grants priority to rule
governed systems as the producers of meaning and social action. Instead, it is the
fundamental dialogue between person and world which I maintain as the primary unit of
meaning creation. Even more to the point, I seek to combine aspects of hermeneutic and
critical inquiry in a manner which intelligibly preserves the understanding of meaning
production as occasioned by the ongoing reciprocity inhering in the person-world unity.
Before advancing further, however, I will address some meta-methodological concerns
with respect to the compatibility of Heidegger and Foucault.
Methodological Differences?: Heidegger and Foucault on ‘Depth”
Hans Kögler (1996) discusses the value of bringing Foucault’s critical thought
and Heidegger’s hermeneutic thought (later developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer) together
methodologically in The Power of Dialogue. Therein Kögler argues for the hermeneutic
claim that presuppositions held by interpreters are mediated by culture and history. As
such, Kögler claims that these culturally and historically mediated presuppositions both
produce and constrain the interpreter’s “consciousness.” In my research on EMRs, the
role of the interpreter includes both myself as a researcher who “analyzes” data and the
research participants who implicitly disclose their presuppositions about lived experience
in protocols and in interviews with me. Kögler wants to argue that one’s “consciousness”
can be expanded if one’s presuppositions (e.g., researcher and research participant
presuppositions) are linked to both the broad cultural-historical framework of one’s
heritage and to the localized cultural-historical perspectives that contribute to one’s
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presuppositions. Specifically, Kögler suggests that a fuller understanding of the
experiential dimension is gained through an acknowledgement of the power relations
always already at work in one’s immediate community. Thus, hermeneutics is made
more complete when the context of macrocosmic historical narratives are linked to
community level power relations.
Power, for Foucault is not to be understood as “hidden” from view. Instead,
power is profoundly visible in the form of social practices. In order to demonstrate the
compatibility of Heidegger and Foucault on this point, I will discuss, in the next section,
how Heidegger’s emphasis on “deep” truths is typically misunderstood as a reference to
knowledge “hidden” beneath appearances. In the subsequent section, I will examine
how ambiguities in Foucault’s understanding of history as discontinuous may belie a
common ground Foucault shares with Heidegger on broad narratives of history.
Influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault was not in search of “deep” meaning, nor did
Foucault believe that there was any intrinsic “deep” meaning to be sought. For Foucault,
“deep” meaning came to signify just another social construction propagated by power.
Heidegger, on the other hand, purportedly exposed a history of Western metaphysics
which covered over the “deep” meaning of being. Does this impasse between these two
thinkers necessarily preclude any productive synthesis between critical thought and
hermeneutics? I will examine Heidegger’s hermeneutically informed approach to
disclosing meaning as a way to clarify how Heidegger employs the term “deep.” This
approach, I believe, facilitated a practical resolution to the perceived division between
Heidegger and Foucault on the issue of “depth.” It also paved the way for justifying my
approach to studying the observable cultural-historical contexts of EMR experiences by

61
utilizing scholarly works with a technocultural-historical perspective. To begin, I will
review Foucault’s criticism of hermeneutics.
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) discuss two types of hermeneutic practices which
have been challenged by Foucault – commentary hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of
suspicion. For Foucault, commentary hermeneutics limits itself by simply thematizing
each actor’s perspective on the intersubjective meanings embedded in his or her
encounter. In doing so, according to Foucault, commentary hermeneutics reproduces or
uncritically expands upon each actor’s limited understanding of shared meaning.
Consequently, practitioners of commentary hermeneutics fail to notice the broader
contexts which produce the meanings and truths lived through by the actors. In addition,
this privileging of the actors’ production of meaning restricts the hermeneutic scope of
analysis from examining the actors’ social practices and their subsequent effects.
Commentary hermeneutics thereby suffers from a kind of interpretive myopia. In order
for me, as researcher, to avoid reproducing an overly narrow EMR analysis, the data I use
will include the perspectives of research participants as well as my interpretation of
discourses operating in each research participant’s Internet community.
With regard to a hermeneutics of suspicion, Dreyfus and Rabinow state that such
suspicion assumes that actors engage in distorting “hidden” truths. Consequently, these
distortions render the actors unable to access concealed truths without the aid of an
“authority” (e.g., the psychoanalyst role in uncovering repressions). Since, however, the
actors’ view of surface meanings is a falsification, a hermeneutics of suspicion presumes
that an “authority” will enable the actors to unmask the deep meaning hidden behind
surface understanding. The interpretive capacity of the “authority” leaps ahead of the
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actors’ possibilities in a way that facilitates the disclosure of the actors’ concealed
meanings.
In this case, Foucault objects to a hermeneutics of suspicion insofar as it seeks
“deep” meanings behind distorted surface understanding. Quoting Dreyfus and Rabinow:
Foucault’s basic objection to the hermeneutics of suspicion is
that these secrets which the actors can be forced to face must not be
understood as the true and deepest motivation of his [sic] surface
behavior. (p.124)
Here, Foucault would maintain that it is problematic to retain the presupposition that
“true” meaning is hidden from view beneath psychological awareness or behind
appearances. Instead, Foucault argues that surface appearances, such as speech acts and
historical practices, are audible and visible sites of meaning production. That is of
course, notwithstanding a person’s effort to withhold or ignore certain significations.
Even if such a person were motivated not to reveal meanings to others, it would still be
the case that meanings are produced and sought out in and through observable
phenomena, not by searching out deep truths. In The History of Sexuality Foucault wants
it to be understood that the notion of “deep” truth is a construction of cultural-historical
processes linked to power:
[It is through the organization of power] that we became
dedicated to the endless task of exacting the truest of confessions
from a shadow.
The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our
“liberation” is in the balance. (p. 159)
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By extension, Foucault subjects the hermeneutics of suspicion to the same critique he
applies to commentary hermeneutics. Both forms of hermeneutics fail to acknowledge
the relevance of symbolic frameworks in the interpretive process. Moreover, these
background frameworks are not concealed, but rather, are present on the surface. For
Foucault there are only surfaces in the realm of meaning constitution. The belief in
hidden depths is a conceptual error. As a result, my research into EMRs will avoid the
interpretive act of constructing meanings which are not well grounded in the observable
data used in this study.
Given Foucault’s claim that the production of meaning is a visible phenomenon,
the question arises: Is it possible to overcome Foucault’s objection to Heidegger’s
emphasis upon “deep” meaning? In order to respond, I will begin by examining
Heidegger’s discussion of meaning as a way to demonstrate that Heidegger and Foucault
both attend methodologically to the observable matrix of meaning production.
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the meaning of meaning as “the ‘upon
which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it
gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception ” (p. 193). In
speaking about fore-structures, Heidegger suggests that one’s initial understanding of
what is encountered is informed by one’s presuppositions. By speaking about meaning as
the “upon which,” Heidegger is also suggesting that what one encounters in everyday
dealings derives its intelligibility from the way in which what is encountered is embedded
in a “totality of involvements.” In my research on EMRs, I will attend to the totality of
involvements by examining scholarly texts about technocultural-history and by exploring
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discourses (e.g., through graphic user interfaces and Internet documents) associated with
the Internet sites used by research participants.
At this point, it is important to note that both the totality of involvements and
fore-structures are public and accessible ways to understand meaning. For example,
Heidegger discusses how a hammer is not initially understood as a decontextualized
object. The meaning of a hammer is informed by cultural-historical presuppositions
about such objects, as well as by an understanding of the work produced by employing
the hammer. And this work, for Heidegger, “bears with it the referential totality within
which the [hammer] is encountered” (p. 99). To be sure, the usability of the hammer can
be understood more fluidly when one considers that the context of a hammer’s meaning
for a carpenter is far different than the context of a hammer’s meaning for someone who
is being attacked. For the carpenter the hammer is a building tool, for the potential victim
of assault it is a tool for protection, a weapon. In both instances, the meaning of the
hammer is assigned by the entities which are “discovered in using it.” It is one’s
openness to the changeability of referential totalities which allows presuppositions about
the hammer to be modified in a manner which acknowledges the impermanence of
meaning. Thus Heidegger, not unlike Foucault, attends to the indivisibility of meaning
from the world or social clearing of background significations. Meaning is not, as it
were, to be found behind the phenomena of the world. Meaning is understood through an
awareness of the worldly weave of references. Hence, for Heidegger, meaning is not
“deep” in the ordinary sense of the word. In Being and Time, Heidegger remarks:
[I]f we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation
does not become a “deep” one [tiefsinnig], nor does it puzzle out
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what stands behind Being. It asks about Being insofar as it enters
into the intelligibility of Dasein. (p. 193)
Here, depth pertains to the intelligibility of what is encountered. Dasein understands
what is encountered through its holistic awareness of the entwinement of being and
world. In understanding depth beyond conventional understandings of spatiality, we can
then see that breadth might be a more apt term. Depth qua breadth is a profoundly visible
contextual phenomenon for Heidegger. Albert Hofstadter remarks in his translation of
Heidegger’s (1982) The Basic Problem of Phenomenology :
We must not think of being, Sein, as a being, ein Seiendes - as, for
example, some deep principle behind all other beings, serving as their
source, their ground, their creator. This confusion started with the
beginning of philosophy in the West with Thales . . . and has continued
down to the present . . . The necessary implication is that being cannot
be understood in the same way as beings. I can understand the hammer
by understanding functionality, but functionality is not another being, on
a higher plane than the hammer, which then has still another mode of
being on a higher plane of being as its being, by which it is to be
understood. (pp. xxiii-xxiv)
If the being of a phenomenon is not to be understood as “deep,” nor is it to be retrieved as
“higher” for Hofstadter. Again, the meaning of the hammer (its functionality) is found in
and through the weave of references it gathers. This is a non-essentialist view of
meaning which does not take recourse to “higher” Platonic ideals or to “deep” and
original truths linked with a metaphysics of presence.
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Given Hofstadter’s additional remarks upon the meaning of depth, how then does
one make further sense of Heidegger’s elucidation of depth? Robert Romanyshyn
(1983) offers us, perhaps, another profile of insight illustrated by the notion of depth as
“lateral depth.” Turning to Merleau-Ponty as a source of clarification, Romanyshyn
remarks:
[C]onsider the phenomenon of depth. It is not the visible, and yet as
invisible it has no other way of appearing except as of the visible. The
painter, for example, who paints depth must paint things, and it is between
and among things that depth appears. The depth of a thing is not that which
is inside it but that which the thing is in and through its existence among
other things . . . (p. 234)
Romanyshyn points to a quality of depth as residing in the “between.” Thus, the meaning
of depth arises from one’s submission to the dialogic movement always ready to happen
between things and situated ‘subjects.’ The depth of meaning remains invisible only
insofar as there is a failure to deliver oneself over to the understanding that one is thrown
into a world already populated by a system of references which awaits meaning-ful
engagement. Moreover, this web of references is conditioned by the histories, cultures,
discourses, and power relations which inform the plentitude of meanings awaiting
thematic articulation by situated agents. It is the situated agent who possesses the human
power to creatively appropriate such “repressed” or “oppressed” significations and
frameworks. Recuperation of the power to imagine novel meanings makes possible
practices of freedom consonant with the therapeutics of culture informing my research
into EMRs. For example, my imaginal interpretation of the EMR protocols, followed by
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an interview with each research participant, stood as a provisional effort at
collaboratively re-appropriating depth/breadth dimensions. Once the collaborative reappropriation of depth/breadth dimensions were thematically rendered, such research data
in effect cleared a space for netdwellers in general to more readily identify, reinterpret,
and modify background orders subtending their virtual and everyday existence.
Methodological Differences?: Heidegger and Foucault on Historical Continuity and
Discontinuity
As I mentioned in the Introduction, Foucault and Heidegger appear to have
adopted divergent positions with regard to narrating history. Where Heidegger locates a
rationalizing telos occurring at a macrocosmic level of history, Foucault argues for the
existence of historical discontinuities and ruptures best observed at the local level of
historical events. In this section, I ask if the historical perspectives of Heidegger and
Foucault are as divergent as they appear. And, if they are not - if their perspectives
instead turn out to be interrelated, my interpretation of EMR experiences can
accommodate discoveries suggesting that power relations may sometimes reproduce the
dynamics associated with broad cultural-historical narratives. That is to say, the fluidity
of power relations at various Internet locations may not always signify a rupture from the
dominant cultural-historical themes.
To begin, I suggest that there exists an ambiguity embedded within Foucault’s
sustained emphasis upon privileging local versions of history. Specifically, Foucault
claims that the process of subject formation is consistently informed by something akin to
“regulation” and “normalization.” In other words, Foucault contends that amidst the
discontinuous unfolding of power relations throughout history, normalizing forces are
always already at work. According to Dreyfus and Rabinow:
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In Discipline and Punish and in the part of The History of Sexuality
devoted to bio-power, Foucault begins his diagnosis by pointing to the
peculiar way modern norms work, which he calls normalization.
Among all the rich assortment of techniques, practices, knowledges,
and discourses Foucault has discussed, normalization is at the core.
(p. 258)
Moreover, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault declares that when legal power
commingles with the human sciences, a “legal-scientifico complex” (cf. bio-power), or a
formidable union of discourses arise which combine to develop normalizing practices and
docile bodies. In the face of the legal-scientifico complex, Foucault suggests that the
subject is vulnerable to subjection by micropractices of domination. Although an
opposing argument might aver that these regulatory norms change over time, according
to Dreyfus and Rabinow, it remains the case that the subjection of bodies to regulation is
an enduring background presence for Foucault.
Our norms are always on the move as if their goal was to bring every
aspect of our practices together into a coherent whole. To this end
various experiences are identified and annexed as appropriate
domains for theoretical study and intervention. (p. 258)
It is this continuous progression of normativity which I believe links Foucault to
Heidegger. I argue that although Heidegger was blind to the play of power relations due,
in part, to his emphasis upon examining the implications of Western metaphysics,
Foucault’s emphasis upon a plurality of discontinuous power relations fails to integrate
the existence of historical continuities embedded in Foucault’s own historical accounts.
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Specifically, Foucault may have not fully understood the significance of his claim that
regulatory practices are continuously co-present with power relations across the way
stations of history. Such a foreclosure may have prevented Foucault from articulating a
commonality he shared with Heidegger. For instance, in Dreyfus essay, “Heidegger and
Foucault on the Subject, Agency and Practices,” he points out that Foucault’s historical
narratives may contain an emphasis on continuity:
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault tells a rather unNietzschean
continuous story of how the gradual development of confessional
practices in the West produced a very stable, unified subject . . . .
[T]hese confessional practices linked up with totalizing
scientific practices in the early seventeenth century . . . and finally two
centuries later, a science of sexuality that was supposed to hold the
clue to human agency. (p. 9)
Thus, mapping Foucault’s discussion of the historical continuity of normalization
processes onto Heidegger’s understanding of Enframing (Ge-stell) as a continual
“ordering” of practices has merit, though it is not without its challenges. Certainly
Foucault is clear that this process of regulation is a non-subjective intentionality, or
rather, occurs as if there were a “strategy without a strategist.” However, it remains
possible that social clearings may instantiate hierarchies of power relations which may
become frozen for indefinite amounts of time. When imbalances in power are
concentrated in this manner, persons or things may indeed come to presence in enduring
ways for extended periods of time – particularly when the limited cultural-historical
consciousness of a people contributes to a marginalized awareness of sites for enacting
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resistance. As such, it rested upon Foucault’s shoulders to explain how the normalizing
telos of rational discourse has achieved a relatively dominant status in Western culture.
Insofar as there are situations where Enframing (Ge-stell) has not achieved a grand scale
ordering of the social clearing, I would agree with Foucault that the fluidity of power
relations gives rise to social clearings in flux. At the same time, it is also possible that the
broader mode of revealing referenced by Heidegger’s notion of Enframing (Ge-stell) can
promote a world ordering or backdrop which sets the parameters within which power
relations are at play. In either case, the interpretation of the data in this research study
illuminated some of the ways in which broadly concentrated discourses of power
produce, constrain, or coexist with a plurality of power relations. Moreover, the data
suggested some of the ways in which persons come to presence in an enduring way,
while also recognizing that the coming to presence of ‘subjectivity’ can also be a fluid
phenomenon.
Summary of Research Purpose and Guiding Presuppositions
Purpose
The purpose of this study, by way of review, rests upon an inquiry into EMRs and
the kinds of ‘subjects’ potentially co-constituted through immersion in Internet
communication. Thus, my core question pursues an inquiry into the kinds of
transformations undergone in the experience of self, other, and sociality during Internet
communication. In this way, I contribute to a reexamination of utopian and dystopian
claims regarding the impact of the Internet. Four kinds of qualitative data are
incorporated into this inquiry regarding subjectivity and sociality. The data include
experiential descriptions, interviews with research participants, cultural-historical
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accounts about the significance of technology, and an analysis of discourses constellated
around sites for EMR communication. An integrated interpretation of these qualitative
data rests upon my preconceptions regarding the structure of meaning.
From a hermeneutic point of view, the act of naming presuppositions allows the
researcher to overcome the belief that bias-free perspectives are attainable – “In every
case . . . interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance” (Heidegger, 1962,
p.191).

Restated in critical terms, it is understood that the researcher is an agent

inevitably situated within a particular power/knowledge system invested with value –
“We are inescapably and fundamentally bound up with power saturated
preunderstanding. We can’t escape it, we draw on it in order to understand” (Kögler,
1996, pp.105-106). Thus, when the “taken for granted” assumptions at the heart of
preconceptual understanding are acknowledged, the act of interpreting meaning can be
understood as a situated outcome of the dialogue between culturally and historically
embedded researchers and research participants.
Methodological Presuppositions
In asking about how human beings currently live the metaphor of cyborg
subjectivity as a fusion of human and machine, I adopt Heidegger’s (1962) notion of
“being-in-the-world” and Merleau-Ponty’s (1961, 1968) understanding of the “subjectobject dialogue” and “flesh” as renderings of the interdependent and indivisible nature of
person and world. Thus any traditional notion of the human ‘subject’ is recovered as
distinguishable but not divisible from its lived horizons. I therefore contend that the
meaning of the being of cyborg ‘subjectivity’ will arise through attention to the broad
referential unity gathered by human-machine fusions, as well as, by the ongoing play of
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significations always already waiting to emerge when solicited by phenomenal
perspectives. Consequently, I have introduced the guiding presupposition that a
contextualization of empirical ‘subjective’ data (viz., protocols) should incorporate broad
historical narratives, local force dynamics, and the acknowledgement of imaginizing as
fundamental constituents of the interpretative process. Otherwise, uncritical adherence to
the constricted disclosures encouraged by rational discourse and the assumption of a
subject-object split would sever what exists as a fundamental unity. It is an organic and
holistic mode of understanding human existence that can occasion a richer thematic
articulation of lived meanings and culturally inscribed bodies and practices.
Since this research project is meant to be rigorously qualitative in nature, I also
presume that some meanings, typically marginalized by more traditional research
inquires, can be foregrounded through a researcher’s recovery of the “meaningbestowing” structure of interpretation and perception. When the narrow perceptual
openness of the ahistorical and decontextualized clearing of rational thinking is brought
into dialogue with the ground of imaginative thinking - which is free to grasp synthetic
interrelations - I presuppose that the reinstatement of imaginative thinking allows for a
richly integrated articulation of lifeworld considerations. Moreover, integration of such
latent lifeworld considerations and meanings into cyberspace theory makes possible a
cultural therapeutic. This therapeutic of culture may then pave the way for identifying
circumscribed and prescribed regulatory practices in a manner which allows one to freely
retrieve and act upon productive and constraining forces. In this way, any prereflective
enactments of “normalizing” or “disciplinary” strategies (e.g., Nietzsche’s life denying
nihilistic repetition) might be overcome.
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Literature Review-Based Presuppositions and Research Questions
The research and theoretical literature reviewed in the Literature Review provide
a backdrop for the research questions. The presuppositions subtending my research
questions revolve around utopian and dystopian views of technology, the value of “real”
experience over against simulated experience, the social and psychological impact of
increasing engagement with EMRs, the loss of connection to one’s bodily and earthly
context, the project to overcome one’s finitude, the expanded opportunity to explore
different identities, the expanded opportunity to explore different others, and the
importance of attunement to aesthetic experiences amidst modern technology’s
Enframing (Ge-stell). It is in and through mindfulness to these presuppositions that a
research clearing is established where I can interrogate the research data about the
construction of ‘subjectivity’ and sociality undergone during EMRs. By also attending to
research participant meanings and symbolic orders, I am able to await the revelatory
unfolding about cyborg existence. As such, I will now go on to outline the overall design
of this research project – a methodological design which will bring my presuppositions
into dialogue with the empirical data I obtain.
Research Design
The phenomenon at hand called me to lay out a form of inquiry into its
conditional nature, into its situated being. As such, I was invited to faithfully and
rigorously construct a way in which the phenomenon can show itself. Consequently, I
developed an empirically grounded critical-hermeneutic approach to the study of EMRs.
I did this, in part, because it appeared that in order to render “unconscious” aspects of
EMR experience more visible, such a project necessitated an acknowledgment of how
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lived meanings and social practices are infused with the impress of locally and
historically co-present discourses.
Phenomenon to be Studied
This research project interrogated the historical and modern technocultural
backdrops linked to the Internet’s emergence into the public domain during the early
1990s. This research project also explored human participation in the social possibilities
afforded by the Internet in order to illuminate the emerging co-constituted
transformations of human existence. Donna Haraway’s metaphor of the cyborg served as
a touchstone for illustrating how the notion of human-machine fusion may participate in
gradually refiguring the human world and one’s sense of self.
Research Participants and the Protocol Question
Persons who believed that they use the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful
connections with others were asked to participate in this research project. I solicited
research participant involvement through the distribution of flyers, advertisements, and
word of mouth by persons acquainted with this research project. The solicitation was
worded in the following manner:
If you would like to participate in a research study about socializing on
the Internet, please contact Andrew at the following number (telephone
number provided). Any and all correspondence will be kept confidential.
If you choose to participate in the study, you will be asked to fill out a
questionnaire that will be mailed to you. You may also be asked to
participate in a voluntary interview. Additional details can be discussed
when you contact me at the telephone number listed above.
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Research participants were asked to respond to an author-designed survey which
included seven short-answer questions and one protocol question intended to illuminate
EMR experience. The survey questions read as follows:
For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In order
to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen
name.
1) Female ____ Male ____ Other ____ (check one)
2) Age ____
3) Ethnic background
_________________________________________________________
4) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful
relationships?
_________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________
5) Windows user ____ Macintosh user ____ (check one)
6) What is your Internet provider name? __________________________
7) What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address
of the site where your encounter took place?
____________________________________________________________
8) Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an
intimate connection with another person on the Internet. Include in your
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person. Also,
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships
with others.
*Please describe your experience in enough detail so that somebody who has never
had the experience would know what it was like.

In the protocol question (#8), the research participants were being asked to
describe how their experiences of self, other, and the process of socializing on the
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Internet were experienced. In effect, they were being asked how their Internet
experiences mattered to them.
Research Components
As I mentioned in the above section, some of the research materials included
research study advertisements, an author-designed survey, and the provision of an
Informed Consent form to research participants. I also used a second set of materials.
Specifically, I selected scholarly works (supra) addressing pre-Socratic, Socratic, and
fifteenth to twentieth century cultural-historical perspectives on the human engagement
with technology. Each of these works was consistent with my methodological
presupposition that human beings exist in a co-creative relationship with technology.
Each of these works also recognized the way in which the cultural-historical world
participates in constructing human experience. The perspectives offered in each text
were, however, as different as they were similar. The differing cultural-historical vantage
points taken up in each text allowed me to more fully assess the participation of the
Western world in producing human experience.
All of the scholarly texts I employed have been reviewed in the Literature
Review. Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” opened up
“thinking” about a broad historical narrative regarding modern technology - enframing.
Here, Heidegger meditated upon the way in which the modern technological mode of
revealing clears a space for a narrow understanding of things as “standing reserve.” In
Technology as Symptom and Dream, Robert Romanyshyn examined the vision of modern
technology and its relationship to historical events from the fifteenth century up to the
twentieth century. In doing so, Romanyshyn worked out how the historically informed
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dream of technology contributed to a particular psychological way of relating to one’s
body and to one’s earthly abode. In The Saturated Self, Kenneth Gergen examined
human being’s expanding engagement with communication technologies. Gergen
described how increased EMRs with people have inaugurated a shift away from the deep
self of romanticism and the rational self of modernism toward the plurality of postmodern
selves and the concomitant impact on social relationships. Finally, in Code and Other
Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig challenged the notion that cyberspace is a space of
freedom and, instead demonstrated how cyberspace has no nature. Lessig argued that
cyberspace is, more or less, a regulable space subject to the immediate local impact of
software code, laws, norms, and markets. Moreover, the degree of cyberspace regulation
is contingent upon the degree to which people attempt to influence the values shaping the
architecture of the Internet.
Procedure
Research participants will be asked to respond to a protocol question intended to
illuminate EMR experience. Informed by the work of Giorgi (1975) and Wertz (1983), I
will conduct an interpretive thematic rendering of the experiences described by each
participant. In order to do so, I will adopt the stance of psychological reflection. I will
then engage in multiple readings of each protocol in order to gradually articulate the
psychological themes which reflect the relationship between the research participant and
her experience of EMRs. This attitude of psychological reflection will first require me to
get a sense of the meaningful whole of each protocol as a starting point. From there, I
will be able to identify the smaller units of meaning comprising the whole protocol.
After identifying these smaller units of meaning, I will then organize them into a
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narrative that reflects the meaningful whole of each protocol. Throughout the process of
psychological reflection I will incorporate Murray’s (1986) “imaginizing” by attending to
the cultural-historical imagination (or discourses) structuring the meanings lived through
by each participant. I will also attend to ambiguities in each description as well as to the
potential surplus of meaning embedded in the language of the protocol. The
incorporation of imaginizing will allow me to retrieve marginalized meanings, consonant
with research participant descriptions, and place them into the narrative. In Step 2, I will
contact each participant (e.g., face-to-face, telephone) for an interview. Where meanings
of their respective protocols are vague or portions of the protocol seem to suggest
“breakdowns” in communication related to compliance with or resistance to Internet
practices or discourses, I will read those parts of the protocol to the respective participant
and ask for clarification. I will then “circle” back and integrate the research participants’
clarifications into the meaning units pertaining to their protocols.
It is noteworthy that my reading of successive protocols led to the discovery of
themes I had not previously identified. In such cases, I re-read the other protocols with
the intent to locate the newer themes. Where appropriate I added these new themes to the
respective protocol narratives. After completing a full analysis of all the protocols, I
organized the themes pertaining to each of the protocols into a general person-centered
narrative.
In Steps 3 and 4, I shifted my thematic analysis to the analysis of technology. In
Step 3, I conducted an interpretive analysis of the texts and “window” (e.g., graphic user
interface) associated with the site of Internet communication. The purpose here was to
identify themes, practices, and discourses typifying the local site of communication. In
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Step 4, I conducted an interpretive analysis of the broad narratives of history at work in
the scholarly texts I discussed in the “materials” section. The thematic analyses were
conducted in a manner similar to the approach adopted in Step 1. Thus, in Steps 3 and 4,
I familiarized myself with entire site of Internet communication and the scholarly texts. I
then noted the cultural-historical themes potentially linked to Internet sociality. I then
“circled” back and integrated Step 4 and step 3 into a technocultural-historical narrative.
Finally, I fashioned a situated global narrative with regard to Internet subjectivity and
sociality by integrating the person-centered narrative and the technocultural-historical
narrative into a unified critical-hermeneutic account. The situated global narrative
therefore stood as an instantiation of how person-centered and cultural-historical
processes contribute to the construction of ‘subjectivity,’ meaning, experience, and social
actions.
Results
The Results section contains the critical-hermeneutic analysis of data pertaining to
the construction of subjectivity and relatedness in cyberspace. Data Section I consists of
a Person-Centered Narrative re-presenting the integrated interpretations of each research
participant’s protocol and telephone interview. The unabridged protocols and the
transcripts of the telephone interviews can be found in Appendixes D-K. Section II
culminates in a narrative regarding Local and Cultural-Historical Data. Whereas Section
I instantiated an analysis of the “subject” pole of lived experience and social praxis,
Section II re-presented interpretations of the “worldly” contribution to experience. The
AOL local site common to the research participants’ online social interactions was
analyzed along with scholarly texts addressing the cultural-historical backdrop of
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Western technology. The AOL local site data can be found in Appendixes L-O. Finally,
Section III concludes with a Situated Global Narrative which stands as an integrated
description of how cyberspace subjectivity and sociality are bound up with broad and
local trends in technocultural history.
The benefit of partitioning the Results section in the three-part form described
above allowed the process of “subject” formation and social practice enactment to be
considered in a richly differentiated manner. The dynamic interplay of multiple
processes always already making contributions to the construction of meaning,
subjectivity, and virtual social practices were thereby illuminated. For example,
interpretations of the Person-Centered Data allowed the life-situated meanings of each
research participant to be disclosed from their own lived “psychological” perspectives.
The incorporation of research participant interview perspectives into my interpretations
allowed research participant voices to occupy a valued place in the construction of
meaning units. Furthermore, combining my interpretation of the written experiential
descriptions with input from research participant interviews allowed me to revise the
presuppositions guiding my interpretations vis á vis the hermeneutic circle.
Section II allowed for the consideration of local and broad cultural-historical
forces contributing to the meanings, virtual social practices, and experiences of “self”
undergone by the research participants. In effect, the production of discourse-laden
social practices in cyberspace were illuminated in this section. Moreover, a hermeneutic
circle was built into the form of Section II as well. The inclusion of the local Internet site
analysis allowed the presuppositions at work in the grand narratives about technological
culture and history to be reworked by circling back and forth between discourse laden
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practices at the local level and those articulated at the macro level of analysis. The end
result was the technocultural-historical narrative. At the same time, this two-tiered
cultural-historical analysis also paved the way for Section III’s decentralization of the
person-centered process of meaning construction and culture/history making. Thus, it
was in the situated global narrative that the holistic backdrop of discourse and the
situated influence of the “subject” were brought back into a dialogic unity.
By way of review then, the three data sections are organized in the following
manner:
1) Section 1 contains an integrated interpretation of Person-Centered Data (viz.,
protocols and interviews) culminating in a person-centered narrative.
2) Section II contains an analysis of AOL Local Data and TechnoculturalHistorical Data culminating in a technocultural-historical narrative.
3) Section III integrates the person-world data of Sections I and II into a situated
global narrative.
Section I: Person-Centered Data
Here, in Section I, I interpret the protocols written by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn
re-presenting their lived attempts to form meaningful relations in the world of
cyberspace. In effect, their stories provided insight into the process of being swept up
into the excitement and promise generated by AOL’s dream to sell and normalize virtual
interactivity. Examination of the meaning units flowing from Rochelle, Bryce, and
Dawn’s protocols revealed that they do indeed give themselves over to the space of AIM
social practices with hopes that virtuality will provide a fertile landscape for intimate
relationships to thrive. In a sense, each of the research participants literally and
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figuratively bought into the expansive virtual social practices. Moreover, each of the
research participant’s discovered that virtuality allowed them to overcome the finiteness
of bodily facticity and access people who would be otherwise unavailable through
reliance upon bodily powers alone. However, further thematic examination of Rochelle,
Bryce, and Dawn’s protocols led to the disclosure that they did not continue to passively
act as docile subject’s willy-nilly delivered over to social practices prescribed by AIM.
Instead, their initial acceptance of AIM eventually led to breakdowns in communication,
resistance to certain virtual practices (e.g., multiple identity expansion) and modification
of AIM practices by importing other communicative practices (e.g., telephone, offline
meetings) as a way to offset the loss of carnality in cyberspace. The three research
participants’ assertion of individual autonomy, therefore, lent support to my
methodological presupposition that virtual space was a co-constructed landscape.
The co-constructive process occurring between the research participants’ and the
cultural-historical world of social practices and discourses have been elaborated, further
ahead, in Section III’s situated global narrative. The situated global narrative revealed
that the linkage of cultural-historical forces to virtual social practices was not sufficient to
guarantee that individuals would submit to such practices. Mere submission to available
social practice would have suggested that dominant discourses maintained a
unidirectional impact on the kind of “self” research participants become amidst the
practice of virtual social intimacy. Thus, the voice of subjectivity served as a
counterbalancing force influencing how relatedness would occur in cyberspace and
informing what practices and discourses would be enacted or ignored.
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That said, further development of the Internet experiences of Rochelle, Bryce, and
Dawn have been developed in the person-centered narrative articulated at the end of this
section.
Protocol #1: Internet related themes – Rochelle, 21 y.o., Caucasian, female
1. Offline interpersonal stress, followed by an introduction to Internet social spaces and
practices, occasioned exploration of online social experiences
In the midst of family upheaval, Rochelle was open to the encouragement that she try out
a new form of social interaction.
• “My parents had just moved to Provo, I was living with my aunt . . . who . . . was
diagnosed with a serious medical condition . . . My best . . . friend had just discovered
the Internet and she introduced me . . .”
2ahn. The lure of inhabiting taboo or otherwise unavailable social (cyber)spaces can lead
to a transgression of ethical and legal offline norms eschewing identity alteration
Rochelle was enthralled with the privilege of access to alternative virtual life spaces,
which she attained by assuming a different identity. Rochelle’s identity revision was
enabled by the absence of carnality in cyberspace. However, during the interview,
Rochelle stated that once online, she generally preferred to withhold aspects of her
identity rather than completely morph into an altogether different online persona.
• “Using my aunt’s credit card, I authorized the use pretending to be her.”
• “You could portray yourself any way you want, make a completely different life for
youself [sic].”
3b. Internet fascination turned into a self described “addiction” to the standing reserve of
available (and forbidden) virtual males to socialize with
The opportunity to access communities of virtual people, considered taboo or
inaccessible offline, became irresistible.
• “ . . . with in that month and a half was addicted. I would sneak on late at night, and
talk to a lot of older guys.”
• “ I was sneaking online after my parents were asleep and after I got home from
school when they weren’t home yet.”
• “ . . . all the guys I talk about were way older than I was at the time . . . I’m not going
to analyze why that is at this time and point but at the time it made me happy so I just
went with it.”
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4c. At the beginner stage of Internet communication, Internet based re-presentations of
online others were accepted as accurate portrayals of their offline embodied “selves”
Rochelle did not initially anticipate that virtual others posed with identities untethered to
the facticity of their offline identities.
• “I was naïve at the time, so I believed pretty much anything they told me . . .”
5d. At the beginner stage of Internet communication, intense emotions of affection were
felt toward the personas of online others encountered during cybertext chat
Rochelle found herself swept up in intense emotions of hope and love after feeling
affirmed by the virtual others she encountered.
• “Then there were a couple others, and of course I was in love with all of them.”
6g. The world of Internet chat provides one with the power to be immediately
transported away from the “reality” of everyday life concerns as well as the stress of
virtual world conflicts
Rochelle found that cyberspace provided her with an increased power to control the
kinds of social experiences she underwent. Rochelle felt as if she was able to replace the
stressful “reality” of her everyday world and “self” with that of the more appealing and
absorbing “reality” of virtual intimacy.
• “. . . It’s like you are in your own little world, nothing matters except you and the
person/persons you are talking to.”
• “ . . . It’s a relief from everyday life, because you can just be your [sic], and live in
a fantasy world if you wanted to online.”
• “Nothing bothers you, if you don’t want to talk to person, you can very easily block
them from your buddy list or just ban them from talking to you at all . . .”
7e. Cybertext chat can be less stressful if one prefers to be evaluated on the basis of
social presence rather than physical presence
Rochelle’s fear about being judged primarily in terms of her bodily appearance were
allayed during e-text chat.
• “You feel really special inside, like you have nothing to be afraid of because the
person you are talking to isn’t judging you for looks, just solely on how you interact
online.”
• “ . . . It lets you open up to someone without them staring at you . . . you don’t have
to worry if you have spinach in your teeth . . .”
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8f. Difficulty interpreting online humor and sarcasm can interfere with safely immersing
oneself into online chat
Rochelle found that when the virtual other’s humor tilted toward sarcasm, it was difficult
for her to know if she was still in a secure social space or if she had exposed herself to
the possibility of malicious judgment.
• “It’s hard to tell someone’s sense of humor online, but usually it goes through.
Sarcasm is a big one though. Sometimes you can’t really tell whether or not the person
is being just mean, or sarcastic.”
9i. The remoteness of disembodied sociality clears a social space for virtual others to be
more socially insensitive
After some painful online experiences, Rochelle developed the belief that the physical and
social distance, intrinsic to online chat, invited hurtful social behavior from online
others.
• “I guess that’s why it is easy to be jerks online, because they aren’t face to face with
you, so they just do what they want . . . it hurts just the same.”
10j. The computer screen, as a symbolic barrier between self and other, may not
diminish the emotional injury from being “verbally” aggressed in cyberspace
Rochelle experienced the emotional wounds inflicted by virtual others no less intensely
than she would in a face-to-face encounter.
•“But in reality no matter if you are behind a computer screen or in person, it hurts
just the same.”
11. The computer screen, as a symbolic barrier between self and other, may not diminish
the emotional difficulty of undergoing conflict in cyberspace
Rochelle found arguments with virtually present others no less unpleasant than such
conflicts would be face-to-face.
•“I’ve had my share of fights online as well, and believe me, they were just as hard as
they would have been if the fights were in person.”
12k. Transitioning from a virtual relationship to an offline embodied encounter can
require deliberation and screening
Rochelle put effort into securing her parent’s approval to pursue a date with someone she
made an acquaintance with online. Rochelle’s parent’s insisted on first screening
Rochelle’s virtual acquaintance.
• “. . . I finally asked them if I could meet someone in person form online. It took
some convincing but they let me as long as they met him first . . .”
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13. The first e-enabled offline “date” with a virtual other occasioned more frequent dates
of a similar kind with different virtual others
Rochelle increased her efforts to meet virtual others offline after her first e-enabled
offline date.
• “ . . . that was just an icebreaker. I met guys more often after that.”
14lx. Impressions formed about virtual others online turn out to be disappointing representations of what virtual others will be like in the flesh
Rochelle’s e-enabled dating disappointments were chalked up to her naiveté and her
belief that most males were lacking in character and forthrightness about their intentions
despite their benign virtual representations of “self.”
• “And the one person that you do find may look good online, but then you get them
on the phone and they are completely different, it’s a real let down.”
• “ . . . Out of all the guys I met online, there weren’t too many “nice” guys . . . “
• “ . . . I didn’t really know what I was getting into with those kinds of situations . . . It
was kind of an emotional roller coaster for me, but I soon learned that guys are like
that.”
15m. As a heterosexual female, it can be a relief to encounter a virtual male whose “self”
seems to manifest similar qualities
Rochelle was relieved to meet a virtual other who she perceived to be dissimilar to
previously encountered virtual males and, at the same time, more similar to her.
• “ . . . it was almost as if we knew each other, we had a lot in common and I was jus
[sic] so glad that he wasn’t into the types of things all the others had been.”
16n. A decision to correct an online mis-representation about one’s offline “self” occurs
when the virtual other may be significantly mismatched with one’s offline “self”
Rochelle was able to be straightforward about the difference between the age she
assigned to her online “self” and her actual offline age. Rochelle was able to do this, in
part, because she perceived that the “older” online other might be concerned about the
age discrepancy.
• “He was older . . . You had to be 18 in order to place an ad, so I told a white lie, but
in my second e-mail to him, I did tell him that I was only 17, and that in two weeks I
would be 18.”
17o. Where e-text rapport turns into enthusiastic telephone (voice-based) space rapport, a
long-term relationship becomes possible
Rochelle engages in a long-term relationship with her e-enabled date. The offline
relationship did not ensue until Rochelle felt extremely positive about the “self” of the
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virtual other. The sustained sense of rapport both persons established were developed
through their extensive virtual interactions across different electronic mediums.
• “We hit it off, even on the phone. We talked on the phone almost every day, for
hours at a time. Finally, we decided to meet . . .”
• “When you finally get a hold of someone who is stimulating you feel a connection.
You think, “Oh wow, we have something in common.” And you want to know more
and more about this person . . .”
18p. Caution about the character of the “self” of an online other can lead to a sketchy
agreement to meet offline
Rochelle’s next long-term offline relationship first began online with a feeling of caution
and a tepid sense of rapport and interest in the “self” of the virtual other. Moreover
Rochelle found herself to be scarcely motivated to meet offline.
• “ . . . For some reason though, I thought he was too “shady” . . . He, at that time, was
I guess too boring for me . . . We arranged to meet eachother [sic] there, or just in
passing, say maybe we’ll see eachother [sic]there . . .”
19. Misinterpretation of intentions can result in a failure to communicate further
Rochelle feels misunderstood when the virtual other claims that Rochelle intended to
avoid further contact with him.
• “He swears that I blew him off, but if I did, it wasn’t intentional . . .”
20q. The level of attraction or interest in the “self” of a virtual other does not necessarily
re-present a reliable impression of what the offline experience of the other will be
Rochelle found that impressions of online others do not translate well into experiences of
the other offline.
• “ . . . So I guess it goes to show that even if we hit it off online, doesn’t mean we will
hit it off in person, and vis versa.”
21r. The degree of enjoyment experienced during online chat varies depending on the
virtual space chosen and the kinds of virtual others chatted with
Rochelle did not find online chat to be a consistently pleasurable experience due to the
variety of Internet spaces and virtual others she experienced.
• “ . . . In general when you are talking to people in chat rooms its kind of fun.
Depends on the chat room, and what kind of people you actually engage . . .”
22r. In chat rooms, the virtual “self” of others tends to come into presence as puerile
forms of chat
Rochelle experienced most chat room social practices as immature.
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• “The whole problem I had was just talking to people who were mature . . .”
23su. As a female, the decision to allow virtual males to view photographs depicting her
physical appearance can be experienced as risky – particularly if she believes that her
body image does not match Western culture ideals
Rochelle sometimes experienced emotional injury when receiving feedback about the
posting of her picture online. Rochelle found herself needing to prepare emotionally for
anticipated judgments about her posted image
• “ . . . I’m not a Barbie . . . so I rarely gave out my picture and when I did I had to
prepare myself mentally.”
• “After a few years of that I got tough, or bitter . . .”
24t. In personal ad sites, it felt less traumatic to share the picture of her embodied female
“self” since it was assumed that disapproving others might simply pass over the image
without comment
Rochelle felt less attacked by unkind judgments in a personal ad site because she
assumed that disapproving others were more likely to pass over her picture without
bothering to comment. In this way, Rochelle felt that her feelings were “spared.”
• “When I posted personal ads I did have my picture on there, but that wasn’t as bad as
the chat rooms . . .”
25v. A female’s wish to merely chat online was frustrated by the perceived intention of
online males to pursue sexualized objectives
Rochelle eventually decided to resist and reject the sexualized practices of online males.
• “ . . . I’m sure the guys had a different frame of mind, but I wasn’t going to play their
games anymore.”
26y. Though one can adopt multiple identities and indulge in fantasy online, it was
learned that “true” intimacy cannot be sustained where such “false” re-presentations of
self occur
When the pursuit of love is embarked upon, Rochelle decided that the online other’s
failure to be what s/he portrays him/her “self” to be online can lead to rather large
disappointments.
• “ . . . You can live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are really looking for true
love, don’t falsify anything, it just makes for a big disappointment in the end.”
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27z. The practice of virtual sociality can dramatically decline when one successfully
transitions to establishing a fulfilling offline relationship
Rochelle found that her involvement in a rewarding romantic relationship reduced her
Internet use to the function of briefly checking email and playing games. Chat room
involvement no longer filled a prior emotional need.
• “ . . . I still use to [sic] Internet to play games, but I don’t go into chat rooms. There
is no need to, I have everything I need in a person.”
Protocol #2: Internet Related Themes – Bryce, 27 y.o., African-American,
male
1a. Enthusiasm and fascination surface during early encounters with modernized
electronic communication equipment and practices
Bryce’s exploration of and learning about the unprecedented Internet communication
practices gave rise to early feelings of exhilaration. It was enjoyable and socially
liberating to interact without seeing or being seen or known by anonymous virtual others.
• “It was fun, and exciting, and innovative to me.”
2bh. The “self,” perceived as socially inadequate and vulnerable, opens up to practicing
sociality through a distanced and disembodied modality
With regard to embodied self-image, Bryce experienced his everyday “self” as impaired
in the arena of face-to-face encounters with new people. However, with no-body present
during Internet chat, Bryce experienced the Internet as offering a safer horizon in that he
could practice a less immediate means of interacting with others. Thus, the absence of
Bryce’s online physical presence, freed Bryce to display an e-text identity able to engage
in more expansive social “self” practices.
• “I am a shy person at first . . . . the Internet gave me an outlet. I could say almost
anything without feeling odd . . . ”
• “I’ve found that socializing on the internet has impacted my personal growth by
giving me more opportunities to meet people that I wouldn’t normally talk to, or be
able to talk to because, of my shyness.”
3c. The “self” feels freer to re-present itself through dialoguing about personally
meaningful topics
Bryce felt liberated to practice “self” expression by “chatting” about typically
unexpressed matters of personal interest – especially sexual matters.
• “I would talk about sex, politics, and other things that appealed to me.”
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4d. The Internet is initially viewed as a relatively effortless instrumental means to
accessing a desired resource - knowable others
Bryce initially discovered that Internet chat encompassed fewer obstacles to succeeding
in his project to meet others seeking social opportunities. Moreover, the knowledge that
a large variety of virtual others also sought to meet new people allowed Bryce to initiate
interactions with greater ease.
• “I found that the Internet made it easy for me to become acquainted with someone.”
5e. An early sense of comfort and mastery with e-relations breaks down when deception
is encountered
When Bryce discovered that the disclosive space of Internet chat allows virtual others to
portray a textual presence incommensurate with the facticity of their offline bodily being,
Bryce’s feeling of betrayal occasioned a return to the offline world and the semblance of
visual certitude about identity therein.
• “My first experience to meet someone new on the Internet was horrible because, the
person lied about his age and appearances. When that happened, I immediately stop
[sic] using the Internet as a way to meet a partner.”
6f. Unsuccess making acquaintances in the incarnate offline world prompted the
realization that use of the prosthetic-like equipment of the Internet was an indispensable
aid in meeting others
Bryce’s repeated failure to connect with embodied others, in the anxiety ridden horizon
of Bryce’s everyday offline world, gave rise to Bryce’s realization that he was somehow
incomplete or ill equipped to make acquaintances. As a result, Bryce chose to revise his
approach to online social practices thereby reducing the risk of being deceived online.
This allowed Bryce to shore up his perceived “self” image of inadequacy by donning
Internet equipment in order to successfully meet a partner online.
• “A few months past and I weren’t [sic] meeting people on my own [italics added], so
I decided to meet a partner.”
7g. Success in transitioning from a virtual relationship to a face-to-face relationship
hinged on utilizing Internet communication equipment, frequent daily e-chat, and efforts
to know the “self” of the other
Before meeting his future partner in the offline world, Bryce dialogued online with him
extensively as a way to fill out the cybertext re-presentations of his potential partner’s
“self” more fully. Bryce developed a better online sense of the “self” of his future
partner by noticing his online social style and emphasis during chat time.
• “. . . I learned many things about him through the Internet so by the time we met I
knew many things about him. That meeting on the Internet involved [sic]into a threeyear relationship.”
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8. The Internet aided in expanding awareness of offline social venues for meeting others
The Internet allowed Bryce to increase his awareness of places for socializing in his
everyday embodied world.
• “’The Internet gave me more places such as clubs . . . to meet people.”
9i. Embracing Internet equipment and practice allowed “self” confidence and practical
know-how about offline relationships to emerge
Bryce was able to successfully integrate practical Internet social skills into the daily
social “self” practices of his everyday relational life space. As a result, Bryce felt that
his embodied “self” image offline had transformed into a more capable and less
vulnerable offline presence.
• “It has also given me more courage and confidence . . . I now know the types of
people that are attracted to me and how to approach them.”
Protocol #3: Internet Related Themes – Dawn, 29 y.o., African-American,
female
1a. Job responsibilities impose an unwanted geographic separation from an offline
significant other. The decision to use the Internet as a means to communicate harbors the
potential to ease separation stress due to decreased financial expense
Dawn found herself disappointed about the imposed physical separation from her
romantic partner. The combined stress of financial limitations and difficulty
synchronizing schedules to talk precluded further use of voice-based long distance
telephone service. Dawn thus pragmatically accepted relocation to a text-based Internet
space (email) for interpersonal connection.
• “Well due to job training updates, I had to interact with my significant other using
other means of communication . . .”
2b. The communicative praxis of email space felt distant and created misunderstanding
and confusion
Dawn was disappointed with the exclusive use of email space as a way to maintain a
bond with her significant other. Email evoked hollow and confusing feelings of
connectedness which evoked Dawn’s recollection of the lost sensual human qualities
present in other forms of communication. Re-presentations of the virtual other’s
emotional presence (e.g., emoticons) were inadequate substitutes for the other’s bodily
presence.
• “. . . I found the emails to be very cold and impersonal. I would assume one thing
and something else was implied . . . verbal communication (i.e. tone and voice
inflections) makes words come alive and more meaningful.”
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3c. The initial appeal of Instant Messaging (AIM) chat space rests on its similarity to the
responsiveness of verbal dialogue
By switching to the communication medium of AIM, Dawn hoped to retrieve some of the
valued benefit of immediacy (e.g., real-time dialogue) associated with verbal interaction.
• “ . . . Instant messaging was agreed upon . . . to get back some of what verbal
communication offered.”
4d. AIM practice required a tiresome need to calculatively explain one’s concerns
Dawn found that she was eventually discouraged with AIM communication practices as a
substitute for the valued benefits of telephone interactions. The ease and spontaneity of
verbal speech was replaced by the tedium of cognitively working out the written version
of Dawn’s utterances in AIM space. Consequently, the sense and feel of one’s experience
can get lost in he translation from the spoken word to the e-text mode of signification.
• “ . . . IM started to become tedious . . .”
5e. The intention to convey supportive feedback through AIM space can be angrily
interpreted by the recipient as harsh, insensitive, and lacking in understanding about the
AIM recipient’s situation and character
Dawn was shocked by the intensity of her significant other’s animosity arising from his
(mis)interpretation of her text-based instant message to him. The taken-for-granted
context of the dyad’s offline repertoire and understanding sometimes failed to inform
their virtual interaction. Consequently, ill-attuned assumptions and interpretations about
e-text communication ensued.
• “. . . I Imed him stating ‘I am surprised at you’. This statement was interpreted as
‘How dare you judge me . . . He questioned our entire relationship over my simple
statement.”
6f. Conflict resolution becomes possible with the acquisition of an Internet enabled
prosthetic memory. Scrolling through earlier exchanges during AIM chat allows the
AIM sender to retrieve a forgotten context contributing to the conflict
The technology of AIM archiving allowed Dawn to retrieve her memory of the stress
informing her significant other’s actions. The AIM practice of scrolling backwards
through the “chat” transcript allowed Dawn to respond in a more understanding manner
to her significant other’s outrage.
• “But before I Imed [sic] him back a response, I scrolled up to view the beginning of
the IM where he stated how stressed he was . . .”
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7g. The ways in which Internet communication can impede human communication are
manifold
Dawn’s experiences with social interaction in cyberspace leads her to conclude that the
horizon of virtual communication is fraught with a considerable amount of difficulty. As a
result, Dawn concluded that ongoing involvement with AIM praxis can lead to a loss of
ease and fluency with face-to-face communication. Moreover, Dawn found that the
opportunity to calibrate one’s speech to the nonverbal expressions of the bodily present
other is largely eclipsed during virtual communication.
• “My example only implied a fraction of how the Internet can handicap social
interactions with people.”
8h. Internet communication practices produce deficient social skills. The listener’s
assumptions inform understanding more so than the particularities of the conversational
context
The upshot of virtual communication for Dawn involves a diminution in the art of
listening. In AIM space, people are unwittingly trained in the kind of social skills where
hearing takes place without understanding.
• “ . . . Assuming and hearing has taking social skills be it verbal or written out of the
art of conversing. Allowing the world to listen with a deafening ear.”
Person-Centered Narrative
To begin, the anticipation of embarking upon cyberspace social practices are
experienced as potentially gratifying. For, those seeking to make new acquaintances and
form meaningful social connections, the power to leave behind unsatisfying offline
interpersonal circumstances and crossover into a virtual world is inviting. Cyberspace
sociality is eagerly embraced as an enticing alternative for forming meaningful relations.
With the aid of the Internet window, one is plugged into a vast standing reserve of ever
present virtual others seeking social connection. One becomes hopeful, or even feels
spellbound by the expansion of “self” and social possibilities afforded by access to the
electronic frontier. Where one may have typically experienced uneasiness with the
extended power to access such an enlarged social horizon, instead, one’s offline social
anxieties or bodily concerns are significantly diffused in the online world. The embodied
anxieties of social life in the offline world are replaced by the opportunity to enact
previously unlived potentials from behind the seemingly indispensable veneer of a
cyberself persona. With the prosthetic medium of computer enabled e-text representations standing in for the fleshly body of human existence, one believes that new
possibilities for social being can be lived out. For instance, it is felt that virtuality allows
for a liberating contraction of one’s bodily presence. Unwanted aspects of one’s
incarnate presence can be excluded from one’s online persona. At the same time, it is
also felt that there are new possibilities for practicing “self” expansion. Such
possibilities can include taking up the option to enact alternative identities which
transcend ones factical incarnate existence. In addition, one finds that one can express a
typically inhibited sense of “self” more easily after feeling liberated from presenting or
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encountering bodily presence online. Thus doubts constellating around one’s embodied
self-consciousness are muted. However, when one attempts to shift face-to-face
communication practices with a previously known significant other into the realm of
cyberspace communication practices – due to unwanted geographic separation – one,
instead, desires to reproduce the offline experience of the other during online interaction.
Overcoming the loss of the other’s embodied presence becomes paramount. Thus, with
regard to an established significant other, one’s wish for “self” expansion is limited to
acquiring the extended power to somehow retain a sensorial basis for intimate
connection (e.g., voice inflection) despite geographic and economic obstacles.
After meeting a newly encountered other online, a naïve sense of exhilaration is
experienced. Adopting an alternate identity, maintaining ambiguity about one’s factical
body, or liberating a previously inhibited way of expressing oneself allows a felt ease to
accompany interactions with virtual others. Here, virtual relationships are established
with plans made to transition the encounter into the offline world of embodied others.
Feelings of hope, or even strong affection, can be felt towards these seemingly ideal
virtual others. The virtual other’s “self” re-presentation within the cyber-window is
uncritically taken up as an honest portrayal of offline identity. The virtual other’s self representations are trusted. One experiences a degree of comfort and mastery negotiating
the re-presentational signifiers comprising e-relations. However, a breakdown in the
smooth unproblematic flow of such re-presentational social practice occurs around the
time that crossover from the virtual to the “real” world of sociality occurs. One feels
betrayed when the illusion that there is a relative match between the virtual presence of
others and their offline factical being is shattered. One may even recoil at the thought of
once again advancing further into the erstwhile safety of the virtual horizon. Eventually
one begins to be more thorough in efforts to discern the verisimilitude of the virtual
other’s online persona (e.g., extended virtual interactions). Even so, it is learned that
knowing more about virtual other or screening him or her offers no clear-cut indication
about offline compatibility or incompatibility. Even poor first impressions online can
result in positive offline outcomes. Nevertheless, the sense of betrayal becomes less of a
concern if one’s desire to co-author a fantasy relationship was paradoxically co-present
with the wish to establish an intimate encounter. The counterbalancing opportunity to
enter – or even escape – into a creative play space seems to serve as a compensatory
gratification. It is the singular wish to form an intimate offline relationship that
motivates “self” disclosures congruent with one’s offline identity.
Other disruptions are encountered in the attempt to fashion personal online
exchanges with new online others. Despite the symbolic and concrete barrier of the Web
browser window, online conflicts are still experienced as emotionally difficult.
Misunderstood online sarcasm, as well as, verbal aggression are still wounding
experiences impeding further communication. The disembodied nature of the encounter
does not necessarily insure that one is protected from emotional hurt . The concern
becomes that the lack of face-to-face interaction serves as a license for online others to
be more insensitive which interferes with safely immersing oneself in online chat. A
significant portion of online chat is also experienced as “immature.” The experience of
being a woman online is fraught with concerns about the painful judgments rendered
regarding femininity after visual images are posted online; particularly when the
evaluative heterosexual male discourse is founded upon idealized versions of Western
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female body types (e.g., Barbie). In a corresponding manner, the gay male and
heterosexual female’s ongoing exposure to sexualized online advances is eventually tired
of and disliked, or even resisted. Despite the risks for both online, it is remembered that
the enjoyment of online chat varies from one space to another and one persona to
another.
For those who come to online social practices after already having established
offline intimacy, the significant other’s bodily absence fails to be palpably fulfilled by
electronic presence. The familiar rhythms of full-bodied intercommunication are
disrupted by the narrow presence of e-language and the ensuing tedium of increasing
one’s verbiage as a way to compensate for the missing contexts of bodies in situ. The
lack of bodily accompaniments to worded dialogue give rise to incomplete contexts for
meaning. Misinterpretations follow, in part, because assumptions lack the gestural
information of embodied communication. Sometimes scrolling back through Instant
Messaging transcripts- a prosthetic memory of sorts - illuminated the cause of
misunderstandings and lead to conflict resolution.
The outcome for those seeking intimacy through online social practices is varied.
In order to successfully crossover from virtual intimacy to offline intimacy, it is believed
that fantasy play and engaging in the play of multiple identities must be suspended in
favor of revealing more honest disclosures about oneself. Personal growth is achieved
through developing aspects of oneself online (e.g., confidence, social skills, appreciation
for accurate self-disclosures) and applying such practices offline. Moreover, the need for
virtual sociality seems to dissipate as offline social experiences become more fulfilling.
When an intimate relationship precedes the crossover to online communication, there is a
loss of immediacy and a loss of the familiar ease with understanding one another.
Without the sensible other present, it is felt that e-text language by itself ceases to speak
as coherently during intimate exchanges. The loss of the sensual leads to the conclusion
that online social practices produce deficient social skills and result in creating people
who hear without listening.
Section II: Local and Cultural-Historical Data
Here, in Section II, I explore and thematize the world horizon of technology and
the Internet. The critical moment in this section consisted of combining Foucault’s dual
emphasis upon local social practice analysis and archival analysis as a way to understand
the history of the present. The analysis of local and archival standpoints also provided an
informed glimpse into the virtual social clearing belonging to Rochelle, Bryce, and
Dawn’s experiences and interactions.
For the purposes of my research inquiry into virtual subjectivity and sociality,
local site analysis was achieved by examining AOL’s description of the AOL Instant
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Messenger (AIM) window (See Appendix M). The local site analysis was further
augmented by conducting a thematic review of Lawrence Lessig’s commentary on AOL
and AIM itself (See Appendix L). The inclusion of this dual perspective on AIM
prepared the way for privileging Foucault’s emphasis upon articulating the play of
multiple interpretive forces vying to assert reality claims – or, in this case, vying to assert
claims about the situated nature of AIM space.
Destabilizing the authority of AOL’s singular viewpoint about AIM allowed the
“event of (researcher) understanding” about local Internet site dynamics to be freed from
presuppositions about achieving logocentric certainty. By, instead, adopting a
perspectival view on AIM, the technocultural-historical narrative - located at the end of
this section - revealed how AOL’s efforts to market AIM as safe, private, and relatively
unregulated seamlessly passed over AIM’s panoptic and normalizing function. For
instance, AIM’s stress upon insuring privacy for AIM users failed, according to Lessig, to
clarify AOL’s power to trace AIM user activity. Moreover, it understated the lack of
absolute privacy afforded to the users of encryption technology. Such insights clarified
some of the “strategies” used by AIM to condition and normalize various discourse-based
practices.
In the second part of this section, my textual analysis of scholarly works
addressing broad technocultural-historical trends allowed for the instantiation of a
hermeneutic circle – or rather, for the instantiation of a method for revising my
presuppositions about the local world of AIM and the metanarratives about
technocultural history. The works of Martin Heidegger, Robert Romanyshyn, Kenneth
Gergen, and Lawrence Lessig each contributed to enlarging my cultural-historical
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perspective on technology. In and through contrasting AIM social practices with the
macrocosmic perspective on technocultural-historical trends, it then became possible to
picture how the experiences described by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn were also
embedded in discourses at work throughout the way stations of history (e.g., modernism,
Enframing, romanticism). The technocultural-historical narrative, thus, provided a
forum for fashioning an integrated narrative about the relationship between local social
clearings and cultural-historical trends. It was revealed that as the Internet became an
increasingly structured space, the local norms and practices came to reflect, not one
discourse, but a variety of practices associated with the legacies of multiple discourses.
At core, however, AIM space was limited in advance by the legacy of modernity – a
legacy which privileges detached, de-sensualized, and de-contextualized modes of being
in the world with others. Nevertheless, within the frame of modernity, possibilities for
non-modern discourse were still at work in AIM space (e.g., romanticism,
postmodernism). Hence, the technocultural-historical narrative became a story about the
multiple threads of discourse woven into the Net – threads which were sometimes neatly
woven together, and threads sometimes so ill-woven that disentanglement from the Net
was necessitated in order to be free from its limitations.
Further ahead, in Section III, I compose the situated global narrative by reuniting
the interconnected reality of person and world. This was accomplished by reestablishing
the dialogic unity between the lived experiences of the research participants and the
constitutive forces at work in AIM space and in Western technocultural-history.
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Local Internet Site Data #1: AOL Critical Themes from Code (Lawrence
Lessig)
1. AIM space solicits the Western “self” to increasingly disassociate from the physical
body and practice virtual identity re-presentation in terms of a postmodern multiplicity or
modernist/romanticist singularity
By providing an option for online users to adopt multiple screen names, AIM engenders
forms of self-practice and self-fashioning potentially untethered to one’s offline embodied
identity. AIM thereby participates in producing a subject who can enact her sense of
fluid postmodern identity or retain a singular modernist/romanticist sense of identity.
• “. . . When you start an AOL account on AOL, you have the right to establish up to five
identities . . .
So in AOL you are given a fantastic power of pseudonymity that the “code
writers” of real space simply do not give . . .”
2. AOL maintains its (panoptic) oversight by loosely enforcing practices of normative
behavior consonant with a particular cyber-space
AOL positions itself as the institution with the final word on enabling or disabling online
social practices in the various AOL communities. At the same time, AOL allow for a
diversity of normatively different communities and ways of being to exist within the
ambiguous framework of “decency.”
• “ . . . Within the limits of decency, and so long as you are in the proper place, you can
say what you want on AOL.”
3. AOL’s architecture of sociality and power is asymmetrical. Where AOL owners
retain the power to speak to the whole AOL community, each AOL member’s access to
community platforms for introducing broad based change are substantially restricted
AOL has created a social field that grants AOL members the limited power to influence
circumscribed local norms rather than impact the broader regulating authority of AOL
owners. Consequently, the “self” in AOL is fashioned to wield limited power to affect
structural social changes.
• “. . . There is no space where you could address all members of AOL. There is no town
hall or town meeting where people can complain in public and have their complaints
heard by others . . . The owners of AOL, however, can speak to all . . . The rest of the
members of AOL can speak to crowds only where they notice a crowd. And never a
crowd greater than twenty-three.”
4. AOL members exist within a virtual field of “traceability,” or rather, centralized
visibility to AOL’s gaze
The online “self” practices virtual forms of existence while submitting to the awareness
that various online practices may be under surveillance.
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• “. . . AOL can (and no doubt does) trace your activities and collect information about
them. What files you download, what areas you frequent, who your “buddies” are – all
this is available to AOL . . . “
• “. . . . AOL knows (even if no one else does) just who you are. It knows who you are, it
knows where you live in real space . . .”
5. AOL allocates a limited portion of its power to observe other AOL members in the
form of “buddy lists”
AOL members are granted limited power to observe other AOL member activities. AOL
members may also have some of their online actions observed by selected online
members - but only if screen names have been freely disclosed to one another.
• “. . . One wonderful feature of the online space is something called “buddy lists . . .”
Local Internet Site Data #2: AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) Critical Themes
1. AIM advertising produces excitement and immediate access to the technologically
enabled power, value, and social practice associated with maintaining a constancy of
virtual interconnectivity with others
AIM advertising valorizes a multiplication of virtual social practices consistent with the
modernist and Cartesian de-emphasis upon sensual bodily and worldly significance.
• “Connect with your friends and family – anytime, anywhere! AIM® 5.2 for Windows,
Download Now! . . .”
• “. . . AIM Remote™ [buttons]:
{I am Online. Send me an IM.}
{Add me to your Buddy List.}
{Join my Chat Room.}
{Send me E-Mail.} . . .”
• “. . . AIM Express Features: AIM Express lets you send instant messages directly form
a Web browser, such as Netscape navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer, to anyone
who has registered for AIM or who uses the America Online service . . .
2. AIM encourages the employment of prepackaged online pictorial re-presentations of
one’s “self” as a way to communicate what is lost by bodily presence in cyberspace
AIM compensates for what amounts to the modernist and virtual abandonment of the
flesh by introducing a catalogue of smiley face symbols and images of cultural celebrities
into online social practice. In these ways, the virtual social field is filled with representational traces of embodiment rather than the tone and texture of the sensual flesh
and world. The surplus of complexity and dynamism occurring during nonverbal
incarnate interchanges exceeds what virtual re-presentations can convey. The “self” in
AIM space must, therefore, still submit to the diminution of the sensual when employing
virtual social practices.
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• “. . . AIM Expressions™ is the exciting way to personalize your AIM® client and
instant messages . . .”
• “Buddy Icons . . . Make your IMs display your online personality. Choose a cool
Buddy Icon . . . Choose from hundreds of cool Buddy Icons:”
• “Smiley Dictionary: Ever wonder what people are saying on AIM? Use the handy
Smiley Dictionary to keep up . . .”
3. AIM reproduces the Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology by promoting an
instrumental (means-end), efficient, and expedient relationship to language
AIM encourages language practices based on expedience and convenience rather than
upon practices which privilege fulsome modes of revealing.
• “. . . Acronym Dictionary: Get your message across quickly and save some
keystrokes, too . . . you’ll be communicating faster than ever with friends, family, and
colleagues.”
4. Within AOL’s extensive virtual social community exists a centralized list of norms
which frame parameters for the production of norms in local cyber spaces
AIM empowers individual online users to enact personal and local norms. By contrast,
AOL codifies broadly applicable normative rules and guidelines comprised of
suggestions and legal injunctions. Within different virtual spaces, netizens are free to
practice a plurality of ethics (postmodern?) within the limits of legal norms (modernist?)
• “Block members who misbehave.”
• “. . . Please review our chat rules and guidelines.” (See Appendix N for AIM Chat
Room Rules and Guidelines)
5. AIM promotes a subset of social practices which are relatively free from the visibility
of the virtual field
AIM encryption allows Instant Messaging social practices to instantiate a postmodern
space largely free from the encroachment of non-local norms. Encryption technology,
free of backdoor decryption options, would go further to insure against interference from
large institutionalized systems (e.g., government).
• “Encrypted IM: Now you can send and receive encrypted IMs . . .”
6. AOL prompts an incitement to speech in virtual interactive domains
AOL’s incitement to interactive online speech results in a social saturation which can
contribute to the “self’s” exposure to broader ways of being a “self.
• “AIM Chat Rooms . . . Hot Chats . . . Hobbies and Interests . . . International . . . Love
& Romance . . .”
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7. AOL’s addition of the AIM-mobile phone interface furthers the production of social
practices increasingly disconnected form body and world
AOL creates a wireless architecture promoting easier wireless crossovers from voicebased communication space to virtual communication space. Impediments to the “self’s”
immersion in virtual sociality are overcome.
• “. . . Sending IMs to mobile phones just got easier. Now you can create nicknames for
your Buddies’ mobile numbers . . .”
• “. . . Have Instant Messages delivered to your cell phone, when you’re away from your
PC . . .”
Technocultural-Historical Themes #1: “The Question Concerning
Technology” (QCT). Having concluded the critically informed analysis of local AIM
social practices, I took up the task of exploring the broad horizon of Western discourses
in the technocultural-historical textual analyses below. In the first of four scholarly text
analyses, Martin Heidegger’s essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” provided
the widest or most historically panoramic understanding of modern technology vis á vis
the other scholarly texts I examined. Here, Heidegger reached as far back as Socratic
Greece to inaugurate ”thinking” about how the enframing of modern technology opens up
a disclosive space which narrowly reveals things as “standing reserve.” By contrast, the
technē of the pre-Socratic Greeks brought into freer disclosure that which was prevented
from presencing within an instrumental perspective. In corollary fashion, it was later
seen that Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s difficulties with arriving at clarity about the
virtual others they encountered were situated within the constricted social practices
linked to Enframing (Ge-stell).
Below, Heidegger’s cultural-historical understanding of modern technology has
been articulated under two broad thematic categories. The two broad thematic categories

102
to be considered in this section will address forms of being a “self” and forms of relation
with the world occasioned by modern technology.
Themes: Forms of being a “self”
A. Modern technology solicits the self to order the world (as standing-reserve) [QCT]
The theory of nature found in the modern physics of the seventeenth century prefigured
the essence of modern technology, Enframing. With the rise of machine-power
technology in the eighteenth century, Enframing occasioned a clearing where the modern
self participated in marshalling the world to come to presence in a narrowly ordered
fashion. The modern self’s capacity to reveal a richly variegated significance of the
world was correspondingly eclipsed.
• “The essence of technology lies in Enframing. Its holding sway belongs within
destining. Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing,
man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of
pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of
deriving all his standards on this basis” (p. 26).
• “Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets
upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as
standing-reserve” (p. 24).
• “Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely human doing.
Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man [sic] to order the real
as standing-reserve in accordance with the way it shows itself. That challenge
gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates upon ordering the real as
standing-reserve” (p. 19)
• “Modern physics is the herald of Enframing . . .” (p. 22).
B. The instrumental view of technology gives rise to a self understood as the master of
technology (QCT)
The instrumental view of modern technology, as a means to an end, “conditions” the
human self to manipulate technology for the ends which modern technology serves. In
this way, modern technology and the human activity of the modern self are regulated. As
a way to overcome the lack of a free relationship to modern technology, the human self
views its self as the master of the technology it has been “ordered” to employ.
• “Technology is a contrivance, or in Latin, an instrumentum” (p. 5).
• “As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but
does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of
objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he comes to
the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is he comes to the point where he himself
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will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so
threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the
impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as
it is his construct” (pp. 26-27).
• “ . . . modern technology . . . is a means to an end. That is why the instrumental
conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right
relation to technology. Everything depends on our manipulating technology in
the proper manner as a means . . . The will to mastery becomes all the more
urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control” (p. 5).
• “So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the
will to master it. We press on past the essence of technology” (p. 32).
C. The essence of technology invites the self to reflect freely in an ongoing mode of
revealing (QCT)
The essence of technology was prominent during the era of pre-Socratic Greece as
technē. The ancient understanding of technē freed the human self to bring-forth truth,
not as a fixed representation, but rather as a free revealing of what presented itself. The
human self was attuned to the shared participation of conventional modes of knowing
(e.g., objectivity) and aesthetic sensibilities in the process of unconcealment.
• “From the earliest times until Plato the word technē is linked with the word
epistēmē. Both words are names for knowing in the widest sense” (p. 13).
• “Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was
called technē. And the poiēsis of the fine arts was called technē.
In Greece, at the outset of the destining of the West, the arts soared to the supreme
height of the revealing granted them” (p. 34).
• “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is,
on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology . . .
Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part, does not
shut its eyes to the constellation of truth . . .” (p.35).
• “The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of
technology” (p. 3).
Forms of relation with the world
A. In modern technology the world is understood as a resource to be stockpiled as a
standing-reserve (QCT)
Amidst the sway of modern technology, the world is revealed as a potential energy
resource to be store housed for future human use. The disclosure of the world is typically
confined to its value as a readily available material support for human existence.
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• “ . . . man in the technological age is, in a particularly striking way, challenged
forth into revealing. That revealing concerns nature, above all, as the chief
storehouse of the standing energy reserve . . . Modern science’s way of
representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces” (p.
21).
• “And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not
unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiēsis. The revealing that rules in
modern technology is a challenging [Herausforden], which puts to nature the
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as
such” (p. 14).
• “The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of
setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth. That challenging happens in that
the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what
is transformed is stored up . . .” (p. 16).
• “Everywhere, everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand,
indeed to stand there just so it may be on call for further ordering” (p. 17).
B. In modern technology the world is understood as having a singular essence (QCT)
From the time of Socrates forward, the essence of the things of the world was thought to
have been predetermined and unalterable. Truth-claims, grounded in the assumptions of
Western metaphysics, posited a singular essence for the things of the world. In this way,
the being of the world was debilitated by human forgetfulness about the dynamic
unfolding of the world’s significance.
• “Socrates and Plato already think the essence of something as what essences,
what comes to presence in the sense of what endures. But they think what
endures remains permanently [das Fortwährende] (aei on)” (p. 30).
• “But it can never in any way be established that enduring is based solely on
what Plato thinks as idea and Aristotle thinks as to ti ēn einai (that which any
particular thing has always been), or what metaphysics in its most varied
interpretations thinks as essentia” (p. 30).
• “It is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way
what is usually understood by ‘essence’” (p. 30).
C. The essence of technology allows the world to be revealed through a continuous
process of “unconcealment” (QCT)
The “danger” of modern technology encompasses the loss of free unconcealment as a
human practice. Such a “danger” amounts to losing touch with the essence of technology
as a way of revealing the world through continuous cycles of disclosure and
concealment. The plentitude of the world’s significance can show itself when the “saving
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power” to recover open-ended unconcealment is revitalized by the imminent threat of
such a loss.
• “Bringing-forth comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into
unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we call
revealing [das Entbergen]. The Greeks have the word aletheia for revealing. The
Romans translate this with veritas” (pp.11-12).
• “Technology is therefore no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If
we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will
open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (p. 12).
• “The question concerning technology is the question concerning the
constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence
of truth, comes to pass” (p. 33).
• “Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing,
bring-forth, but it conceals revealing itself and with it That wherein
unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass” (p. 27).
• “Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is a danger in the highest sense.
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also” (p. 28).
Technocultural-Historical Themes #2: Technology as Symptom and Dream
TSD. In this, the second scholarly text analysis, Robert Romanyshyn’s Technology as
Symptom and Dream stands as a chronicle of discourses emerging from the world of art,
anatomy, and physical science circa the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries.
Romanyshyn demonstrated how the latter fields of study crystallized practices positing
the self as a spectator, the world as a spectacle, and embodiment as a specimen.
Technology’s corollary dream followed suit by extolling a detachment from both the
earthly world and the incarnate self.
After I compared the cultural-historical themes outlined by Romanyshyn with the
local site analysis of AIM, it became clear that while the local AIM space similarly
privileged practices linked to disembodiment and disconnection from the physical world,
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AIM practices also allowed Internet users to engage in practices partially offsetting the
loss of bodily presence (e.g., AIM Expressions, emoticons) and worldly context. In this
way, AIM’s virtual communication practices both reproduced and challenged the
modernist assumptions informing the architecture of virtuality
In the themes outlined below, Romanyshyn’s cultural-historical understanding of
the technological world and its cultural project have been articulated under three broad
thematic categories. The three broad thematic categories considered in this section will
address living the body, forms of being a “self,” and forms of relation with the world.
Themes: Living the body
A. Modernity solicits abandonment of the flesh (TSD)
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are marked by the rise of knowledges and practices
(e.g., Brunelleschi and Alberti’s codification of linear perspective vision in painting)
which “seeded” the current technological world’s estranged way of knowing and
inhabiting bodily being. Embodiment was understood as a hindrance, an impediment,
and an obstacle to knowing one’s world.
• “. . . within the space of linear perspective vision and under the fixed gaze
which stares at the horizon, the human body is taken up into the heady eye of
mind . . . Our senses will make increasingly less sense of the world as the body
matters increasingly less than thought” (p. 48).
• “Indeed the daring Copernicus’ imagination, ‘which lifted him from the earth
and enabled him to look down upon her as though he actually were an inhabitant
of the sun,’ lies in his willingness to dispense with the body in order to achieve a
vision of things no longer misled by appearances” (p. 95).
• “Descartes . . . completed another work, in 1649, entitled The Passions of the
Soul, in which he continued to elaborate the relations between the conscious
person and the estranged body” (p. 141).
• “. . . the telos of technology’s dream to refashion the body is toward
abandonment
of the body, toward disincarnation” (p. 20).
• “. . . the human body has become something quite unknown to us, unfamiliar, an
alien abstraction . . .” (p. 103).
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• “In leaving the body behind, the self behind the window can better realize its
vision of the world, a vision purified of the flesh, sterilized, if you will, a vision,
we might say, without taste” (p. 114).
B. The modern body is experienced as an object (TSD)
In the modern imagination, the individual’s body is meant to matter from a detached
perspective. The modern discourse understands the human body anatomically, as a
sanitized, depersonalized corpse or specimen. At the individual level, one is thereby
invited to understand living flesh as an object comprised of mechanical functions.
Forgetfulness about the sensual, emotional, and mortal horizons animating the flesh
conceals how the body gathers meaning about its vital involvement in the world.
• “In 1543 [Andreas Vesalius] created modern anatomy. Before Vesalius the nonliving body was a dead body. After Vesalius, the dead body became a corpse.
Corpses are designed to be open for inspection . . .” (p.16).
• “[William] Harvey resurrects the corpse. In 1628 he reanimates it by making
the heart into a pump. A crude machine . . .” (pp. 16-17)
• “In offering us an image of life as mechanism, as technical function, the corpse
hides death and conceals the living body as an e-motional involvement and
relation with the world” (p. 132).
• “ . . . the eye as the paramount organ of distance comes to represent humanity
which, in increasingly removing itself from the world, becomes less and less
touched by it . . we shall say that the body abandoned is free to become the corpse
. . .” (p. 44)
• “ . . . the corpse hides life as well as death . . .” (p. 127).
• “ ‘With the beginning of anatomy,’ van den Berg writes, ‘the distinction
between life and death becomes obscure’ . . . The corpse removes the smell of
death, and in this respect the corpse becomes the only thing it can become, neither
a living nor a dead body, but a lifeless thing” (p. 127).
• “The body which we have invented to fit the space of the world opened up by
the linear perspective vision is a body of technical functioning. It is an
anatomical object . . .” (p. 114).
• “ . . . to retreat within the defined spaces of my anatomical arm, the more my
arm becomes an arm, like any other arm” (p. 105).
• “ . . . our invention of the anatomical body has helped us forget: the body is a
situation and as such changes” (pp. 108-110).
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Forms of being a “self”
A. The modern self is prone to become a detached spectator (TSD)
The “window” of linear perspective vision in art and the objective stance of the scientist
of modernity both participate in producing the detached way in which individuals relate
to their world. Modernity solicits a passive relation to one’s world. Humanity thereby
becomes an observer, a dispassionate spectator of its worldly horizon. Lacking
investment in and communion with a world richly animated by meaning and sensuality,
humanity reproduces a space of literalized interiority that forgets its productive powers
of imagination and reflection. The spectator sees without fully understanding.
• “The window which Alberti imagined between the viewer and the world has
become a style of consciousness marked by our retreat and estrangement from the
world” (p. 68).
• “In the space of linear perspective the viewer is imagined to be looking at the
world as if through a window. The window is our habit of mind . . . Behind the
window we have become distant and detached, a self separated and isolated from
the world, a neutral observer and recorder of the world’s events” (p. 67).
• “The spectator self who trains his or her fixed gaze upon the world also practices
a singular vision. It is that single vision of Newton’s sleep from which the poet
Blake begged deliverance, a literalizing vision which forgets the play of
imagination, which was Blake’s point.” (p. 99)
• “Behind a window, it is easier to imagine that one is only an on-looker of the
world, a detached and non-involved spectator” (p. 67).
• “Cool, detached, impartial, and objective, the self of distant vision becomes
increasingly indifferent to a world it views from afar” (p. 89)
• “ . . . the distance which separates our knowledge of the world from our
experience of it has increased” (p. 68).
B. The modern self is prone to take itself up as a “master” of its world and of nature
(TSD)
Modernism places emphasis upon the self’s detachment from the world. The Western
self’s experience of distance from the world has given rise to a human self imbued with
the belief in its centrality and omnipotence. The ensuing belief in the power to control
and recreate nature serves as an attitudinal backcloth influencing the modern self to
ignore finitude and its symbiotic relation with the vital landscape of life.
• “ . . . in becoming increasingly detached it becomes increasingly possible to
imagine that one is in charge and in control of things. With increasing distance it
becomes easier to believe that one is really at the center” (pp. 44-47).

109
• “Having dominated the earth out of our increasing distance from it, we have
come to believe that we are masters, and even creators . . . In this respect, we have
lost something of the religious sense of human life . . . the sense that we are
already bound, and connected to, and limited by something beyond ourselves” (p.
25).
• “[Frankenstein] is made by man [sic] and is manmade. As made by man the
monster is the product of a human vision which would master, tame, and even
remake nature” (p. 161).
C. The self of modernity tends to reject its “sensual” capacities (TSD)
Linear perspective vision and scientized/mathematicized ways of understanding nature
promote epistemologically based practices which shape the self as a head-centered
rational organism. Humankind is thereby sent on a way of knowing which devalues the
rich sensory ground supporting the reflections of mind. The human self then finds itself
inhabiting abstractions rather than the sensual flesh of its body-world entwinement.
• “There is in this [scientific and mathematicized] attitude a decisive rejection of
the sensuous world and its sensible appearances, a turning away from the fleshy
world of appearances, and even a distrust of how our bodily sense of the world
makes sense of the world, a distrust which is destined to become the methodic
doubt of the world which lies at the heart of the modern scientific attitude . . . .
Doubt occupies in modern thought the same central position which wonder in the
face of the world occupied in Greek thought” (p. 78).
• “Indeed, to set the earth in motion Copernicus had to forget the sensuous body, a
feet for which Galileo gave him much praise. Copernicus had to abandon his
body, he had to leave it behind, he had to become, so to speak, the first astronaut”
(p. 135).
• “. . . within the space of linear perspective vision and under the fixed gaze
which stares at the horizon, the human body is taken up into the heady eye of
mind . . . Our senses will make increasingly less sense of the world as the body
matters increasingly less than thought” (p. 48).
• “In addition to this separation between perceiver and world, the window initiates
an eclipse of the body. Looked at from behind a window, the world is primarily
something to be seen. Indeed, a window between me and the world tends not
only to emphasize the eye as a means of access to the world but also to deemphasize the other senses . . . [M]y vision of the world from behind the window
tends to lose touch with the sounds, tastes, smells, and feel of the world” (p. 42).
• “Our sense will make increasingly less sense of the world as the body matters
increasingly less than thought” (p. 48).
• “ . . . the body increasingly becomes a matter of the head” (p.48).
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D. The self of modernity tends to be “unconscious” of “gestural” meaning and
emotional significance (TSD)
Seventeenth century discourse “reanimated” the body of anatomy as a collection of
reflexes. Depersonalizing embodiment in this way divorced bodily action from the
motivations of the person. The modern self, solicited to forget that a plentitude of
meaning infuses its actions, progressively lost sight of the desires, emotions, memories,
and feminine possibilities motivating its living connection to the world. In banishing the
significance of desire, emotion, memory, and the feminine to the concealing shadows of
forgetfulness, these nonobjective experiences survived in the modern self’s existence as
distressing and ambiguous feelings of anxiety or as disturbing symptoms of disease (e.g.,
neurosis, hysteria, anorexia).
• “ . . . within fifty years of Descartes’ speculations about [the reflex] body, the
English philosopher John Locke, in 1691, makes desire a matter of interior
uneasiness, a restlessness carried inside . . . [A] body whose desires have lost their
place in the world casts a shadow. The reflex body forced to bear its burden of
desire by itself, apart from the world, becomes the mesmerized and hypnotized
body of the eighteenth century” (p. 144).
• “ . . . Freud’s hysterics, whose neurotic symptoms betray how they suffer from
reminiscences, from memories which have no place in the world, make their
appearances respectively at the very beginning of the twentieth century and at the
end of the nineteenth” (p. 142).
• “At this cultural threshold, then, the pantomimic, gestural body of everyday life,
the body which is always more than an objectified technical function, is forgotten
and remembered, and as such it is present as a cultural symptom. For just as an
individual symptom, like anxiety or depression, both reveals and conceals a
conflict of emotions, these shadows of the abandoned body reveal and conceal the
animate flesh of daily life, the body of desire, memory, and movement, the
individual, personal body of character in relation to the world from which we
have all taken flight. As symptoms, then, these figures of the body haunt and
shadow our cultural dreams of escape and reincarnation” (p. 148)
• “Our reigning vision of the world as a space where everything, lying on the
same plane, is a matter of objective fact has been able to appropriate [lived
experience], either by confining it to the world of art, which, it assumed, has little
if anything to do with real life, or by indexing to it the adjective ‘subjective’ . . .
But in doing so we miss the all-important truth that these landscapes are the
unconscious of our age, symptoms in need of our attention” (p.183).
• “In the horizon-tal space of linear perspective vision the idea of progress and the
reality of the unconscious are born” (p. 44).
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• “The madman or madwoman is a body out of control, and the grinning face of
the fool is a mockery not only of a life which would deny death but of a kind of
reason that would leave the body behind” (p. 152).
• “It should be noted, however, that insofar as the shadows of the abandoned body
are predominantly feminine in character, we might venture the notion that the
discovery – invention of the abandoned body is, psychologically speaking, a
masculine enterprise” (p. 151).
E. The modern self tends to function repetitively and mechanically as if it were a “robot”
(TSD)
The scientific discourse of the seventeenth century understood the motion of objects as
driven by the laws of “mechanism.” This mechanical understanding of motion was
employed to explain the behavioral “movements” of human beings as well. Moreover,
this dehumanized understanding of human action, reframed mechanized ways of being as
a means to transcend nature. Thus the human self eventually found itself anchored in a
world that solicited automatic, efficient, and productive behaviors. The modern self was
no longer invited to act in accord with its horizon of manifold possibilities.
• “With Kepler in 1609 we discover that the motion of the planets is an ellipse.
But what matters to our story is not the exact geometric shape of the motion, but
the fact that the motion as geometric prescribes a movement, a circulation
regulated by mechanism. Earth and body obey a new law of circulation, and each
begins to move with a mechanically regulated rhythm” (p. 136).
• “ . . . Descartes’ vision . . . is made quite explicit in his work La description du
corps humain, written in 1648 . . . In this work he offers an explicit formulation of
the body as machine . . .” (p. 140).
• “ . . . the robot as such enters the stage of history in 1928 as a dramatic character
in a play by Karl Capek entitled R.U.R., Rossum’s Universal Robots . . . . What
Capek saw . . . was the mechanization and dehumanization of humanity. And
what he described in his drama was the robot worker, efficient, free from the
distractions of memory and desire, with the body of a man or woman remade and
now superior to nature – a body designed to work, a body whose death would
simply mean the absence of motion” (p. 146).
• “The industrial worker is an explicit incarnation of the reflex body and the robot
is an image of this worker taken to its full degree. The idea of the robot is, of
course, older than the industrial age, but the specific sense of the robot in relation
to labor, and the word itself, belong to the time frame of this history of the
abandoned body” (p. 145).
• “The body reanimated via reflex is a machine, and hence its motion has a
mechanical, repetitive character . . . It is a motion which lends itself to being
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broken into its parts – a motion, then, which allows or invites fragmentation”
(p.144).
• “The automatically functioning body behaves without reference to its situation .
. . . A body, moreover, which is insensitive to its situation, is also a body acting
repetitively” (p.141).
• “The robot would be a being which would transcend nature. It would rise above
the flesh” (p. 147).
• “The eclipse of the difference between the heart as a pump and the human heart,
between technical functions and human activity is the issue” (p. 18).
Forms of relation with the world
A. Things of the world come to matter as a spectacle of objects (TSD)
The window of linear perspective vision participated in producing a detached, deanimated view of the world. The human gaze thereby came to understand the spectacle of
the world as an exhibit comprised of discrete objects. Humankind’s culturally acquired
style of modern perception took cultural, psychological, symbolic, and imaginal distance
from the world of perceptual objects resulting in a de-vivification of matter.
• “What linear perspective vision achieves is a kind of geometrization of the space
of the world, and within that space we become observers of the world which has
become an object for vision” (p. 33).
• “The gaze of the observer . . . leads to a distancing gaze of scientific
observation, and the consequence, in both cases, is that the thing becomes a
specimen and a spectacle” (p. 67).
• “ . . . the self, as spectator of the world with a body which has become a
specimen, already practices that distance which prepares for departure from a
world which has become a spectacle” (p. 57).
• “The spectator self who trains his or her fixed gaze upon the world is also
practicing a singular vision . . . a literalizing vision which forgets the play of
imagination . . .” (p. 99).
• “Insofar as we become accustomed to single vision, to that vision addicted to a
fixed perspective or point of view, to a single angle of interpretation . . .” (pp. 99100).
B. The world becomes place to depart from (TSD)
The intensification of the boundary between human being and world, occasioned by
linear perspective vision, contributed to humanities retreat from the world – a departure
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wherein humankind emotionally withdrew from a world it was neglecting. In this way,
humanity perpetuated a sense of homelessness amidst its earthly landscape.
• “The condition of the window implies a boundary between the perceiver and the
perceived . . . a formal separation between a subject who sees the world and the
world that is seen, and in doing so it sets the stage, as it were, for that retreat or
withdrawal of the self from the world which characterizes the modern age” (p.
42).
• “ . . . the telos of technology’s dream to refashion the body is toward
abandonment of the body, toward disincarnation. The dream is, however,
inseparable from the dream of departing earth. Disincarnation is a moment of
departure” (p. 20).
• “Indeed, the fires of nuclear catastrophe are the symptomatic side of the fires of
departure. Wedded in this fashion, departure takes on the character of
psychological necessity. On an earth wired for destruction, space flight becomes
a means of escape” (p. 23).
C. The world becomes a place to explained (TSD)
The linear perspective vision gave rise to modernity’s relation to the world as something
to be observed, measured, analyzed, and explained. The production of objectively
informed perception, as a cultural habit, thus reduced the qualitative thickness and
richness of the world to categories suitable for rational, scientific understanding and
explanation.
• “ . . . the world on the other side of the window is already set to become a matter
of information” (p. 42).
• “ . . . a linear perspective vision is one which places everything on the same
level and in this respect the imaginal eye of the artist has already prepared the
space for the sixteenth-century emergence of the scientific world of explanations”
(p. 43).
• “When we adopt a look which scales the world to its quantities, the world is
leveled of its qualities. In mapping the world we thereby explain it” (p. 83).
• “In the space of explanation, we turned our eye toward the future and turned our
back on the past. Progress and not history was destined to matter” (p. 180).
D. The world is leveled down to its value as energy resource and commodity (TSD)
Behind the window of linear perspective vision, the displaced world was set to be emptied
of its significance and revalued as a matter of consumption and economics. Modernity
put the world to use as source of energy to be used as the “light” of the human world. In
addition, the extraction of resources from the earth sustained humanity’s reliance upon
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an economics tied to the system of production and consumption for the sake of acquiring
capital.
• “The convergence of economics and science into one vision of reality, the
convergence of truth as explanation and worth as price, the convergence of money
and things, is perhaps the most obvious way in which we have lost touch with
things and things have lost their place” (p.195).
• “Amidst all the events images, inventions, and instruments which belong to our
technological world, the one item which is perhaps the most fundamental is the
equation E=mc2. Nothing perhaps has had more of an impact on our lives, or
indeed on the history of humanity, than this mathematical formula, which has
become the symbol of our age . . . this equation is the code by which the energy of
the stars is released from the ordinary matter of earth” (p. 186)
• “We are energy producers and consumers, and it is energy and our need for it
which most characterize our age” (p. 187).
• “The interest, meaning, and even desire of our relationships with things are
broken, and we find ourselves in a landscape of commodities and consumer goods
subject to the laws of supply and demand” (p. 196).
Technocultural-Historical Themes #3: The Saturated Self (SS). In this, the
third scholarly text analysis, the aperture of historical analysis is narrowed to the
twentieth century. Herein, I thematize Kenneth Gergen’s, The Saturated Self, which
stood as an examination of technological developments in media, travel, and
communication as occasions for the advent of postmodernism. Gergen described how the
prior discourses of romanticism and modernism came into question as twentieth century
technologies brought the individual into contact with an increasing array of non-local
worldviews. Said differently, Gergen described how a plurality of previously
marginalized perspectives were paradoxically admitted into consideration by practices of
modernity. The ensuing influx of diverse perspectives allowed postmodern discourse to
gain credibility whereas romantic and modernist discourses descended, more or less, into
dubitation.
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With Gergen’s cultural-historical analysis in mind, the technocultural-historical
narrative developed at the end of Section II integrated the critically evaluated local AIM
data with Gergen’s characterization of romanticism, modernism, and postmodernism. By
doing so, it was revealed that Internet practices instantiated practices pertaining to each of
the three historical discourses, rather than instantiating one discourse to the exclusion of
the other two.
In the themes developed below, Gergen’s cultural-historical understanding
regarding technology’s impact on constructions of the self and sociality have been
articulated under two broad thematic categories. The two broad thematic categories
considered in this section address forms of being a “self” and forms of relation with the
world.
Themes: Forms of being a “self”
A. The self of romanticism and modernity is undergoing dissolution (SS)
As contemporary technologies open the way for broader social involvements – for social
saturation – the Western self is allowed to “internalize” and enact a plurality of
alternative selves. What once counted as the essential deep self of romanticism and the
rational self of modernism is now giving way to ambiguous possibilities for being in the
emerging postmodern era.
• “It is the process of self-population that begins to undermine the commitments
to both romanticist and modernist forms of being. It is of pivotal importance in
setting the stage for the postmodern turn” (p. 69).
• “ . . . there is little hope that the past can be recovered. Our best option, then, is
to play out the positive options of the postmodern erasure of the self” (p. xiii).
• “ . . . the eroding of the identifiable self is both supported by and manifest in a
wide range of beliefs and practices” (p .7)
B. The self, linked to communication technologies, becomes multiphrenic as the self is
infused with social saturation (SS)
As the self embraces a “symbiotic interdependence” with technologies enabling social
saturation, the self becomes immersed in landscapes filled with multiple, disparate, and
contradictory voices. On the way to early postmodern self-consciousness, the multiply
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populated self can become multiphrenic. In this state, the erstwhile selves of romanticism
and modernism might undergo experiences ranging from feeling unstable, unbalanced
and cautious to feeling free, expansive, and receptive to otherness.
• “There is a populating of the self, reflecting the infusion of partial identities
through social saturation. And there is the onset of a multiphrenic condition, in
which one begins to experience the vertigo of unlimited multiplicity. Both the
populating of the self and the multiphrenic condition are significant preludes to
postmodern consciousness” (p. 49).
• “ . . . there is a cyclical spiraling toward a state of multiphrenia. As one’s
possibilities are expanded by technologies, so one increasingly employs the
technologies for self expression; yet, as the technologies are further utilized, so do
they add to the repertoire of potentials. It would be a mistake to view this
multiphrenic condition as a form of illness, for it is often suffused with a sense of
expansiveness and adventure” (p. 74).
• “ A multiphrenic condition emerges in which one swims in ever-shifting,
concatenating, and contentious currents . . . The possibility for committed
romanticism or strong single-minded modernism recedes, and the way is opened
for the postmodern being” (p. 80).
C. Waning commitments to traditional notions of self lead to enactment of the
postmodern relational self (SS)
Upon embracing postmodern ways of being, the self is more readily attuned to the fluid,
dynamic, and relational qualities of self-realization. Rather than experiencing internal
conflicts over identity definition, the traditional notion of the self - as discrete and selfcontained - gave way to a lived understanding of the self as continually unfolding
through dialogue with various others.
• “As the self as a serious reality is laid to rest and the self is constructed and
reconstructed in multiple contexts, one enters finally the stage of the relational
self. One’s sense of individual autonomy gives way to a reality of immersed
interdependence, in which it is relationship that constructs the self” (p. 147).
• “As the modernist is drawn into the socially saturated world . . . the concept of
the true and independent self – whether constituted by a deep interior or
machinelike rationality – loses its descriptive and explanatory import. One is thus
prepared to enter a third and final stage, in which self is replaced by the reality of
relatedness – or the transformation of “you” and “I” to “us” (p.156).
• “For the postmodern, life is rendered more fully expressive and enriched by
suspending the demands for personal coherence, self-recognition, or determinant
place, and simply being within the ongoing process of relating” (p. 134).
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Forms of relation with the world
A. Objective and rational modernist worldviews are still prevalent despite their conflicts
with emerging postmodern viewpoints and receding romanticist perspectives (SS)
The current cultural zeitgeist instantiates the shifting dominance of various historical
worldviews. Presently the self is conspicuously solicited to relate to the world from the
rational-objective standpoint of modernism.
• “Modernist assumptions of rationality, objectivity, and essentialism have been
under attack . . . Yet even without a sustaining rationale, the modernist
perspective continues to dominate Western culture” (p. 231).
• “ . . . in the three-way conflict of discourses, each simultaneously compels and
repels. Romanticist discourse is inviting in its intimations of profound mysteries
of the person, love, commitment, inspiration, and the like. At the same time,
modernist discourse engenders a promising sense of security and optimism with
its emphasis on the rational, reliable, knowable, and improvable aspects of the
person. And the newly emerging postmodern perspective opens the way to a
fascinating play of potentials and an increased sense of relational reality” (p. 229).
B. The postmodern views of the world imbue the erstwhile certainty of modernist
perspectives with doubt (SS)
The emerging postmodern self doubts the apodictic certainty regarding the identity of
persons and things. The postmodern self respects the impermanence and indeterminacy
of identity and meaning as a positive quality belonging to a world bound up with
inexhaustible profiles of significance.
• “ . . . as the range of our relationships is expanded, the validity of each localized
rationality is threatened. What is rational in one relationship is questionable or
absurd from the standpoint of another” (p. 78).
• “In effect, one’s self becomes populated with others. The result is a steadily
accumulating sense of doubt in the objectivity of any position one holds” (p. 85).
• “Indeed, with the shift from objects to objectification, from reality to
constructions of reality, we cross the threshold into a virtual vertigo of selfreflexive doubt” (p. 134).
• “ . . . as one becomes increasingly aware of multiplicity in perspective, thingsin-themselves disappear form view” (p. 112).
• “ . . . social saturation brings with it a general loss in our assumption in true and
knowable selves” (p. 16).
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• “ . . . the very technologies giving rise to the pluralism of postmodernism also
serve to undermine the potentials of these resources for solidifying cultural modes
of understanding and action” (p. 201).
C. Embracing broader opportunities for relatedness with others alters the forms of social
intimacy (SS)
Social involvements with a broader range of people is possible amidst the social
saturation enabled by modern communication technologies. Compensatory
transformations in social connection include partial intimacy, accelerated pacing of
relationships, or sporadic yet intense encounters.
• “ . . . social saturation and self-population throw traditions into disarray;
committed forms of relationship become antiquated, and a multiplicity of partial
relations is favored” (p. 182).
• “ . . . a new form of relationship emerges in which family members attempt to
compensate for the vast expanses of nonrelatedness with intense expressions of
bondedness. As many understand it, quantity is replaced by quality” (p. 66).
• “The occasional meeting is intensified by its shortness” (p. 67).
• “The pace of relationships is hurried, and processes of unfolding that once
required months or years may be accomplished in days or weeks” (p.62).
Technocultural-Historical Themes #4: Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace
(COLC). In the last of the four scholarly texts, Lawrence Lessig’s Code and Other Laws
of Cyberspace was selected for its micro historical analysis of the constructed nature of
cyberspace. Lessig articulated a short history of cyberspace by demonstrating how the
situated nature of cyberspace is conditioned by the interaction of software code, laws,
norms, and markets. More to the point, Lessig emphasized that the Internet is best
characterized as a mosaic of cyber spaces. Rather than being understood as a single
space, Lessig contended that each cyber space is differently normed, in part, because its
netizens could play a role in defining the values and the architecture governing these
spaces. The inclusion of Lessig’s micro historical analysis in the technocultural-
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historical narrative illuminated the ways in which Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn either
challenged, bypassed, retreated from, and/or submitted to AIM social practices,
In the themes developed below, Lessig’s contemporary cultural understanding of
cyberspace and the discourses impacting the software code of Internet spaces have been
articulated under two broad thematic categories. The two broad thematic categories
considered in this section will address forms of being a “self” on the Internet and forms
of relation amidst Internet worlds (spaces).
Themes: Forms of being a “self” on the Internet
A. Anonymity and code allow the self to take on a wider range of multiple identities
(COLC)
An Internet Provider’s (IP) software code allows the self to come into online presence in
potentially multiple and divergent ways. Where code enables one to adopt multiple
screen names, the self is freed to explore an indefinite range of identities not necessarily
expressible offline. Thus, if one maintains relative anonymity about one’s offline identity,
the online persona is free to experiment with personifying traits incongruent with one’s
offline self.
• “As a member of AOL you can be any one of five people . . . When you start an
account at AOL, you have the right to establish up to five identities, through five
different “screen names . . . “ (p.67).
• “ . . . you are given a fantastic power of pseudonymity that the “code writers” of
real space simply do not give. You could, of course, try in real space to live the
same range of multiple lives . . . [b]ut unless you take extraordinary steps to hide
your identity, in real space you are always tied back to you” (p. 68).
• “In real space you reveal your sex, your age, how you look, what language you
speak, whether you can see, whether you can hear, how intelligent you are. In
cyberspace you reveal only an address, and one that has no necessary relationship
to anything else about you” (p. 33).
• “The selections about code are therefore in part a selection about who, what,
and, most important, what ways of life will be enabled and disabled” (p. 66).
B. The self conducts itself with the awareness that its online activities may be monitored
(COLC)
While relative anonymity can exist between social agents on the Internet, the self is more
or less aware that its activities can be surveilled by the architects of Internet code. In
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this way, the activities of the online self can be potentially codified and regulated by
direct or indirect means.
• “If AOL does not like certain behavior, then in at least some cases it can
regulate behavior by changing its architecture. If AOL is trying to control
indecent language, it can write routines that monitor language usage; if there is an
improper mixing between adults and kids, AOL can track who is talking to whom
. . . “ (p. 70).
• “If a common cookie identifies you across a number of sites (because its sites
have subscribed to a common tracking system), then, in principle, if you have
revealed information about yourself in one of those places, the other places could
know it as well” (p. 35).
• “In the government’s most recent proposals, the authors of encryption code
would be regulated directly – with a requirement that they build into their code a
back door through which the government could gain access” (p. 48).
• “What exactly should we think about constant electronic monitoring” (p.150)?
•“The system watches what you do; it fits you into a pattern” (p. 154).
Themes: Forms of relation in different Internet worlds (spaces)
A. The self can simultaneously inhabit more than one discursive world (COLC)
On the Internet, one may inhabit multiple discursive spaces. In so doing, the world of the
Internet allows the self to “leave” its immediate normative space and enter an alternate
social clearing. Though the self may choose to psychologically escape its offline world,
the self is not fully free from its offline world of competing normative forces.
• “When you ‘go’ somewhere in real space, you leave; when you ‘go’ to
cyberspace, you don’t leave anywhere. You are never just in cyberspace; you
never just go there. You are always both in real space and in cyberspace at the
same time” (p. 21).
• “Cyberspace gave Jake the chance to escape Ann Arbor norms and to live
according to norms of another place. It created a competing authority for Jake
and gave him a chance to select between these competing authorities merely by
switching his computer on or off” (p. 21)
• “Spaces have values. They express these values through the practices or lives
that they enable or disable” (p. 64).
B. The Internet world is composed of many constructed worlds (COLC)
The world of the Internet is not ipso facto a space of incontestable freedom; nor is it
necessarily a place of fixed essence. The Internet is, instead, an array of differently
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normed spaces which have been constructed. Essence does not define the Internet.
These spaces can be regulated and governed. Although a normative structure may
emerge, actions of resistance can contribute to the co-construction of these spaces if
netizens dialogue not only at the level of social interaction, but also at the level of code.
• “There is certainly a way that cyberspace is. That much is true. But how
cyberspace is not how cyberspace has to be. There is no single way hat the Net
has to be; no single architecture defines the nature of the Net” (p. 25).
• ‘ . . . “the nature of the Net is set in part by its architectures . . . the possible
architectures of cyberspace are many” (p. 30).
• “ . . . cyberspace is not a place, it is many places’ (p.82).
• “The networks differ in the extent to which they make behavior within each
network regulable. The difference is simply a matter of code – a difference in the
software” (p. 27).
C. Cyberspaces are influenced by discourses which have impact through and beyond
software code (COLC)
Each Internet space is infused with values. These values are multiply conditioned. The
discourses converging on the code writer and the discourses embedded within the social
spaces of the Internet commingle to influence the forms of relatedness unfolding in a
particular Internet space. Forces such as the market, the legal system, the norms
operating within a given Internet space, and architectural code may support a given
discourse or, instead, re-present competing discursive regimes.
• “’For citizens of cyberspace, . . . code . . . is becoming a crucial focus of
political contest. Who shall write that software that increasingly structures our
daily lives” (p. 60)?
• “Laws, norms, the market, and architectures interact to build the environments
that ‘Netizens’ know. The code writer, as Ethan Katsh puts it, is the ‘architect’”
(p. 90).
• “Constraints work together, though they function differently and the effect of
each is distinct. Norms constrain through the stigma a community imposes;
markets constrain through the price that they exact; architectures constrain
through the physical burdens they impose; and law constrains through the
punishment it threatens . . . . The same model describes the regulation of behavior
in cyberspace” (p. 88).
Technocultural-Historical Narrative
Western Internet technology gathers discourses around Net users and their styles
of understanding self and other. The Western self, given over to cyberrelations, is therein
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stitched into the fabric of pre-Socratic, Socratic, romanticist, modernist, and postmodern
constructions of self and reality. While the cultural-historical backcloth informing the
Net user’s sense of self is woven into a history of sometimes compatible and sometimes
conflicting heritages, the modern self, located at the intersection of these discursive cross
currents, may not be fully aware of their impact on identity construction and social
practice. Expansion of cultural-historical consciousness can illuminate the interwoven
threads producing truth-claims about the very being of the world.
In the first place, the present day Net user is entwined in a long-standing ontology
about what the world is and an epistemology about how to know the world. Socratic and
modern worldviews combined with the Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology and
the linear perspective vision of fifteenth century art, to solicit detached and objective
constructions of reality. Additionally, it came to pass, over two thousand years ago, that
the Socratic Greeks fashioned an enduring perspective about the being of entities in the
world. The beings of the world were rationally deduced to have ideal identities which
were pre-given, fixed, and unchanging. Hence a rational way of knowing the world
solicited humankind to inhabit abstractions about the static “reality” of the world. The
dynamic significations of the living world were thereby partially eclipsed by the twin
towers of rationalist epistemology and essentialist ontology. The romanticist perspective
likewise went on to interpret human being as having a core essence tied to nature and
bound up with systems of morality and ethics. In turn, modernity incorporated the
essentialist view of humanity as rational and further extended a blanket over the holistic
ontology of the world by characterizing the beings of the living world as objective in
nature. For instance, the grid of linear perspective vision gave rise to a detached vision
of “reality” which deanimated the world and re-visioned it as a literal space filled with
concrete objects. The Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology further limited the
presencing of the world as a mere stockpile of resources on call. And, in the modern
scientific realm, the “real” world was moreover categorized as a spectacle of material
objects with measurable physical attributes. Measurability provided scientific forms of
epistemology (e.g., laboratory experimentation) with a seemingly certain empirical
foundation of knowledge. However, science was faced with an impoverished world made
up of ‘dying’ objects. It then followed that the physical science of modernity attempted to
reanimate brute objects as energetic entities (e.g., Einstein’s equation - E=mc2, the
literary figure of Dr. Frankenstein) mechanistically set into lawful patterns of motion
(e.g., Kepler on planetary motion, Descartes on bodies as a collection of reflexes). Thus,
that which produced motion or motivation was accounted for only inasmuch as it was
measurable. As a result, a full understanding of the nonobjective qualities of desire,
emotion, and spirit also descended into the shadows, though somewhat forestalled by
pre-Socratic and romanticist appreciation of the passions. Overall, however, what the
world is was primarily known in and through structured and unbiased objective-rational
assessments of physical attributes. Things became inert substances and living bodies
became anatomical machines with measurable personality characteristics all brought to
life under the guise of mechanical principles of action. Human being thereby abandoned
the sensuous world and carnal forms of knowing while dreaming about transcending the
fleshy experience of existence. It is the recent space of openness to difference in the
postmodern era which has legitimated the act of doubting the all-to-certain foundations
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of modernity. This has not occasioned a doubt which leads to endless skepticism, but
rather it has instantiated a doubt which places the claims of modernity into the margins
while marginalized perspectives are retrieved into the center of human awareness.
Inquiry into the Internet site addressed in this study reveals that AIM instantiates
some of the broad technological discourses outlined above. AIM concomitantly solicits
its netizens to know others primarily through the symbolic mediums of e-text,
pictographic variations of the “smiley face,” and images of cultural celebrities. Here,
static simulations and re-presentations of embodiment replace the presence of the
expressive human form. Thus the attempt to know the virtual other is limited to
abstractions thereby signifying that the excess of context-bound embodied human being
fails to crossover from the everyday world into the virtual world. Hence, ontology of the
virtual other is enframed by a way of coming to presence which is similar to objective representations. Specifically, the window of AIM cyberspace de-sensualizes, decontextualizes, and makes two-dimensional the being of enfleshed humanity.
The modernist construction of an essentially rational self has delivered
humankind over to a cascade of related practices. Philosophical Socratic inquiry, the
linear perspective vision of art codified in the fifteenth and sixteenth century (e.g.,
Brunelleschi and Alberti), and the physical science of the seventeenth century (e.g.,
Galileo) all served to normalize humankind’s detached contemplation of its world.
Estranged from the shared world of things and people, humankind rooted its identity in
the mind’s eye – reason. As rational head-centered beings, the self of humankind became
a dispassionate spectator of its shared world. Detachment from the world corresponded
with disconnection from aspects of being human. The self lived an estrangement from
bodily ways of knowing. Emotionality, sensual awareness, and the imaginative
capacities of incarnate existence became impediments to knowing. The rational self was
prone to believe that it housed undesirable and strange capacities within. Non-rational
ways of being fell out of awareness and practice and became more or less
“unconscious.” Aspects of emotionality became ambiguous and even unwanted. Bodily
gestures lost their significance as positively meaningful. Living in a flesh divided meant
understanding oneself as mechanical and efficient. Vesalius’ development of anatomy in
the seventeenth century and Harvey’s resurrection of the anatomical body as a machinelike body of technical function contributed to disseminating and privileging machine
driven ways of being human. Humankind viewed itself as master of the natural and
technological world. No longer living symbiotically with its world, the modern self was
constructed to explain, predict, control, and extract what it needed from its world. With
the arrival of postmodernism and the self’s interdependence upon technologies of social
saturation in the twentieth century, commitments to dominant notions of being a self were
tested. The postmodern self, located in a liminal space of potential transformation, was
allowed to explore its multiplicity. The early experience of the lived postmodern self met
with a sense of instability and a disparate sense of dizzying multiphrenia. It was the
more experienced postmodern selves, more at ease with difference, that could embrace a
freer range of expressiveness, a receptivity to otherness, and a sense of familiarity with a
fluid identity in ongoing dialogue with its changing circumstances. Hence, the modernist
ideal extolling a detached, rational, and efficiently ordered self housed a body of efficient
technological bio-functions that is now given over to a postmodern technical world where
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the self is saturated with a plurality of possibilities for being otherwise. The self of
postmodernism is invited to embrace a variety self-expressive possibilities, and either
celebrate or struggle with the potential lack of continuity between one enacted possibility
and the next.
When the view of virtual “self” construction is narrowed from the broad culturalhistorical perspective down to the pervasive AIM space, it becomes apparent that the
AIM window allows social practices which create a sense of togetherness and
simultaneously limits the sense of togetherness by producing detached “self” practices
for knowing others. In other words, the AIM window precludes synesthetic bodily ways
of knowing by narrowly accentuating the bodily powers of eye and cognition in AIM
space. It also becomes apparent that virtual “self” expression is solicited to utilize
multiple screen names and the corollary potential for living out singular or multiple
identities. This freedom is set in motion by the virtual ordering of space which
necessitates the “self’s” detachment from spontaneous full bodied expression followed by
reliance upon the calculated use of static pictographic re-presentations to replace
dynamic bodily presence. The online “self” becomes a two-dimensional object amidst a
spectacle of other two dimensional “self” representations. In addition, the requirement
to maintain a continuity between one’s offline embodied self and one’s virtual identity
becomes optional. This freedom is not, however, absolute. AIM space is a surveilled
space. The virtual AIM “self” is subject to a high degree of visibility by AOL, and to a
lesser degree of voluntary visibility by AIM “buddies” - even encrypted communication
carries with it the latent possibility of becoming visible through hacking or legal
intervention. Thus, living out an unbounded freedom to practice identity fluidity is
potentially monitored; particularly in light of AOL’s prescription for conduct in the form
of AOL “rules and guidelines.” In this way, top-down regulations may gradually
discipline “self” regulation in this increasingly structured frontier of cyberspace.
Relatedness, in the world of modernity, is informed by a distinct cultural habit of
interacting. The Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology fosters an attitude of
consumption wherein people and things are disclosed instrumentally. People and things
are revealed as a means to an end. The process of continuous unconcealment is rendered
inert by such a singular vision that reduces people and things to commodity – to a
suitable resource. Modern relations, idled by this constricted way of seeing and being,
overshadow dynamic ways of being with one another and thereby allowing slippage into
interactions permeated by distance and estrangement. Humanity finds itself deskilled in
the capacity to develop meaningful connections imbued with e-motional resonance.
Practical instrumental concerns overshadow enduring passionate concerns. With the
advent of postmodernism and Internet technology, one can leave one’s immediate world
and inhabit one or more social clearings. This simultaneous access to multiple social
spaces includes the opportunity to inhabit spaces with very different norms and a
diversity of possible others to interact with. This exposure to normatively different online spaces or communities opens onto potentially new and unfamiliar relational
practices. These alternative relational practices are in turn influenced by the play of
multiple forces such as the architecture of a website, the norms of conduct, applicable
laws or policies, and market constraints (e.g., the price of access). In either case, the
forms of disembodied intimacy with diverse others allows for the expansion of one’s
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horizons which may include the experience of newfound freedoms, uncertainties,
vulnerabilities, and concerns about safety attendant to online encounters.
While the AIM medium shuts down sensorial modes of being with others, it opens
onto the enhanced power to virtually connect with others beyond the strictures of
physical accessibility and beyond the limitations of those with immediate access to
computers. AIM incites people to virtual speech through advertising and by linking
virtual communication networks to computer users as well as to wireless mobile phone
users. Crossing over into virtual connectivity becomes more convenient. The AIM
window also invites its users to scan the available resource of topic driven chat rooms.
AIM space becomes an instrumental resource for accessing the available reserves of
chat-ready virtual others. A multiplicity of spaces is also available with many
opportunities to crossover from one normative space to another with a simple click of a
mouse. The elaborative and rich use of language is still possible with e-text. However,
AIM instructs its users to consult its Acronym Dictionary as a way to convey that the
efficient and expedient use of language during an encounter is a preferred social
practice. Thus, while the freedom to relate to a seemingly infinite variety of virtual
others is technologically enabled, the medium (as the message) suggests that practices of
virtual relatedness may weave one into the Net, but not necessarily into the lived fabric of
self-other experience.
Introduction to the Situated Global Narrative
Whereas Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s lived experiences were unfolded in Section
I, Section II contained no comment upon any of the research participants’ experiences. In
effect, their lived perspectives were “decentered.” Instead, it was the practical discursive
context of their virtual interactions which comprised Section II. The story about their
cyberspace encounters became an articulation of the Internet scenes which both invited
and inscribed their actions and experiences. In effect, the cyberspace horizon was
acknowledged as an integral ground for their lived experience – as the there (Da) of their
situated being (sein).
In the situated global narrative to follow below, historiographies addressing longstanding Western symbolic orders and AIM social practices were woven together with
salient themes form Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s person-centered descriptions and
interview-based elaborations. By methodologically integrating analyses of discourse,
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practice, and lived experience, the dialogic unity between the research participants and
their cultural-historical worlds was restored. The resulting situated global narrative thus
stood as psycho-cultural-historical profile of experience. As such, it bore out my
research presupposition that subjectivity is situated within discourse rather than
exclusively reducible to discourse.
With the Net as a part of the rich cultural-historical mosaic comprising the
research participants’ lives, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn found themselves confronting
choices about inhabiting two very different life spaces – the earth bound sensual
landscape of incarnate beings and the screenal ‘cyberscape’ of virtual re-presentations.
As much as these spaces diverged on the lived dimensions of bodily presence and social
praxis, both of the online and offline milieus were bound up with cultural-historical
influences. Moreover, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn exhibited differing degrees of
commitment to the culture bound practices of virtual intimacy due to the differences in
their social projects. For instance, Rochelle was motivated to fill an emotional void in
her life by seeking interaction, approval, and romance. Bryce sought to overcome the
constriction of his offline shyness and expand his online and offline relationships. Dawn,
separated from her significant other by geography and work schedules, worked to
preserve a meaningful connection with her significant other. Attention to the different
projects enacted by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn allowed the latent significations
circulating “in” cyberspace to be revealed – particularly where I thematized
interpretations pertaining to the threesome’s responses to breakdowns and successes with
available virtual practices. Consequently, glimpses of research participant subjectivity
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and co-construction of meaning were more visible against this backdrop of
breakdown/fluency and docility/resistance (modification) regarding online practices.
As way to understand the lifeworld accompanying the research participants’
experience, the cultural-historical configuration of the world was taken up as a fluid
system of power motivated discourses refined by institutions and carried out as practices
performed by bodies caught up in those institutions. From this critical perspective, it
became apparent that the Internet apparatus provided multiple spaces for the emergence
of modern, postmodern, and – to a lesser degree - romantic discourses vying to invest
bodies to enact particular practices. Despite the progressive routinization and
normalization of practices in AIM space, opportunities to rework or transgress discursive
practices were indeed possible.
Section III: Situated Global Narrative
Life on the Net begins as one gazes through the cyberspace window upon the
procession of textual and pictographic re-presentations lighting up the virtual world. To
look upon and within the glow of the interface window inaugurates the first moment of
crossing over from the physical world into an AIM space promising sociality as its
offering. In this space, the embodied other radiates within the weightless luminescence
of the cyber window glow as text, emoticon, and reproduced image. Within this portal,
multiple discourses become virtual practices, interpersonal graces become serial
keystrokes, and physical bodies become light.
The Modernist Horizon. From the modernist perspective, the cyberspace stories
lived out by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn were intertwined with a number of modernist
discursive designs for living. AIM, in turn, provided the space for disseminating
practices consonant with the discourses embedded within the research participants’
stories. Mind-body division, separation from the incarnate other, detachment from the
earthly context, detached contemplation, increase in instrumental efficiency, and
machinic enhancement of human powers were each provided for by the Internet. To be
sure, these trends in AIM practices sometimes signified, instantiated, and extended
earlier cultural-historical moments associated with modernism.
In the fifteenth century, Alberti codified Brunelleschi’s linear perspective vision
thereby placing humankind before a window gazing, from a distance, into a work of art.
Humankind was therein solicited to practice seeing the world as a passive and detached
spectator peering out upon a deanimated realm. In the moment of adopting Alberti’s
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vision, humankind was set upon the path to simultaneously abandon its flesh and depart
from its world as its eye and mind remained to rove over an estranged spectacle of
objects. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, science breathed ‘life’ into this
devitalizing discourse. Vesalius deanimated the human body by advancing an
anatomical understanding of the body. Harvey went on to reconceive of the body in
mechanistic terms while Descarte later re-animated the body as a reflex driven machine
(cf. B. F. Skinner). With the emergence of modern technology, its Enframing (Ge-stell)
brought humanity into accord with a narrow disclosure of the world as a standing
reserve. The human-technology interface granted humankind with the power to
efficiently order the world for the purpose of extracting resources. With technology at its
service, humankind takes itself as the master of technology and its world. In doing so,
humanity became more machinelike. Hence, the Socratic Greek view of beings as poor
reproductions of ideal essences existing outside of space and time was replaced by the
modern technological view of human beings as a more perfect posthuman improvement
upon nature.
The Internet apparatus paved the way for disseminating practices of relatedness
and styles of “consciousness” influenced by modernism. As a result, full-bodied
modalities for expression and knowing were de-emphasized during virtual
communication. AIM space fostered such practices through an incitement to enact
virtual speech. This included dissemination of “free” instant messaging capability,
centralized access to chatrooms, options to create buddy lists, and an AIM upgrade to
mobile phone interface with AIM. Within this discourse-tinted AIM window, one could
realize the promise of accessing a ready reserve of available others. Inasmuch as e-text,
emoticons, and pictographic images were relied upon during intimate virtual
communication, the worldly and sensual contexts for interpreting and making meaning
were eclipsed. Meaningful places for interpreting intimate gestures dissolved.
Increasingly, humankind was called forth to relate to abstractions of otherness in AIM
space. Eye and mind – the tools of rationalized virtual practice – were well suited to
engage such abstractions. The physical body was consequently relegated to carrying out
the mechanical know-how to operate Internet technology; a rather limited way for the
physical body of the master of modern technology to function. Ironically, the Internetbased actions of the research participants were sometimes frustrated by the absence of
embodiment during meaningful communication – a body that was typically downplayed
in its significance by modernity.
Poised at the cusp of the twenty-first century Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn sat
before the AIM window readied for meaningful encounters within the modernist informed
AIM space. Initially, the opportunity to interact with somebody and simultaneously nobody was embraced. The research participants lived out the Cartesian tinged deprivileging of the flesh. They did so either out of the enthusiastic hope of forging new
relations with previously unreachable others, or at least with the hope of retaining some
of the texture and immediacy of offline encounters with a previously known other. In
either instance, the three research participants were motivated to seek out virtual
sociality due to a perceived deficit in their life or being (e.g., geographic separation,
social awkwardness, emotional emptiness). Conducting relations in the screen mediated
space of AIM also provided for an initial sense of safety from the unwanted exposure of
their incarnate self to online others. In so doing, the research participants sacrificed
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their bodily hold on the earthly context intrinsic to the offline lives of online others. At
the same time, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn acquired an enlarged sense of spatiality
allowing them to overcome the brute limitations of measured distance. Some of the
obstacles found in the natural world were thereby surpassed. The power to access a vast
standing reserve of chat-ready virtual others were a mere point-and-click away. Before
the research participants could fully savor the space of virtuality, however, breakdowns
in their cyberspace practices occurred. As much as these collapses may have signified
breakdowns intrinsic to the discursive practice themselves, these breakdowns also
represented breakdowns in the research participants’ willing compliance with
participation in those practices. Hence, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn discovered that the
body-technology fusion enabled gains in mastery and power in cyberspace while also
being knitted to losses in the body-world powers of being with others. For instance, the
research participants each took up the prosthetic possibilities of embracing Internet
enabled sociality in a way that allowed for expansion beyond their offline bodily
limitations. In and through adopting an online identity and virtual modalities of
communication, the research participants reproduced the discursive turn away from
attention to body and world. Thus the modern techno-self was able to leave behind
unwanted facets of identity associated with embodiment (e.g., the seeable body, the
sexual body). At the same time, the offline self significantly severed the tie to sensuality
and corporeality.
Breakdowns occurred when virtual others were perceived as misusing the AIM
forum for disembodied presence by being deceptive about offline identity and/or by being
demeaning towards the research participant. In such moments, the full-bodied emotional
reactions of the research participants were asserted. Experiences of disappointment and
dismay occasioned research participant doubts about their initial investment in AIM chat
practices. Counter to modernity’s emphasis upon a rational basis for ethics, an
embodied emotional ethic asserted itself. For example, each of the research participants
engaged in strategies to integrate their bodily concerns and needs into future Internet
practices (e.g., meeting offline, viewing or posting online pictures, increased scrutiny of
online chat, reflective retreat from online chat). In these ways, modernity’s
normalization of detached modes of contemplation of experience were jettisoned.
Moreover, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn did not read e-text as passive observers. Instead,
they treated AIM space as an interactive space. When breakdowns occurred, they
eventually increased their active participation – but only after deciding to reconfigure
AIM forms of sociality to suit their respective projects. Thus, modernist detachment was
not fully reproduced; it was instead replaced by occasional efforts to recoup the loss of
sensual bodily presence.
With regard to the majority of the aforementioned modernist practices, the
research participants integrated responses of both reproduction and resistance. Where
mind-body dualism required disavowal of embodiment, the research participants utilized
virtual communication, but often in order to establish on offline connection. In other
cases, the research participants attempted to infuse some kind of gestural signifier (e.g.,
emoticon, image) into their virtual communication. Embedded within meaningful virtual
communication practices was, thus, the motivation to retrieve both embodiment and the
world horizon. The return to the body and world as the sensual ground for occasioning
meaningful spaces was also fueled by breakdowns in the naïve and passive contemplation
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about the virtual other. Confusion and conflict ensued when unexamined attributions
about the virtual other were made. As Dawn suggested, “assumptions” about meaning
were often made because the body-world contribution to the construction of meaning was
absent. Intimate communication required increased effort at establishing understanding
when the contexts of body and world were absent. Even then, it could not be taken for
granted that existentially congruent appraisals about the other had been constructed.
None of the above is meant to suggest that the research participants did not
benefit from the machinic enhancement of bodily powers. To be sure, the Internet did
indeed facilitate the overcoming of offline obstacles to communication. However,
conjoining meaningful self-expression with electronically mediated tools was not
preferred as a primary means of conducting sociality. Aligning one’s “self” and one’s
relational life more fully with a machine-like mode of existence did not ultimately hold
long-term appeal for these research subjects.
The Romanticist Horizon. The romanticist perspective brought with it the
discursive assumptions that human being was comprised of a mysterious deep interior
essence (e.g., nature’s “voice within”). The knowable “self” was viewed as profound
rather than rational or machinic. In its profundity, the romanticist self was not
knowable through (empirical) observation of surface behaviors and practices. Instead,
important aspects of self were to be found beyond what was visible. Nevertheless, the
being of the romanticist self consisted of ways of talking which addressed passion,
depth, meaningfulness, and personal significance. Values sprang from the deep
interior of human being rather than from the derivations of reason.
AIM practices were not altogether consonant with romanticist discourse. AIM
provided the online user with the opportunity to create anywhere from one to five screen
names. However, it was not required that the act of naming should reflect the deep
essence of the individual. Still, an online user could autonomously exercise such an
option, especially in light of AOL’s effort to discourage “impersonation” and attempts to
“mislead” others. Although there was no requirement for the visible presence of the
online user in AIM space, this de-emphasis did not appear to signify AIM’s valuation
that a deep interior of the self existed or could in necessarily reveal itself. Nevertheless,
emoticons and AIM Expressions disenfranchised the distinctiveness of the embodied
other by taking recourse to homogenized or popular culture displays of individuality
(e.g., celebrity facial expressions) and the passions. With regard to passionate
expression, AIM did not fully repress such practices so much as AIM encouraged the
efficient use of language (e.g., Acronym Dictionary). With regard to value systems, AIM
did not appear to acknowledged romanticist forms of online value construction. Rather
than emphasizing value guidelines congruent with the sensibility bequeathed by a deep
human wellspring of ethicality (e.g., goodness emanating from nature’s “voice within”),
AIM stated that “conduct should be guided by common sense, basic ‘netiquette,’ and
[AIM’s] chat guidelines.” Moreover, privacy was not guaranteed, though AIM
professed that it would not monitor chat rooms and it offered encryption technology to
AIM users. AIM encryption contained a decryption key thus allowing for the potential of
virtual practice oversight by AOL owners or the U.S. government. In addition, chatroom
postings were highly visible endeavors within the AOL community and for those on
“buddy lists.”
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Overall, AIM did not instantiate a set of integrated social practices or values
indicative of romanticist discourse. If romanticist discourse issued forth from anywhere,
it was Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn who enacted it. With regard to meaningful and
genuine virtual encounters, Rochelle and Bryce responded with mixed feelings of
frustration and disappointment to mismatches between re-presentations of the virtual
other and their factical offline presentations of self. They hoped that the code of conduct
was imbued with some semblance of fidelity in relation to others. Moreover, when the
sexual motivations of virtual others clouded Rochelle and Bryce’s efforts to establish
meaningful dialogue, the research participants’ felt that a social contract for establishing
intimacy had been breeched. If the virtual other was previously known in the offline
world – as was the case with Dawn - frustrations occurred when it was believed that the
context of the true “self” and its qualities were forgotten or overlooked during online
chat. It also became frustrating when the intended meanings were not as easily grasped
online as they had been during offline encounters.
In summation, the research participant’s brought romanticist assumptions about
authenticity, the existence of a true “self,” and (possibly) ethics to their meaningful
online encounters. When breakdowns occurred, the research participants’ became either
discouraged, disappointed, avoidant, or at least more effortful in their attempts to be
faithful to the latter romanticist assumptions – even if AIM space did not readily enable
the practice of such beliefs.
The Postmodern Horizon. Postmodern discourse provided yet another discursive
backdrop to Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s AIM experience. The Internet has been
understood as a “technology of social saturation” with the potential to expose Net users
to a plurality of beliefs, perspectives, values, and social practices. As a result, the advent
of growth in technology-enabled social connection (e.g., telegraph, radio, telephone,
television, Internet) gave rise to a “postmodern consciousness.” For example, it was
believed that immersion in a pluralistic field occasioned doubts about modernism and its
beliefs in a bounded identity, in a cohesive essential self, in the existence of objective
reality, in the necessity of rational practices, and in the existence of individually
authored intentions. A postmodern consciousness was thereby readied to acquire a
pastiche personality comprised of multiple non-local identities, values, and practices.
Value was placed on embracing a plurality of possibilities without imposing a
hierarchical grading of those possibilities. Thus the breakdown in the narrow
perspectivity belonging to modernism and modern technology (e.g., Enframing) could
allow the essence of technology (e.g., presencing) to release the play of signifiers and
non-traditional perspectives into the foreground of being.
Several practices coded within the social architecture of AIM allowed for
postmodern discourse to be enacted. The combination of AIM advertising and the AIM
interface window excited and incited awareness about a variety of electronic social
mediums – email, instant messaging, centralized chatroom access, buddy lists, and
mobile telephone access. These alternatives allowed for enumerable opportunities for
immersing in postmodern informed encounters with those enacting non-local differences.
In some cases, postmodern and modern possibilities were latent within the same AIM
convention. For instance, the Cartesian separation of identity and body was occasioned
by AIM’s provision for “screen names” – names, in effect, signifying dis-incarnate
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screen presences. Despite the ensuing instantiation of a mind-body split, screen names
still gathered the potential for postmodern practices. For instance, the Net user could
assume from one to five screen names which could reflect partial aspects of one’s
identity, unlived aspects of one’s identity, or no connection to one’s offline identity. Thus
the screen name user could enact identity multiplicity, partiality, authenticity, or
performativity of morphed traits. In these ways, the employment of screen name
practices could reflect multiple discursive latencies rather than a single discursive
practice. How one’s practices were structured amidst the presence of multiple discursive
latencies was another matter in itself.
This normalization of AIM social practice – through posted “guidelines” - was,
however, another area where AIM’s regulatory presence was ambiguous enough to
enable multi-discourse enactments. Indeed, AOL’s presence as a centralized observer of
AIM practices was simultaneously enacted and relinquished. Concordantly, practices of
freedom and compliance were ambiguously enabled and disabled. In such instances,
modernist practices ironically served as a ‘swivel’ sometimes opening on to postmodern
practices, and sometimes signifying modernist practices. A single virtual practice could
index more than one cultural-historical discourse. For example, the option to
communicate through encryption provided for some freedom from normalizing
surveillance. In this way, the lack of Net user visibility to a centralized observer implied
that a relatively open clearing for free expression existed. However, the presence of
encryption keys allowed for the free space of encrypted communication to potentially
‘swivel’ over to a space regulated by centralized norms. Moreover, visibility to one’s
“buddy list” or “traceability” by AIM delimited that freedom from normalizing gazes in
other chat spaces. Even though one’s immediate buddy group could conceivably remark
upon a narrow range of one’s AOL activities, the final word on norms belonged to AOL
even though AOL did not always exercise its authority. In this way, the power to initiate
change was always already asymmetrical and concentrated within the hands of corporate
executives. The power to organize social norms, from a lateral rather than a vertical
power structure, was overridden by the hierarchy of power pre-programmed into the
architecture of AIM communication. And yet, AIM portrayed itself as allowing local
virtual environments to construct their distinctive social systems. Instead, it was usually
the case that AOL provided regulated virtual spaces containing the co-present
possibilities of postmodern freedom and modernist regulation.
The way in which Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn responded to the postmodern
possibilities in AIM space added another dimension to the process of intimate virtual
communication. For Rochelle and Bryce, the opportunities for expansion of “self” and
social possibilities in cyberspace gave rise to heightened enthusiasm. For both Rochelle
and Bryce, shedding the factical body allowed for the postmodern possibility of
journeying into a variety of previously unexplored social horizons. While Rochelle
sought after dialogue with “older” males for the first time, Bryce was able to access
casual and potentially romantic chat with gay males at a time when he felt woefully
inadequate to do so in his offline life. Despite early positive reactions, Rochelle and
Bryce’s exposure to non-local differences later gave rise to mixed reactions. Initial
enthusiasm about accessing an expanded social horizon sooner or later gave way to
disillusionment. Indeed, Rochelle and Bryce’s enthusiasm was eventually clouded by the
disruptions they encountered in their emerging connections with virtual others. These
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disruptions arose when differing values about how to practice meaningful connections in
and through cyberspace clashed. Rochelle and Bryce found that alternative social
patterns in AIM space unexpectedly re-gestalted into frustrating encounters where one
could feel demeaned, attacked, manipulated, or deceived. Bryce immediately reacted
with disdain to the deception he encountered. Rochelle, on the other hand, gradually
discovered that her initial desire for approval turned into dissatisfaction with objectifying
and immature social practices she encountered. In both instances, Rochelle and Bryce
subsequently refashioned AIM practices in order to carve out meaningful encounters
consonant with values of honesty and kindness (romanticist?). Therein, Rochelle and
Bryce resisted modernist instrumentality. In effect, they resisted means-end forms of
sociality. This is not to say that neither Rochelle nor Bryce valued AIM space as a
postmodern play space. On the contrary, the exclusion of online bodily presence allowed
Rochelle and Bryce to undergo “self” contraction inasmuch as disconcerting aspects of
their offline selves were not re-presented online. This exclusion of offline characteristics
allowed Rochelle and Bryce to ironically practice a playful and liberating “self”
expansion in and through their cyberself personas. Previously unlived potentials for
being could thereby be enacted. In contrast, Dawn’s experience with a previously known
significant other revealed that when obstacles to face-to-face communication involved
geography and time schedules rather than body image issues, “calculated” efforts to
somehow overcome the absence of the embodied ground of communication were enacted.
In this way, it was revealed that the absence of the gestural body was immediately
experienced as a significant loss. The contracted quality of AIM space thereby became
“tedious” and frustrating rather than meaningful and expansive.
Dawn’s frustration highlighted another theme regarding the experience of
understanding and meaning in AOL’s region of cyberspace. For each of the research
participants, re-presentations of “self” and significance in cyberspace became
problematic, sooner or later. For Rochelle and Bryce, AIM space re-presentations failed
to consistently provide clear-cut indications of offline compatibility or incompatibility
with virtual others. The lack of important contexts for understanding the virtual other both bodily and worldly - sometimes created impediments to grasping meanings. Thus
the smooth unproblematic flow of communication sometimes concealed the lived fact that
misunderstandings were unknowingly circulating during an intimate online encounter.
From Dawn’s point of view, AIM space was training the “world to listen with a
deafening ear.” The outcome for each of the research participants was the wish to return
from (post)modern virtual relations to the ground of sensual body-world encounter. In
this way, it came to be that an always already existing “discourse” of body-world unity
ultimately subverted cultural-historical efforts to normalize (post)modern virtual
communication practices.
Discussion
Discussion Outline
Listed among the research presuppositions I bring to this critical-hermeneutic
circle of understanding is my view that the human-cyberspace interface reproduced
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culturally and historically informed practices. Here I presuppose that cultural-historical
practices serve as conditions for the possibility of becoming a subject and for the
possibilities of shaping social relations. Specifically, I presume that technoculturalhistorical discourses and practices contribute to the formation of a disclosive
(cyber)space – a social clearing or field of power relations – which invest human bodies
with differing prescriptions for being-in-the-world with others. Beginning with these
background cultural-historical considerations, I open the Discussion section with a
Descriptive Summary of the Results. Therein, I articulate a concise reinterpretation of
the research findings. This reinterpretation allows me to fashion the second portion of
the Discussion section – the Results Re-view. In the Results Re-view, I construct a
dialogue between the Descriptive Summary of Results section and the Literature Review
section. The circular dialogue between the two sections allows additional understanding
about the being of cyborg subjectivity and cyborg intimacy to be illuminated.
Throughout the literature re-view, I periodically address implications for future
cyberspace study. Towards the end of the re-view I reflect upon my initial
presuppositions about the critical-hermeneutic aspects of doing qualitative research. I
then conclude the Discussion by addressing the Research Study Limitations and
suggestions for future research modifications.
Descriptive Summary of Results
The techno-social scene of the twenty first century has been cast within electronic
spaces. Within these virtual places human participants metaphorically grappled with the
possibilities of living out virtual cyborg existence. For those electronically wired into the
experience of human-machine hybridity, however, such cyber spaces were not marked by
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neutrality and unbounded freedom. In this study, I found that AOL’s Instant Messaging
world offered up a horizon replete with the cultural-historical discourses and practices
related to modernism, postmodernism, and romanticism. In addition, AIM space
gathered together the dreams, values, practices, transformations of existence, and
shadows associated with the effort to embody such a discourse-infused virtual cyborg
‘life.’ As such, the cyborg’s “psychic” and social ‘life’ came to reflect the mixing of new
possibilities and shadowed possibilities circulating within the technocultural psyche.
Through an interrogation of the research participants’ experiential descriptions of ‘life’ in
E-merica’s AIM frontier, the lived quality of cultural-historical dreams and conflicts
came into sharper relief.
It was found that the kind of subject under discursive construction in AIM space
was different than the kind of subjectivity emerging when the research participants’
engaged in the process of co-constructing identity. At first glance, AIM practices most
obviously solicited a Cartesian subject (e.g., mind/body as split, instrumentalist attitude,
disengaged observer) at home within a field of virtual re-presentations which allowed for
postmodern enactment of alternate identities. At the level of co-construction, however,
subjectivity emerged as a virtual cyborg who was both appreciative and ambivalent about
its technologically expanded powers to connect with a standing reserve of chat-ready
others. Indeed, this technologically enabled expansion of spatiality was sometimes
accompanied by an increased sense of safety and invulnerability. At the same time, the
electronic life of a cyborg entailed losses in the bodily power to generate meaningful
spaces of interaction. The loss of meaningful spaces gave rise to a cyborg subject with an
eye that was sometimes “blind” and sometimes “illiterate.” As a result, the research
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participants’ co-constructed version of being a virtual cyborg subject resuscitated their
strong allegiance to the sensual bodily powers of signification – bodily powers which,
according to Donna Haraway, should have been repudiated by cyborg subjects. For
instance, the research participants did not docilely submit to reproducing themselves as
disembodied virtual cyborg subjects. The research participants, instead, played with
options to freely cross back over into the lived world of embodied others after having
initiated crossover into the ethereal space provided for by AIM. In effect, these virtual
cyborg practices were not beholden to enacting disembodied social practices
submissively. The research participants, instead, took up the meaning of a Cartesian
discursive practice as if it were a sliding signifier. The research participants did so by
periodically re-appropriating Cartesian practices as a vehicle for retrieving practices
associated with sensuality or embodiment.
As to the form of electronic relations, the kind of sociality emerging in cyberspace
was characterized by a normalization of communication wherein research participants
were remotely present to the partial presence of distant others (e.g., as textual, screen, or
telepresence). In these ways, remoteness and partiality of presence contributed to a mode
of sociality which could include significant disjunctions between chat partners regarding
the meanings circulating during a virtual encounter. The meaning bestowing capacity of
signifiers was in “retreat.” For example, bids for virtual intimacy encompassed instances
of substantial “undecidability” about basic aspects of a virtual other’s identity. This kind
of privative ambiguity resulted in decreased experiences of “being-with” others in a more
existentially congruent manner, and increased experiences with “being-among” others
where “[e]veryone is the other and no one is himself [sic]” (Heidegger, 1962, p. 165). In
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order to retrieve the possibility of meaningful relations, the research participants engaged
in a calculated intensification of virtual social practices, or a modification of discursive
practices.
Finally, electronic sociality revealed itself as an interactive practice where a
profound visibility to peripheral others (e.g., soft surveillance) was unreflectively taken
for granted. Despite the potential visibility of an encounter and the modernist framing of
postmodern possibilities for sociality, the research participants imported some of their
own ethics into the enactment of virtual relations.
Having briefly summarized the research results above, the descriptive summary
below stands as an extended elaboration of the experiences lived out by the research
participants. Therein I chronicle their efforts to fashion a social existence at the
intersection of an AIM clearing infused by a technocultural-historical assembly of
discursive practices.
A thematically sketched cyborg story. The research participants arrived at the
threshold of cyberspace sociality needful of social connection. Without the temporary
prosthetic of the Internet, the offline self was perceived as insufficient to overcome
obstacles to establishing or maintaining social encounters. By pre-reflectively becoming
a cyborg - by temporarily embracing human-computer hybridity – the research
participants were allowed to leave behind the perceived impediments of the flesh and
momentarily dream of enhanced powers to connect with distant others. Previously
inaccessible, taboo, or feared others were bought within reach. Thus, a postmodern
expansion into non-local social spaces coupled with a postmodern expansion of the self’s
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constricted or unlived possibilities were enabled by this dissolution of ties to
embodiment.
The AIM window was initially perceived to be a place from which to launch into
AIM enabled social connection. When a research participant’s project was to form new
relationships, enthusiasm about complying with AIM practices was high. In Bryce’s
words, “It was fun, and exciting, and innovative to me” (Appendix G). A research
participant’s separation from the incarnate body, as a way to access the standing reserves
of chat-ready others, was not initially thematized as problematic. The modernist flight
from body and world coupled with the postmodern liberation from an identity bound to a
singular (embodied) identity was pre-thematically experienced as rife with gratifying
possibilities. In Rochelle’s words, “You feel really special inside, like you have nothing
to be afraid of because the person you are talking to isn’t judging you for your looks, just
solely on how you interact online” (Appendix D). It was easy to be spellbound by the
AIM window’s power – a power to enable a relatively safe simulated coexistence with
previously unavailable simulated others. The modernist sense of fleshly vulnerability
was seemingly overcome by integrating a sense of identity with the machinic power to
expand social spatiality and be simultaneously shielded from unwanted exposure to
others (e.g., disembodied communication, AIM blocking button).
Where a strong offline tie to the virtual other already existed, Dawn experienced a
muted hope of recovering a satisfying semblance of offline immediacy while online “ . . . IM was agreed upon [for] both of us to get back some of what verbal
communication offered. IM offered a pseudo-telephone call” (Appendix J). At that
point, to be a virtual cyborg and anticipate a valued aspect of offline sociality on the
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‘other side’ of the AIM window was incentive enough to make the attempt. Conflicts
linked to the modern, postmodern, and romantic cultural-historical discursive practices
were yet to vividly emerge. For Dawn, the modernist departure from the body-world
matrix of life was tacitly accepted so long as the promise of establishing a meaningful
virtual connection with her significant other seemed viable. Even if no-body was present,
the desire for the logos of bodily-being-with-others, in some form, did not have to be
fully surrendered, or so it seemed. Thus, a bodily-based sensibility was already at work
in decisions to engage in AIM sociality.
The AIM window enabled and incited the use of multiple electronic social
mediums (e.g., email, pictographic representation, buddy lists, centralized chatroom
access, mobile phone access) through upbeat advertising. Therein, the modernist call to
seemingly sever the bond with the body and earthly world was embedded within the
manifold point-and-click solicitations of the AIM window buttons. These research
participants, however, focused primarily upon Instant Messaging, chatroom spaces,
email, picture posting, and emoticons during their attempts at establishing meaningful
encounters. Concurrently, their preference to cross back over into some form of a more
sensorially informed encounter (e.g., telephone contact, face-to-face meeting) stood as a
bodily-based practice imported into the AIM clearing. Here, the research participants had
not passively and docilely fallen into a slumbering forgetfulness about the bond between
intimacy and fleshly encounter. By retaining the option to interlace virtual encounters
with sensual-bodily aspects of sociality, the research participants retained the choice to
resist the AIM window call to adopt the detached perspective vision of a spectator.
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Postmodern and romanticist practices were simultaneously possible within the
aforementioned chosen practices. That is to say, various AIM practices were not
necessarily beholden to a single discourse such as modernism. An AIM window practice
could conceivably slide or ‘swivel’ in a way that allowed for a prethematic enactment of
an alternate cultural-historical practice. For the research participants, the option to shift
the referential significance of an AIM space practice was always present, albeit
prereflectively. From a research participant’s point of view, however, the prereflective
choice to shift the index of an AIM practice was “consciously” influenced by feelings
such as frustration, emotional hurt, and emotional fulfillment. Again, a sensual-bodily
ethic asserted itself. In Rochelle’s words, “You can be yourself, or you can be anyone
you want to be really. You can live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are really
looking for true love, don’t falsify anything, it just makes for a big disappointment in the
end” (Appendix D). The bodily experience of disappointment influenced the ready-tohand way in which virtual practices were put to use. Specifically, Rochelle’s comment
highlighted how the postmodern freedom to enact false, fantastical, or latent aspects of a
research participant’s “self” might be solicited by the use of AIM space screen names.
Alternatively, a romanticist pursuit of love could lead to a re-appropriation of screen
names for the purpose of enacting “true” (e.g., factically congruent) disclosures about a
research participant’s offline “self.” The meaning of a discursive practice was not,
therefore, unidirectionally determined. Its significance was, instead, co-constructed.
Thus, coming into presence in a genuine manner during meaningful encounters could
hold sway for the research participants despite the modern and postmodern Enframing of
AIM space practices.
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Once immersed in AIM space, the research participants fashioned areas of smooth
functioning virtual practices. At other times, they experienced points of social
breakdown sometimes followed by acts of renewed compliance or resistance. For
instance, the act of living out a cyborg vision sometimes included resistance to a detached
(modernist) engagement with the spectacle of virtual others. Adopting cyborg vision
could also signify how the virtual self lived through an eye which accustomed itself to the
partiality of a virtual other’s coming into presence. In part, it felt safer to both be and
encounter the partial presence of others as an e-text presence or as a screen reality.
According to Rochelle, “Nothing bothers you, if you don’t want to talk to a person, you
can easily block them . . . If the ‘real’ world was this easy, it’d be so nice, you would get
rid of jerks right off the bat . . .” (Appendix D). While distance and partial presence
hampered bids for intimacy, the safe distance of virtuality reduced the sense of prolonged
vulnerability. In the blink of a cyborg eye, the intrusive, deceitful, immature, or abusive
virtual other (or subject) could be made to vanish.
As a virtual cyborg subject, acquisition of the modernist power to feel relatively
invulnerable became an occasion for other social breakdowns. To be invulnerable in
cyberspace was to signify that a research participant participated in AIM space as a
remote presence. As a remote presence, however, efforts to know the virtual other were
palpably frustrated. As Bryce recounted, “My first experience to meet someone new on
the Internet was horrible because the person lied about his age and appearances.” The
research participant assumption that online others enact (romanticist) authenticity as a
code of conduct was violated. Consequently, research participant’s could be
unknowingly deceived about the other’s factical offline bodily qualities. Here, the
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virtual cyborg eye sometimes became a partially blind eye. The cyborg eye could also
become an illiterate eye. As a result, difficulty with forming accurate understanding was
sometimes suffered. In Dawns words, “I looked at the computer screen in complete
horror. He was lashing out at me. He questioned our entire relationship over my simple
statement. All I meant by the statement was how surprised I was . . .” (Appendix J).
Without the signs of bodily sensuality and worldly context, the remote eye of
understanding became an eye sometimes lost at sea with linguistic signifiers.
Specifically, the invulnerable cyborg could become lost in the remote eye of “mind,” – a
“mind” unwittingly filled with decontextualized fantasy constructions about text-based
meanings. Such an eye lost the possibility of immersing itself within the manifold
significations which faithfully sing the body-world unity indicative of a virtual other’s
identity. In such instances, the research participants were motivated to prevent or
overcome the fantasy constructions occasioned by AIM sociality by shedding aspects of
their cyborg armor and engaging in efforts to reduce distance from the virtual other. The
desire to meet by telephone or in person signified moments of resistance. In other
circumstances, the reassertion of effort to intensely scrutinize e-text communication
occurred - to the point of “tedium” – thus signifying redoubled effort at compliance with
the modern and postmodern calls to continue the practice of virtual existence in AIM
space. Whereas Rochelle resisted reliance upon AIM practices to establish intimacy by
continuing to insist on face-to-face encounters, Bryce and Dawn engaged more actively
in AIM chat. Dawn did so out of an imposed necessity, stating that she had to “calculate
how to present information” rather than rely upon spontaneous speech acts.
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Just how the “cyborg self” of AIM space was culturally and historically produced
involved AIM strategies of normalization and regulation. One aspect of behavioral
regulation in AIM space has been addressed through the description of discursive
practices described heretofore. Another AIM-based strategy for regulating behavior
involved AIM’s modernist informed “Rules and Guidelines” posted online by AOL. The
“Rules and Guidelines” were modernist inasmuch as they seemed to spring from a
“common sense” and legalistic sense of justice rather then, for instance, from a
romanticist sense of a deep interiority connected to nature. AIM ethics did, however,
provide for the possibility of some postmodern freedom by emphasizing that chatrooms
“are NOT monitored.” AOL’s panoptic surveillance was also limited inasmuch as AIM
provided “industry standard” encryption for its users; an encryption, however, wherein
AOL and the U.S. government maintain decryption privileges. Moreover, AIM
possessed other pre-programmed capacities to trace AOL member activities on the
Internet. AIM also provided “buddy lists” which allowed virtual “buddies” to know
when another buddy was online and what chatroom that particular “buddy” might be
found in. The activities of a virtual cyborg in AIM space were thereby normalized as
profoundly visible to AOL and selected members. Therefore, postmodern and romantic
ethics could be negotiated in a multitude of AOL spaces, but within the confines of
AOL’s overarching code and modernist informed “Rules and Guidelines.” In this way, a
virtual cyborg could potentially become the object of normative discipline. Thus virtual
freedom in AIM space could be performed within, of course, a modernist frame.
Results Re-view
Response to the literature on cyborgs and physiology. How have images of the future
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handed down to Western civilization from its past influenced the human experience of
cyberspace in the early twenty first century? The results of this study amended Donna
Haraway’s early 1990s understanding of what it means to fashion existence from out of
the cyborg image. According to Haraway, the cyborg – a hybrid of human and machine
(e.g., Internet) – was an irreverent and transgressive figure born with the capacity to
oppose and resist acquiescence to the coding attributed to its origins of “mud and . . .
militarism and . . . capitalism . . .”
Initially, the research participants in this study did indeed adopt the prosthetic of
computer-enabled Internet access in order to establish intimate connections with others.
However, this human-machine fusion was only a temporary and transitional choice. The
wish to retain machinic powers, such as an expanded sense of social spatiality, was
ultimately relinquished in favor of retrieving some sense of the lost sensual-bodily
connection. Rather than embrace a transgressive cyborg existence, even after having
experienced the embodied self as inadequate, the research participants maintained an
abiding motivation to return to the “mud” and sensuality of their embodied being.
Moreover, they preferred to work toward achieving successful unmediated encounters
rather than submit to modernist (and militaristic?) solicitations to maintain machinic
detachment or to practice postmodern fantasy enactments during virtual encounters. In
this study, cyborgs did not ultimately defy their human “origins” so much as much they
resisted modern technological discourses associated with their hybridity. A bodily
emphasis was re-appropriated as the research participants became distressed about the
receding relevance of carnal disclosive powers. Rather than docilely accept such a loss;
rather than repress, mourn, or become nostalgic about bodily absence, the research
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participants creatively worked to resist prolonged disconnection from some form of
sensually informed encounter. Thus, this study revealed that the prethematic flight from
embodiment into virtual cyborg subjectivity was enacted ambivalently. Submission to
modern technological discourses were at times resisted when the bracketing of bodily
participation became problematic.
To be sure, the research participants initially expected the fusion of humanelectronic ‘life’ to enable a safe expansion of power to inhabit non-local spaces. Therein
they became cyborg “subjects” outfitted with enhancements over their biological and
spatial finitude. As cyborg “subjects,” they could also conceal their offline facticity. At
the same time, to prethematically become an electronic cyborg meant that research
participants sometimes endured strained efforts to retain eclipsed aspects of bodily being
and power or withstand their diminution. Here, electronic simulations of presence did
not successfully tranquilize anxiety about the loss of sensuality.
Was this sense of sensual-bodily loss and return motivated simply by a wish to
return to the familiar ground of human flesh? The physiological understanding of human
being found in the perennial standard text, Gray’s Anatomy (1989), provided an account
of the human body as an organic machine. In summary, this traditional physiological
discourse produced an objectified understanding of the human body which rendered
consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon of internal disequilibrium leading to the
formation of “adaptive” maintenance and survival responses. The results of this study
supported Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that this kind of mechanistic and instinctual
understanding of human physiology is insufficient. For Merleau-Ponty, human behavior
and purpose cannot be fully explained by simply relying upon stimulus-response
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explanations (e.g., behaviorism) and instinctual drive theory. As discussed earlier,
Merleau-Ponty described a “human order” of existence that organized biological
functions through the interpretation of context bound meanings. In this study, the
research participants experienced distress during social breakdowns when meaningful
spaces for intimacy dissolved or did not materialize. Thus, a wish for fulfillment
unrelated to mere biological maintenance and instinctual gratification prevailed at those
times (e.g., resisting sexualized social agendas). The importance of fulfilling meaningful
experiences associated with the “human order of existence” took precedence.
Where the loss of meaningful sociality resulted in breakdowns, it became clear
what kinds of “subjectivity” the research participants identified with – a meaningful
bodily-being-in-the-world with others. This loss also clarified how each research
participant struggled with bodily absence, as well as how they grappled with the absence
of non-virtual contexts which typically enrich the sense-making process. The opportunity
to construct meanings by integrating sensorially informed experience of the virtual other
the virtual other’s worldly life context was unhappily absent for the research participants’
during bids for meaningful AIM space encounters. In this way, the images from the
movie “2001” served as poignant reminders about the lifeless and devitalized shape
meaningful human existence takes when the earthly horizon of existence is replaced by
the look and rhythm of technologically saturated ‘life.’
Implications for further inquiry into cyborgs and physiology. The finding
that virtual cyborg social existence extended spatiality and enhanced the sense of social
insulation from physical and emotional risks also pointed to the concomitant loss of
integrated sensorial participation during social encounters. In this regard, Marshal
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McLuhan’s (1964) landmark thesis on media extensions of human capacities suggests a
direction for further research motivated by a cultural therapeutic. McLuhan reasoned that
as technological mediums extend human capacities and take over those functions, such
extensions result in the atrophy or numbing of human abilities (e.g., heaters extend the
body’s thermostatic function). For example, Dawn stated that Internet as a tool for
socializing was “[a]llowing the world to listen with a deafening ear” (Appendix J). In
effect, Dawn experienced the Internet as extending and muting the human capacity for
listening and whole bodied interpretation during social encounters. Following
McLuhan’s argument regarding technological extensions of human capacities I,
therefore, suggest that research addressing biological systems correlated with the
integration of symbolic and emotional experiences, might clarify how prolonged humanelectronic interface during virtual social interactions impacts brain-body systems. Jane
Healy, a researcher in educational computing, has already initiated reflection and inquiry
into the medical and behavioral implications for widespread computer use by children.
In Jane Healy’s (1998) work, Failure to Connect: How Computers Affect Our
Children’s Minds – for Better and Worse, Healy expressed concerns that time spent on
the computer displaced time available for physical and interpersonal experience. Healy
went on to suggest that research on the brain development of children who spend
significant amounts of time on the computer might shed light upon such conditions as
Attention Deficit Disorder and arrested emotional development. Healy thereby supported
research examining the limbic system (emotional functions), the prefrontal cortex (self
control, planning), and the neurotransmitter serotonin (related to aggressive moods), all
of which she believes are altered by prolonged computer use.
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Healy did not however address Internet sociality. With regard to those engaging
in prolonged involvement in AIM sociality, I would go on to suggest that the sensually
depleted social environment of AIM space may be indicative of a need for biological
research into its impact upon tactile readiness for unmediated human contact (cf.
Harlow’s (1974) monkeys). I would also suggest that biological research also examine
the long-term impact of virtual sensual deprivation. It may be that the impact of
immersion in virtual sociality may give rise to a dis-integrative effects on human neural
networks for synthesizing the complex social-emotional information conveyed during
face-to-face human encounters (e.g., synesthesic sense, corporeal schema). Thus the
meaning of being a virtual cyborg may indeed involve a biologically entwined
“forgetfulness,” or selective inattention to the signifying power of human gestures,
human emotions, and human desire beyond their adaptive biological functions.
Response to the technocultural literature. This study both modifies and
supports perspectives raised in the review of technocultural literature. First, I begin with
images and subtexts bound up with the landmark film, “The Matrix” (1999). The
theretofore stunning and unparalleled visual effects found in “The Matrix” were
undoubtedly seductive in demonstrating the appeal for immersion in simulated existence.
Whereas the demolished state of the filmed version of the “real” world pales in
comparison to the renovated visuals of the movie version of the Matrix, it can be asked
whether or not the disparity between AIM space and the offline world of the research
participants varied as vividly. Specifically, and for the purposes of this study, it was
found that Baudrillard's contention that simulations lacked the capacity to coherently
signify the “real” garnered support from the research participant protocols.
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In this study, the notion of the “real” referred to the research participants’ concern
about the match between their perception of the online and offline identities of virtual
others; about the match between their experience of virtual rapport and offline rapport;
and about the match between intended meanings and subsequent interpretations of those
meanings. For example, Bryce found the discrepancy between the online and offline
identity of the other to be a “horrible” experience where deception was involved.
Rochelle found the discrepancy between online and offline rapport to be unpredictable
and often “a real let down.” Dawn, on the other hand, found misinterpretations of
meanings to require a “tedious” amount of effort to rectify or avoid. The research
participants’ reactions suggested that a postmodern virtual world filled with identity
experimentation is undesirable when the overarching project to establish meaningful
connections with others is already fraught with potential misunderstanding. Their
predilection for some kind of modernist certainty about the other’s re-presentations or a
romantic desire for a level of integrity about their identity was generally preferred during
virtual interactions.
The results of this study were in partial accord with the Romanyshyn’s musing
that the “dream body” of cyberspace serves as a vehicle for the factical body to abandon
earth. In similar fashion, this study partially supported Dery’s contention that netizens
seek to achieve “escape velocity” in order to metaphorically break free of earth’s
gravitational pull as a way to achieve technological transcendence within the global
network of cyberspace.
According to the research participants, the modernist desire to transcend
embodiment in order that “mind” could merge with the electronic network of cyberspace
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was at best a temporary project. Initially, the research participants did indeed seek to
take a more or less enthusiastic flight into the cyberspace realm of sociality. However,
their expectations about the possibilities of life within the electronic frontier were
dimmed as breakdowns in virtual interactions emerged. In a variation on the words of
Herbert Marcuse (1964), the research participants may have initially experienced a kind
of “euphoria in unhappiness;” a kind of fun and relaxation derived from consuming
Internet related goods and services. And yet, such consumption led to unhappy
realizations about and resistance to an unsatisfying repression of human possibilities.
Whereas the economic interests of AOL may have converged with modernity’s Cartesian
incitement to embrace the “false need” to crossover into virtual worlds, it turns out that
these research participants sought out AIM as a means to cross back over into enacting a
discourse of meaningful bodily-being-in-the-world with others. In such moments, the
research participants enacted a retrieval of the marginalized desire for holistically
contextualized sensuality. It is therefore no surprise that the research participants’ initial
perception that their embodied presence was a nuisance to offline social connection gave
way to the alternative realization that virtual re-presentations (“dream bodies”) of self and
other became a nuisance by inducing confusion during virtual chat.
Ironically, transcendence or excessive immersion into the sociality of the Internet
became a potential obstacle to meaningful intimacy for virtual cyborgs. As stated earlier,
the virtual cyborg eye becomes an eye often blinded to the presence of others. It also
became an illiterate eye during times of confusion about the meaning of decontextualized
signifiers in AIM space. Sometimes dim-sighted and lost in the translation of e-relations,
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the “mind” of a research participant was occasionally reminded of its incompleteness
without the complement of its bodily powers.
Implications for further inquiry into virtual technocultural. The research
participants’ descriptions of their respective online behaviors tended to challenge
Foucault’s (1978) notion that the power of discourses are merely “productive” social
practices. Whereas technocultural historiographies can benefit from an examination of
how human conduct is “drawn out, revealed, isolated, intensified, [and] incorporated by
multifarious power devices ” (1978, p. 48), it can also benefit from an examination of
how alternate human experiences and practices may be marginalized or indeed
“repressed” after power “measured the body, and penetrated modes of conduct” (p. 48).
From Heidegger’s point of view, it is also important to realize that where one possibility
(or mode of conduct) is revealed (or produced), another possibility is necessarily
concealed (or marginalized). Even in The History of Sexuality, Foucault did indeed
acknowledge that the “inducement to speak” or to “confess” eventually enabled power to
“manage”” and “normalize” practices – “ [T]he pleasure discovered fed back to the
power that encircled it” (pp. 44-45). Although Foucault objected to the notion that
“essential” aspects of human being could be “repressed” and subsequently “liberated,”
the relevance of a cultural therapeutic would diminish if all emotional and bodily
indicators of health were trivialized as mere effects of social construction.
In light of Foucault’s argument that all truth-claims vary because they are situated
within different power/knowledge formations, any consideration of counter claims
asserting the existence of universal bodily needs and desires amidst EMRs warrants
caution – especially since non-Western religious and ethno-cultural groups may differ.
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Thus a more conservative experience-near argument might, instead, suggest that the
research participants’ “desire” for embodied contact arose from a perceived “lack.” And
such a lack may not have been due to the absence of mere anatomical bodies. Rather, the
experience of desire and lack may have been occasioned by the absence of encounters
with historied bodies, bodies that signify historically informed meaning and identities
through physical and gestural signs. This would of course point to the possibility that
human desire and historied bodies may have a contemporary, if not lasting importance for
humankind in the West. Thus, historiographies about the burgeoning culture of
simulation would do well to maintain narrative openness to the possibility that desire for
encounters with embodied others may indeed arise for an indefinite period of time in the
West. This would of course invite considerations in the area of “normative” or “ethical”
cultural-hermeneutics. Moreover, it would strengthen justification for suggesting
modifications to future virtual technologies on the grounds of psychological health and
well-being. As the psychoanalytic historian, Daniel Burston (2000) summarized in his
scholarly account of R. D. Laing’s theories in The Crucible:
[Laing] referred to ontological security as the ‘normal’ state
of affairs and argued that the ability to identify with one’s body, to
sustain good-enough interpersonal relationships . . . and to enjoy some
congruence between one’s being-for-oneself and being-for-others
are constitutive of mental health . . . (p. 135)
The failure to identify with “the communal self [as] perforce corporeal” (p. 134),
according to Burston, may lead one become enveloped in a phantasy world. And where
the experiences described by the research participants in this study can be deemed
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relevant, meaningful bodily being-in-the-world with others might be counted as a situated
constant in the area ethical critical-hermeneutics.
A useful example of such a project is Robert Kugelmann’s (1992) study of the
relationship between the discourse of modernity and the “archaic” body in Stress: The
Nature and History of Engineered Grief. From Kugelmann’s perspective the “stress”
experienced by the human body signifies an implicit critique of modernity and its
emphasis on progress. Kugelmann argues that modernity’s form of progress alienates
humankind from the lived body. Whereas modernity focuses upon reasoned efficiency
and productivity, the lived body asserts its care for societal growth which is in accord
with carnal earth-bound considerations. Here, Kugelmann’s emphasis upon the lived
body as a potential foundation for resisting aspects of modernity’s progressive discourse
stands as useful touchstone for research motivated by a cultural therapeutic sensibility.
Following from Kugelmann’s work, it would profit the field of psychology to
remember that the “symptoms” linked to enfleshed subjectivity can inaugurate a valuable
breakdown of the symbolic order. One positive outcome of such a breakdown is that it
can restore values associated with flesh and earth into forms of being-in-the-world with
others. For example, Kugelmann argues that the accelerated mechanization of society
places increasing stress upon humankind. Such stress does not always call out to be
mastered (e.g., stress management). Rather stress may signify the bodily recognition of
lost worlds, lost forms of intimate personal relationships, lost opportunities for dwelling,
and lost opportunities for experiencing moments of meaningfully lived time. Kugelmann
goes on to suggest that the creation of “empty time,” time freed from the need to be
efficient and productive, may allow for the opportunity to mourn such losses, or to arrive
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at choices to resist the burgeoning scarcity of being-in-the-world meaningfully. Quoting
again from Herbert Marcuse (1964):
“Naming the ‘things that are absent,’ is breaking the spell of the
things that are; moreover it is an ingression of a different order
of things into the established one – “le commencement d’un monde”
(p. 68).
Response to literature on psychological issues. In the Literature Review, I
researched a substantial amount of speculative theory about the impact of human
immersion in cyberspace. Some of the arguments posed by different EMR thinkers
included Gergen’s claim that social saturation can occasion multiphrenic experiences,
Poster’s argument that narcissistic tendencies are solicited by cyberspace, Romanyshyn’s
discussion of cyberspace-induced depression as an invitation to return “home,” and
Robin’s concern that cyberspace immersion reactivates infantile omnipotent strivings.
Whereas the latter theories argue that immersion in electronic sociality might give
rise to deleterious outcomes, other perspectives allowed for more generative possibilities.
From a positive psychological standpoint, Robins’ went on to submit that the Internet
could serve as an imaginal space or a “transitional space” (cf. Donald Winnicott)
allowing for the diminution of omnipotent tendencies. Turkle stressed that the outcome
of cyberspace involvement depended upon one’s purpose. For instance, Turkle found
that cyberspace contributed to one’s personal growth when the Internet was utilized to
work through areas of desired growth rather than merely “act out” a fantasy existence.
All of the above claims or fore-conceptions about the psychological implications of EMR
immersion contribute to the following discussion.

155
The findings in this study lent limited support to Gergen’s perspective that
identity expansion is enabled by electronically enabled social saturation. Gergen argued
for a developmental perspective on postmodern identity formation. In this study, the
research participants clearly sought out self-expansion as part of their pursuit of
meaningful virtual encounters. The kind of expansion they preferred, however, only
modestly referenced a wish to alter their respective identities by “internalizing” the
differing qualities of virtual others. Instead, the research participants sought to live out
genuine unlived possibilities for being in relation with others. These possibilities were
previously unlived because the research participants felt inhibited during bodily
encounters (e.g., due to judgments about female body-image, shyness). Bodily presence
was a discomfiting nuisance.
Whereas the research participants may have experienced an initial desire for
exposure to the vast alterity of online others, instead, Rochelle and Bryce eventually
experienced discontented moods leading them to enact a (romanticist?) search for a
compatible other. In such instances, their postmodern desire to infuse their identity with
a dramatic expansion of values and modes of being a “self” was discarded. In Bryce’s
words, “I now know the types of people who are attracted to me and how to approach
them” (Appendix H). Bryce was less interested in fundamentally expanding the types of
persons he related to so much as Bryce sought to determine the kinds of people he was
compatible with. During Rochelle’s teenage years, the excursion into the standing
reserve of different others (e.g., older males) was fraught with misunderstandings,
misconstrued perceptions about having made successful intimate connections, feeling
objectified, feeling judged, feeling attacked, and feeling deceived. In her post teen years,
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Rochelle found a romantic partner and subsequently retrenched herself in her embodied
world - “ When I met him, my Internet time went from 2 to 3 hours a day to just minutes
checking my e-mail, and occasionally responding to them . . . I don’t go into chat rooms.
There is no need to, I have everything I need in a person” (Appendix D). In this way,
Rochelle’s reactions –as well as Bryce’s - supported for Romanyshyn’s contention that
certain moods can signify a call to return “home” to one’s ownmost being and
possibilities.
Nevertheless, in contrast to Gergen’s thesis that social saturation enabled selfexpansion, these research subjects found that the self-expansion was enabled more so by
the body-concealing architecture of the Internet and its associated technology. The
prosthetic of the Internet allowed for a research participant’s identity to be ambiguous
and only partially present online. This kind of remote presence was experienced as less
anxiety provoking. The decrease in anxiety allowed the research participants to begin
acting upon their preexisting desires for being-in-the-world with others. Thus, the call to
postmodern consciousness and practices had limited appeal for these research
participants. In contrast to Gergen’s viewpoint, the journey into postmodern and
modernist possibilities was instead followed by a return to the comfort-zone of the
research participants’ embodied possibilities.
As to Robins’ contention that cyberspace solicited omnipotent infantile strivings
and Poster’s claim that narcissistic tendencies were likewise solicited, the support for
these claims is at best ambiguous. It is not clear from the protocols that the research
participants intended to engage in behaviors that were distinctly insensitive or
demanding. In one instance, it is clear that Rochelle did appropriate her aunt’s credit
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card without consent, did “sneak” online late at night, and that she did misrepresent her
age online. Beyond such practices, Rochelle demonstrated a motivation to correctly
identify her age online after preliminary chatting with a virtual other seemed as if it might
lead to further interaction. In terms of the virtual other’s actions, it is noted that Rochelle
and Bryce instead experienced online others as variously deceitful, motivated by
sexualized agendas, “mean,” or “immature.”
In Dawn’s case, her significant other perceived Dawn as judging him without any
sense of understanding while online. Although he experienced Dawn as emotionally
attacking, it became clear to Dawn that she had been relying on him to utilize
remembrance of their offline “repertoire” in order to mitigate against such
misunderstandings Dawn also added that the absence of bodily presence led to reliance
upon “assumptions” or fantasy constructions to guide the interpretation and response to
perceived meanings. Without bodily presence, a fluid revision of interpretations and
responses was impaired. According to Dawn, “I wouldn’t know to make adjustments if I
wasn’t there” (Appendix K). Thus it was possible that a research participant could
experience the other person as self-centered and insensitive, in part, because the absence
of online sensual presence limited the possibilities for conveying fluid responsiveness to
misunderstandings and unintended inflictions of harm (e.g., relational disjunctions) while
chatting with the virtually present other.
This discussion of insensitive online behavior opens on to Robins’ contention that
cyberspace can be a kind of Winnicottian “transitional” or imaginal space for growth. In
some ways, this line of thinking is compatible with Turkle’s finding that online users
experience personal growth if their implicit project was to work through areas of desired
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self-development. The findings of this study supported the latter arguments for the
growth potential occasioned by the practice of cyberspace sociality. The research
participants revealed how they did indeed strive to overcome or learn from the
disappointments they encountered in the imaginal space provided for by AIM. The
experience of social frustrations online helped to dispel the illusion that cyberspace
sociality was a space of uninterrupted possibilities for gratification. Though, in most
cases, there was no responsive (m)other present to aid them in reflectively metabolizing
such frustrations, the research participants did resist or modify discursive practices as a
way to continue in their quest to establish meaningful connections. The one exception
was Bryce, who reported that offline friends assisted him in working through his reaction
to feeling “horrible” about the online deception he encountered – “They told me that not
everyone would do that if I changed my approach” (Appendix H). Bryce was indeed
supported in the process of reorganizing his understanding about AIM space after the
“moment of illusion” was shattered.
Implications of the literature re-view on psychological issues. In summary, the
re-view of the literature on psychological issues led to a new understanding that the
achievement of one’s possibilities for being genuine in relation to others may be
preferred over against the pursuit of postmodern consciousness. Furthermore, there was
ambiguous evidence supporting the understanding that cyberspace is populated by those
exhibiting a social insensitivity motivated by narcissistic and infantile attitudes. As
discussed above, cyberspace forms of sociality and meaning production were prone to
misinterpretations by the research participants or by the virtual others. Thus, I found that
some virtual social practices seemed harsh or obtuse, in part, because the AIM
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architecture included the programmed elision of the sensual body-world background
thereby disabling fluid responsiveness to shifting meanings and reactions during virtual
encounters. In one example of misperceived insensitivity, Rochelle stated, “He swears
that I blew him off, but if I did, it wasn’t intentional” (Appendix D). In another example,
Dawn described her significant other’s indignation following his misinterpretation of her
Instant Message:
‘Is this what you think of me? If you feel this way, why
are you in a relationship with me?’ I looked at the computer
screen in complete horror. He was lashing out at me. He
questioned our entire relationship over my simple statement.
(Appendix J)
On the latter point, it is possible to consider, with reference to Erich Fromm
(1955), that the positive qualities of AIM space engendered “socially patterned”
deficiencies for being-in-the-world with others. By “socially patterned” defect, Fromm
was referring to a culturally constructed loss of human freedom and spontaneity which
passed for psychological health. Fromm claimed that the pervasiveness of such losses
generally passed by unnoticed as socially patterned defects were prereflectively
understood to be givens of existence – in the same way, for instance, that email is now
viewed as a standard form of communication in professional and personal circles.
Fromm went on to state that socially patterned defects have sometimes been reframed as
“virtues.” In that way, the strategy of elevating loss to virtue gained currency because the
losses were deemed to serve necessary societal ends. With regard to reframing loss as
virtue, I found a ready parallel where the unreflective production of dualistic or Cartesian
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styles of relating in cyberspace reigned. Here the absence of bodily connection to self
and others would have achieved the status of “normality” if research participants had
fully surrendered to narrow Western body-image ideals or Western expectations to place
workplace commitments ahead of personal relationship priorities.
In R. D. Laing’s (1965) The Divided Self, Laing discussed the consequences
associated with conducting relations from an “existential position” which exiled the
“self” form one’s bodily presence. Where the basic unity between mind and body and
other has been experientially divided, Laing suggested that actions emanating from a
“self [which] avoids being directly related to real persons” (p. 86) can begin to feel futile
and perceptions can seem unreal. A phantasy life may then emerge which is increasingly
divorced from infusions of vital corporeal experiences. The sense of “self” may then
become precariously fragile and “unreal” if consistently barred from bodily presence.
“Schizoid” forms of existence may then come into being. Where it is indeed possible that
“schizoid” forms of subjectivity can be stylized by the culturally sanctioned proliferation
of electronically mediated relationships (EMRs), I suggest that a cultural therapeutic
should counter the potential for alienation from “self.” That is to say, from a general
perspective, that a researcher’s employment of a cultural therapeutic not only asks the
researcher to identify societal “repression” of possibilities for being human, it also asks
that the researcher to point toward a pragmatics for retrieving or resuscitating such
possibilities.
Although cyberspace may solicit schizoid tendencies, the social evolution of
Rochelle and Bryce - which emerged from their online experiences - suggests that the
potential for personal growth in cyberspace can be harnessed for those who are hampered
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by some form of social anxiety. Psychotherapeutic interventions can be implemented for
the treatment of social anxiety by titrating the exposure of anxious individuals to the full
immediacy of embodied encounters. For instance, a treatment protocol that begins with
the less threatening reality of “real time” Instant Messaging might allow persons with
social anxiety to incrementally work through their reservations about direct social
encounters. In effect, persons experiencing social anxiety might find the progressive
exposure to an embodied social clearing to be less overwhelming. This kind of therapy
might also include psycho-education about social-emotional competencies as a way to
offset the normalization of social deficiencies intrinsic to virtual sociality. In Dawn’s
words, “I know a couple of people personally that found it kind of hard to assimilate back
into real life without having to deal with IM . . . it’s almost like dating all over again”
(Appendix K).
Response to the Continental philosophy literature review. The results of this
research study tended to support and elaborate Hubert Dreyfus’ view that the “essence”
of the Internet technology disclosive space is to make things “accessible and
optimizable.” The research participants were drawn into the Enframing (Ge-stell) of
AIM space, in part, by the promise that a standing-reserve (Bestand) of chat-ready others
would be available. Bryce underscored the efficiency of their availability in his research
interview:
[Y]ou had more choices of people on the Internet. You had all
those screen names of people who are interested in meeting or hooking
up . . . Where in the bar someone could just be having drinks with friends,
they don’t really want to be bothered with other people or they could be
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there by themselves just having a drink. In the chatroom, people want to
talk. They want to talk, want to meet people, want to talk about things,
about politics, sex, music, whatever. (Appendix E)
The unequivocal accessibility and availability of others was not in question, unless of
course someone like Dawn was seeking out contact with a previously known individual.
In Dawn’s situation, accessibility was nevertheless enhanced by AIM technology, but not
always – “Because of the hours we both worked, it was kind of hard to pin each other
down at certain times of the day” (Appendix K).
With regard to the other half of Dreyfus’ contention that the essence of the
Internet was to make things “optimizable,” it turns out that the optimization of virtual
other’s presence was a substantial challenge for the research participants. Whereas
“things” might come to presence in an optimized way, the re-presentations of other’s
often drifted into undecidability for the research participants. Without the perceptually
rich background of body and world, the indeterminacy of the virtual other’s identity, as
well as, the uncertainty about the sustainability of online rapport in the offline world
could be a source of ongoing uncertainty. In this way, AIM was not necessarily geared to
enhance optimized human presence so much as AOL was inciting excitement about
developing a positive and playful attitude toward the partiality of presence in AIM space.
For instance, AOL’s high-energy advertising pitched a postmodern emphasis upon
playing with signifiers regarding an AIM user’s identity. AOL encouraged the
implementation of AIM Expressions, Buddy Icons, and the Smiley Dictionary:
Put Tom Cruise on your Desktop! AIM Expressions is the
exciting new way to personalize your AIM client and instant messages
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. . . . Buddy Icons . . . Make your IMs display your online personality.
Choose a cool Buddy Icon . . . . Smiley Dictionary: Ever wonder what
people are saying on AIM? Use the handy Smiley Dictionary to
keep up! (Appendix L)
Thus, a modification of Dreyfus’ stance on the essence of Internet sociality might
be reworked to specify that the Internet has become a disclosive space which makes chatready others partially accessible and virtually accessorized. The point being that AOL
has in effect incited a kind of ‘fashion consciousness’ with regard to outfitting the virtual
cyborg. In other words, AOL’s strategy for marketing virtuality has enacted a
pictographic ‘beautification’ of virtual cyborg presence. The construction of virtual
cyborgs is enfolded in a strategy which incites a postmodern exhilaration about adopting
and encountering re-presented identities progressively disconnected from immediate
bodily referents.
The Continental philosophy literature re-view implications. As stated earlier,
the implications of successfully carrying out the discursive tactic to normalize and
fetishize electronic presence have potential repercussions within the area of “socially
patterned” deficiencies.
Response to critical literature on cyberspace. The purpose of employing
critical-hermeneutic features in this study was to provide a basis for building a history of
human subject formation as it has been occurring in twenty first century simulated
spaces. This particular form of historiography attended to the relationship between the
broad narrative of history and the discourse relations within local virtual contexts. By
fashioning this kind of cultural-historical inquiry, I also intended to elucidate meaning
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construction, lived experience, and social practice choices as they unfolded at the
dialogical intersection of historically situated discourses and research participant
motivations. This entailed an analysis of the new form of “fundamental social
experience” in Western culture, EMRs. In and through the window of cyberrealtions this
study attended to the “mobile and complex power relations” ordering human praxis in
simulated social spaces. In this way, an expanded understanding of human experience
could include a perspective on how cultural-historical discourses participated in creating
value, assigning meaning, and prescribing social practices. With such an understanding,
this study was positioned to make a cultural therapeutic contribution; one which allows
humankind to modify cultural-historical practices through an awareness of being
embedded in discourse-laden practices.
The sole example of extant critical research into “self-fashioning” through
Internet use was conducted by Alan Aycock. My research both supported and extended
Aycock’s methodology and findings. Through Aycock’s limited examination of e-text
speech acts, he found that the netizens interacting on the Bulletin Board Service (BBS)
for chess players focused on developing a “deep” inner self (e.g., chess skills) akin to the
discourse of romanticism. Though I might argue that the skill of chess requires the
development of the cognitive powers of reason and strategy, and is therefore a modernist
project, I would support Aycock’s effort to identify the kind of “self” under development
as a means for locating the discursive regime investing, producing, and subjectifying the
body. While I would also support Aycock’s effort to identify historical discourses, I
would add that Aycock’s identification of a single historical discourse at work on the
BBS could have been extended into an examination of the “power relations” within
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which the BBS subjects were situated. Without attention to the play of power and how
subjects play with discursive practices, it can appear as if humankind simply submits to
its subjectification. It can also become unclear as to whether or not netizens are enacting
discourses motivated by the local space, or have somehow imported discourses or desires
which add to the play of symbolic systems.
By my introduction of a more complex inquiry - which included research
participant perspectives, cultural-historical literature, and local site analysis - my study
revealed that the research participants did not necessarily adhere to the enactment of one
particular discourse. Instead, the research participants attempted to prethematically
weave together a variety of discursive practices as a way to achieve meaningful social
encounters. In some cases, the research participants utilized a practice typically
associated with one particular cultural-historical discourse for another discursive purpose
altogether. For instance, Bryce began requesting picture postings from virtual others for
the purposes of moving relationship offline, not for the purpose of submitting to the
disincarnate sociality occasioned by modernism. Bryce, in effect, cross-appropriated
one discursive practice in order to achieve the ends particular to a different order of
meaning (e.g., bodily presence). In other cases, research participants submitted to the use
of virtual sociality reluctantly. Dawn felt compelled to use AIM because geographical
distance interfered with maintaining her offline relationship. Nevertheless, Dawn
submitted with displeasure – “Well I just think [AIM] is a cold thing because it lacks
emotion. I mean, no smiley [face] . . . [takes] the place of what someone says . . . A word
that’s printed and how it’s said is two different things, has two different connotations”
(Appendix K). By introducing the research participants’ voices through protocols and
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interviews, it was discovered that a virtual practice could signify a multitude of meaning
systems. It also became apparent that adopting a practice did not necessarily imply
submission to the discursive purpose typically associated with that practice. Instead, the
research participants in this study maintained their valuation of meaningful bodily-beingin-the world with others even if the local space of AIM disabled such a practice by virtue
of its programmed architecture. Here, the cyborg power of expanded spatiality was
ambivalently embraced along with the construction of a virtual sociality privileging the
partial and remote presence of others.
Implications of the critical literature re-view of cyberspace. The implications
of this critical-hermeneutic approach to research pointed to the way in which
communities can be empowered to recognize the significance of maintaining a free
relation to modern technology. In this way, a community can begin to recognize the
impact it might have on its future and the future of technology.
In Disclosing New Worlds: Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the
Cultivation of Solidarity (1997), Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus
refer to such empowerment as “history making.” For Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus
history making “changes the way in which we understand and deal with ourselves and
with things” (p. 2). The relevance to my research is further extended by the viewpoint of
Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus that modernism and postmodernism instantiate “living in a
nonhistorical way” (p. 10). Whereas modernism demands the reproduction of objective
practices, postmodernism produces an emphasis on change as mode of existence. In
neither instance does a “historical consciousness” lead to a modification of such
practices. What Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus instead, call for is a process of
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“articulation” which allows for the “retrieval” of once valuable practices which have been
marginalized or lost. From there the “reconfiguration” of current cultural-historical
practices can occur in such a way so as to allow some version of those erstwhile practices
back into the relative center of consideration. Hence, from my perspective, the continued
effort to generate critical-hermeneutic research regarding virtual technology can enable
social change by the reintroduction and “resuscitation of our historical skills” (p. 15) and
awareness thereby allowing for the informed practice of free choice.
Conclusion
My initial presuppositions stemmed from my understanding that the body-world
dialogue is a fundamental aspect of human existence. What I did not anticipate was the
elastic way in which the research participants put virtual practices to use in order to
regain a sense of body-world unity. As a result, I gathered a new understanding about
how the research participants could appropriate non-preferred discursive practices and regear them for personally desirable ends. Rather than directly oppose non-preferred
practices, these research participants appropriated such non-preferred discursive practices
as a means to reestablish possibilities for bodily being-in-the world with others. Rochelle
provided a description of how she prereflectively appropriated the discursive practices of
Cartesianism and postmodern identity play for non (post)modern ends:
You can live a fantasy on the Internet, but if you are really looking
for love, don’t falsify anything, it just makes for disappointment in the
end . . . I met my boyfriend of a year and a half online . . . When I met him,
my Internet time went from 2 to 3 hours a day to just minutes checking my
e-mail, and occasionally responding to them. And to this day that’s how it is.
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I still use the Internet to play games, but I don’t go into chat rooms. There is
no need to, I have everything I need in person. (Appendix D)
In this way, acts of resistance sometimes involved the implementation of the very
practices which were being resisted. Acts of submission sometimes enabled acts of
transgression. What might this mean about the Enframing (Ge-stell) of virtual
technology?
Though my preunderstandings about the subjective and social benefits of
cyberspace were uncertain at the outset of this study, I have now gained an alternate
understanding of the insight Heidegger (1977) gleened by quoting the poet Friedrich
Hölderlin in “The Question Concerning Technology,”
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also (1977, p. 28)
Drawing upon the latter couplet, Heidegger stressed that the “danger” was not modern
technology per se. The danger issued forth from Enframing (Ge-stell) and the way in
which it blocked the dynamic disclosure of truth (alētheia). Furthermore, the Enframing
(Ge-stell) of modern technology compounded the danger by denying that it sends
humankind upon a privative “destining” or path of disclosure. “[F]or this reason the
coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without
the cooperation of the coming to presence of man [sic]” (p. 39).
On my reading and reflection, it became clear that the danger Heidegger spoke of
was, instead, humankind’s witting or unwitting surrender of the “saving power” – a
surrender of the understanding that in order to recover the “essence” of technology’s
marginalized mode of revealing, one must first articulate the kind of narrow disclosure
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holding sway in modern technology. Upon retrieving the capacity to make modern
technology’s danger intelligible, one could then further the saving power by embracing
the awareness that anxiety and mood prompt one to faithfully and resolutely practice
one’s own coming to presence over and against submission to the circumscribed and
prescribed practices of a constricting discursive regime. And this, of course, would
necessitate that humankind maintain a free, non-docile, relation to the modern virtual
technology of cyberspace.
Research Study Limitations and Suggestions
As the geography of virtual life increasingly overlaps with everyday human
existence, psychological studies will have to grapple with the transformed anthropology
of human being-in-the-world with others. In addition, as the social clearing of
cyberspace challenges the possibility for meaningful interactions, it is important to recall
the value of meaning for humankind.
The research participants have each in their own way alluded to the dissolution of
meaning and understanding amidst virtual social encounters. At various points in
Western history the loss of meaning has challenged humanity as well. During the later
stages of the mediaeval age, doubts about religiosity and spiritual dogma gave rise to
uncertainty about humankind’s worth. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
Friedrich Nietzsche’s proclamation that God was dead challenged the existence of
founded spiritual meanings. Concerns about nihilism notwithstanding, the modern
technological world now brings computer enabled virtual environments to bear on the
possibility of creating meaningless human social spaces in the twenty first century. With
the juggernaut of virtual world deployment well under way, it is possible that the death of
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grounded meaning may someday be at stake as humankind continues to embrace a wider
range of electronic encounters (e.g., mobile phones, text messaging, virtual reality
immersion). For the purposes of advancing the project of cultural therapeutics in the
psychology field, I therefore suggest that this critical-hermeneutic study still has room for
further differentiating the process of meaning production. That is to say, I contend that
another thread of cultural-historical discourse warrants methodological inclusion into
critical-hermeneutic notions about the structure of meaning.
At the outset of this research study, I presupposed that meaning and experience
were comprised of macro and micro historical discourses in dialogue with life situated
persons. In reference to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of language and Murray’s work
on imaginizing, I also presupposed that the non-literal understanding of language, as well
as an understanding of the imaginal ground of experience informed interpretations of
meaning. I now suggest that I did not go far enough in delineating the range of
discourses relevant to the practices of online subjectivity, sociality, and meaning
production. Indeed, I submit that discourses which are not intrinsic to cyberspace
technology warrant future research consideration. Specifically I suggest that, future
studies would do well to admit into consideration the alternative value systems research
subjects bring with them to virtual encounters. This procedural adjustment would allow
research participants’ religious values, ethno-cultural backgrounds, sexual lifestyles, and
gender perspectives to be included as part of the play of power at work in cyber space. In
this way, Foucault’s effort to clarify the full complexity of the social field can be
advanced. This kind of methodological refinement can further safeguard the
interpretation of person-centered data from the researcher’s faulty assumptions about the
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cultural backdrop informing social practices. The process of researcher understanding
and interpretation can thereby achieve a more synthetic level of refinement.
This procedural adjustment could be accomplished by modifying the process
outlined for interviewing research participants. Rather than simply mirror and amplify
research participant statements, researchers can go further by actively soliciting research
participant reflection upon the values informing their practices. Drawing upon Michael
White’s (1993) understanding of how to introduce deconstruction into psychotherapy
practices, the researcher might make efforts to clarify which value systems the research
participants believes they are cooperating with. A researcher might then be better
prepared to clarify when a research participant believes she is adhering to, for instance, a
Gnostic Christian practice of body flight over against a Cartesian motivated abandonment
of the flesh. Questions that culturally and historically contextualize practices might
include:
1) “[How] were [you] recruited into this view . . .” (p. 24)?
2) “What does this reveal to you about your motives, or about the purposes
you have for your life” (p. 45)?
3) “What do you think this might reveal to me about what you value
most” (p. 46)?
4) “How do you think this spoke to them of who you are, and about
what you believe to be important” (p. 46)?
Such questions can contribute to the development of a culturally sensitive research
method which further clarifies the multiplicity of discourses at play in the multi-voiced
flesh of the human world.
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Appendix A
Consent to Participate in Research Study Form

Duquesne University
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
TITLE:

Internet Dwelling, Cyborgs, And The Matrix of
I: An Empirical Inquiry With CriticalHermeneutic Features

INVESTIGATOR:

Andrew Felder, MA
XXXX Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
Home Telephone #: 555.555.5555
Work Telephone #: 555.555.5555
Cell Telephone #: 555.555.5555

ADVISOR:

Dr. Paul Richer
Psychology Department of Duquesne University
555.555.5555

SOURCE OF SUPPORT:

This study is being performed in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the doctoral degree at Duquesne
University

PURPOSE:

You are being asked to participate in a research project that
seeks to investigate the experience of attempting to
establish a meaningful social interaction through use of the
Internet. You will be asked to provide a written description
about your experience regarding such social exchanges on
the Internet. In addition you will be asked to allow me to
interview you. The interviews will be taped and
transcribed.
These are the only requests that will be made of you.

RISKS AND BENEFITS:

There are no risks beyond those encountered in daily life
and no benefits beyond the opportunity to reflect upon the
impact of the Internet.

COMPENSATION:

You will not be compensated for participating in this
project. However, participation in this project will require
no monetary cost to you. In addition, an envelope will be
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provided for the return of your written description to the
investigator.
CONFIDENTIALITY:

Your name will never appear on any survey or research
instruments. No identity will be made in the data analysis.
All written materials, consent forms, tapes, and
transcriptions will be stored in a secure and locked place.
Your descriptions will appear with the identifying
information of yourself and other’s removed excepting age,
gender, ethnicity, and marital status. The tape recordings
will be destroyed upon completion of the research project.

RIGHT TO WITHDRAW: You are under no obligation to participate in this study.
You are free to withdraw your consent to participate at
any time.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS: A summary of the results of this research will be supplied
to you, at no cost, upon request
VOLUNTARY CONSENT: I have read the above statements and understand what is
being requested of me. I also understand that my
participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw my
consent at any time, for any reason. On these terms, I
certify that I am willing to participate in this research
project.
I understand that should I have any further questions about
my participation in this study, I may call Dr. Charles
Hanna, alternate Chair of the Duquesne University
Institutional Review Board (555.555.5555).

___________________________________
Participant’s Signature

____________
Date

___________________________________
Researcher’s Signature

____________
Date
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Appendix B
Research Advertisement
Announcement

Request for Research Participation
WHO AM I AND WHAT IS THE RESEARCH ABOUT
Greetings! My name is Andrew Felder. I am a doctoral candidate in Clinical
Psychology at Duquesne University. At this time, I am on a fellowship at Ohio State
University. The research you are being asked to participate in is a part of my doctoral
dissertation. If you would like to participate in a research study about socializing on the
Internet, please contact me by email or at either of the telephone numbers listed below.
Any and all correspondence will be kept confidential. If you choose to participate in the
study, you will be asked to fill out a questionnaire that will be mailed to you. You may
also be asked to participate in a voluntary interview. Additional details can be discussed
when you contact me at the telephone numbers or email address listed below.
QUESTIONS?????
You may contact me directly about any questions or concerns.
Andrew J. Felder
5555 Xxxxx Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201
Home telephone) 555.555.5555
Work telephone) 555.555.5555
Email) xxxxxx@osu.edu
Fax) 555.555.5555
THANKS FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE!
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Appendix C
Questionnaire – Rochelle
For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In
order to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen
name.
6) Female X Male ____ Other ____ (check one)
7) Age 21
8) Ethnic background Caucasian
9) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful
relationships? 9 years
10) Windows user X Macintosh user ____ (check one)
6) What is your Internet provider name? AOL/Other web sites via AOL
7) What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address
of the site where your encounter took place? AIM, AOL Chatrooms
8) Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an
intimate connection with another person on the Internet. Include in your
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person. Also,
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships
with others.
(See Appendix D)
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Appendix D
Written Protocol #1 – Rochelle
In this section, the first research participant’s experiential protocol will be quoted
verbatim. Any typographical or grammatical errors will be printed, without revision, in
order to preserve the potential significance of “errors” contained in the protocol. Within
the text of this protocol, numbers and brackets have been employed as a way to highlight
sentences suggesting distinct units of meaning. Where the same theme recurs within the
same protocol, a superscripted number will indicate how many times the theme recurs.
For instance, the designation “52” signifies that the fifth theme appears twice within the
same protocol. If a theme was hermeneutically modified by research participant
interview material, an alphabetic letter will follow each number (e.g., 1a, 2b). The
alphabetic letter will correspond to alphabetic letters placed in the transcript of each
research participant’s audio taped interview (See Appendices E, H, and K).
Protocol #1 – Rochelle, 21 y.o., Caucasian, female
1-[It all started when I was in my teens. My parents had just moved to Provo, I was
living with my aunt and my grandmother, who I was very close to, was diagnosed with
severe medical condition. My best friend at the time lived down the street from my aunt
so I was over there all the time. She had just discovered the Internet, and she introduced
me to something that was going to get me in trouble for the next couple of months. Her
brother had the AOL disks and gave me one. I downloaded it onto my aunt’s computer
and signed myself up.] 22a-[Using my aunt’s credit card, I authorized the use pretending
to be her.] 33b-[After about a month and a half she found out about what I had done, but
with in that month and a half was addicted. I would sneak on late at night, and talk to a
lot of older guys.] 4c-[I was naive at the time, so I believed pretty much anything they
told me. There was this one guy in Nevada who was married, promised he was going to
come down and visit. He got caught and his wife e-mailed me to let me know that their
electricity was cut off, and he wasn’t as rich as he portrayed himself to be.] 5d-[Then
there were a couple others, and of course I was in love with all of them.]
63g-[It’s hard to describe the feeling you get when you do talk to someone online.
It’s like you are in your own little world, nothing matters except you and the
person/persons you are talking to.] 72e-[You feel really special inside, like you have
nothing to be afraid of because the person you are talking to isn’t judging you for your
looks, just solely on how you interact online.] 8f-[It’s hard to tell someone’s sense of
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humor online, but usually it goes through. Sarcasm is a big one though. Sometimes you
can’t really tell whether or not the person is being just mean, or sarcastic.] 63g-[But back
to the feelings. It’s a relief from everyday life, because you can just be your, and live in a
fantasy world if you wanted to online.] 22h-[You could portray yourself anyway you
want, make a completely different life for youself. It’s free of any of the hassle you
would get in the “real” world.] 63g-[Nothing bothers you, if you don’t want to talk to a
person, you can very easily block them from your buddy list or just ban them from
talking to you at all. If the “real” world was this easy, it’d be so nice, you would get rid
of the jerks right off the bat and not have to worry about anyone’s feelings] 9i-[I guess
that’s why it is so easy to be jerks online, because they aren’t face to face with you, so
they just do what they want.] 10j-[But in reality no matter if you are behind a computer
screen or in person, it hurts just the same.] 11-[I’ve had my share of fights online as well,
and believe me, they were just as hard as they would have been if the fights were in
person.]
33-[Back to my rendezvous; nothing really happened with me meeting anyone until after I
was out of my aunts house, living in Provo with my parents, and me making the promise
to my parents that I wasn’t going to meet anyone from online without them knowing and
only being allowed be online for an hour a day. Well that didn’t last too long. I was
sneaking online after my parents were asleep and after I got home from school when they
weren’t home yet. I got in trouble a couple of times, but then I finally calmed down and
listened to my parents.] 12k-[A little time went by and I finally asked them if I could
meet someone in person from online. It took some convincing but they let me as long as
they met him first. So they met and I went on my first real date with someone I met
online.] 13-[It was my first and only date with him, but that was just an icebreaker. I met
guys more often after that.] 142l-I even met some guy that I was going to school with in
the fall. He turned out to be a jerk also. Out of all the guys I met online, there weren’t
too many “nice” guys. I did have a steady boyfriend for a while, but that was after I met
the guy I had lost my virginity to. He was older and I met him online and we only met
once. I don’t regret any of the things I have done, or are going to do in the rest of the
paper; I just take it as a lesson learned.] 33-[You will notice that all the guys I talk about
are way older than I was at the time, and to this day, still are. I never once had intimate
relations with a guy the same age as me. I’m not going to analyze why that is at this time
and point but at the time it made me happy so I just went with it.] 12-[So about a year
went by, I was back in Albuquerque and I was bored and lonely. My friends and I were
out of touch, I was in a new neighborhood, and I was going to a school far away from the
neighborhood, so I really didn’t have any friends that were close by. So the end result to
that was I placed personal ads. I think I placed a couple in different places. My main
focus was on AOL though. I got a few responses here and there. I met some guys in
person. Some I only saw once and others I saw a couple of times, nothing too serious.]
143-[I did have a couple one-night stands here and there, but I looked at it as me being
young and just having fun. I didn’t really know what I was getting into with those kinds
of situations. I thought, well hey he wants me to sleep with him he must like me. So of
course thinking that I did what they wanted and they got what they wanted and I never
heard from them again. It was kind of an emotional roller coaster for me, but I soon
learned that guys are like that.] 15m-[After a few of those games, I got a response one
day from a guy that was actually pretty funny. He made me laugh so I responded. He
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responded back, and it was almost as if we knew each other, we had a lot in common and
I was jus so glad that he wasn’t into the types of things all the others had been.] 16n-[He
was older, but he didn’t seem to mind that I was 18. Well that’s what I put on my ad.
You had to be 18 in order to place an ad, so I told a white lie, but in my second e-mail to
him, I did tell him that I was only 17, and that in two weeks I would be 18.] 172o-[We hit
it off, even on the phone. We talked on the phone almost every day, for hours at a time.
Finally we decided to meet. I don’t think I even told my mom I was meeting him, but he
picked me up from school and we went back to my house because my mom wasn’t home
and we just didn’t really have anything else to do. We ended up sleeping together, but
some how our relatinship wasn’t based on sex. I think it’s because I had a sixth sense
about him, and I even heard from him the next day. That was the start of my second
longest relationship.] 18p-[Let me tell you about my longest which is going on two
years. It was about August 2001 and I still had my person ad out. One day I got a
response that wasn’t too exciting, but hey it was a new interest so I wrote him back. We
wrote back and forth and we even chated online on AIMs. We kinda hit it off, it wasn’t
anything special really. I don’t know if he was too boring for me at that time in my life
or what, but I just wasn’t “feeling” it. So being nice and seeing how we were at least
getting along, I gave him my phone number and he called. For some reason though, I
thought he was too “shady”. Like he was hiding something or he just really wasn’t into
the conversation. At that time in my life I was always partying staying out late, drinking
underage, and just going with the flow. He, at that time, was I guess too boring for me.
The one thing we did have in common though, was that we bothed liked going to a local
club. We arranged to meet eachother there, or just in passing, say maybe we’ll see
eachother there, but we never did meet up] 19-[He swears that I blew him off, but if I did,
it wasn’t intentional. Well a coule of months had passed, I would look for him online,
but he was never online anymore. So pretty much I just forgot about him. I had gotten
into a relationship (again from online) that didn’t last too long, but it did move fast in the
sense that we were already talking about marriage. Well I got out of that one quickly,
and wasn’t really looking for anything, or anyone persay] 20q-[Well in July of 2002, my
friend and I went to the local club for her birthday. Neither one of us was really in the
mood to be there, it was just something to do. I wasn’t really caring what I looked like, I
was just there, she was drunk because it was her 21st birthday and I was just pretty much
laughing at her the whole night. Well, I went outside for a while, and while I was out
there, I saw this guy that I noticed kept looking at me, and I kept looking at him, because
well hey, he was cute. So anyway, we “eyed” eachother and then I went back inside.
Well after I went inside, he followed. He went back to where he was standing with his
buddies, and I was just standing there, watching my friend dance with everyone, and he
actually came over and asked me to dance. To avoid the awkward silence I introduced
myself. He said I think I know you, are you Datsmallmouse? I said yes, he said, well
I’m Wu, Smoothdancinguy. It didn’t hit me until he said his screen name because he
gave me a different first name online. So anyway, that was the start of my relationship
now. So I guess it goes to show that even if we hit it off online, doesn’t mean we will hit
it off in person, and vis versa]
21r-[Ok, now that you know the history of how I became involved in the Internet, let me
tell you how it makes a person feel. In general when you are talking to people in chat
rooms its kind of fun. Depends on the chat room, and what kind of people you actually
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engage in conversation with] 22r-[The whole problem I had was just talking to people
who were mature. You don’t find that too often in chat rooms no matter what site you go
to] 232s-[My other problem was my picture. I’m not a Barbie, and I don’t have the
Barbie figure, so when people saw my picture they were so cruel; mostly guys and mostly
guys my age. Maybe that’s why I never dated guys my age. Who knows, so I very rarely
gave out my picture and when I did I had to prepare myself mentally] 24t-[When I posted
the personal ads I did have my picture on there, but that wasn’t as bad as the chat rooms,
because of people had a problem with the way that I looked they wouldn’t tell you right
then and there. If they didn’t like, they wouldn’t respond to your ad.] 232u-[After a few
years of that I got tough, or bitter, either way you look at it I learned how people really
are, and that I didn’t want to associate with people who were that judgmental about the
way you look as to whether or not they will continue to talk to you.] 25v-[In most cases I
just wanted someone to talk to, converse in an interesting conversation. I didn’t want to
jump everyone’s bones. I’m sure the guys had a different frame of mind, but I wasn’t
going to play their games anymore.] 172o-[When you finally get a hold of someone who
is stimulating you feel a connection. You think, “Oh wow, we have something in
common.” And you want to know more and more about this person. It’s really
addictive. You rush home to see if they have e-mailed you. You wait online to see if
they are going to be online the same time you are. It makes you feel special to know that
someone has the same interest, or may just be interested in you. You go from talking
online, or e-mail, to exchanging numbers, to maybe even dating, or at least just meeting
in person.] 143x-[And that one person that you do find may look good online, but then
you get them on the phone and they are completely different, it’s a real let down. Of
course you have your expectations, and if they aren’t met, then you start all over again.
Feeling a little disappointed and taking what you have learned from your previous
experience you go back out there and see what you can the next day.] 72-[Personal ads
are, I think, are a great thing if you aren’t into the bar scene or you are a really shy
person. It lets you open up to someone with out them staring at you, and with them
starting at you, you don’t have to worry if you have spinach in your teeth or even worse a
booger.] 26y-[You can be yourself, or you can be anyone you want to be really. You can
live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are really looking for true love, don’t falsify
anything, it just makes for a big disappointment in the end.]
27z-[I don’t use the Internet to cruise for guys anymore. I met my boyfriend of a year
and a half online, and we have been happy ever since. When I met him, my Internet time
went from 2 to 3 hours a day to just minutes checking my e-mail, and occasionally
responding to them. And to this day that’s how it is. I still use to Internet to play games,
but I don’t go into chat rooms. There is no need to, I have everything I need in person.]
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Appendix E
Interview Transcript #1 - Rochelle
Andrew (A) – I am turning on the tape recorder. Okay.
a[Beginning in the first paragraph, about midway through, you mention, “Using my
aunt’s credit card I authorized the use pretending to be her.” I wonder if you could say
more about the experience of pretending to be her.
Rochelle (R) – I wasn’t pretending to be her online. I was pretending to be her to
authorize the use of AOL. So, like, online I was myself, but just to get the usage of AOL,
I would have to call AOL and verify that I am the person on the credit card to use AOL.
A – Primarily to obtain access.
R – Right.]
A – b[In the next line you said, “After about a month and a half she found out what I had
done, but within that month and a half I was addicted. I would sneak on late at night and
talk to a lot of older guys.”” Could you say more about that experience of feeling
addicted?
R – I had to get on. I was always wanting to know if I had email. I was always wanting
to know who was online. And, you know, if it was one of my friends then I would be on
for hours. So we’d be talking for hours on end if I didn’t get caught (laugh). If
somebody came home early, then I would just turn off the computer and run into my
room.
A – Are you saying that it felt like you needed to be online - that you couldn’t resist
being online.
R – Yes.]
A – c[In the next line you say, “I was naïve at the time so I believed pretty much anything
they told me.” Perhaps you could say more about that.
R – (Laughter). Yeah. Well, they were older guys and they were significantly older. I
was sixteen or seventeen at the time and they were like 34, 36 at the time; and the one’s I
remember specifically, both of them lived in New Mexico and one would tell me that he
was going to fly me down or that he was going to come down and visit me and you know,
all this other stuff. And one of the guys, actually, his wife saw one of the emails that I
had written him or one of the conversations that we had and she emailed me back saying
“Oh by the way, he is married, he’s a firefighter, but he is broke since he got cut off last
week.” So, yeah . . . that’s pretty much how it went.
A - That’s when you began to realize people were –
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R – No not necessarily (laughter).
A – Not necessarily then either.
R – No. It took awhile for me to realize what the intentions of people were online.]
A – d[Then in the following line you say – referring to the married man – “ . . . and of
course I was in love with them all.” What did you mean?
R – Yeah. They gave me false hopes and I guess at the time that’s what I needed because
my grandma had passed away like a couple months prior to that, but . . . it was like a
filling-the-void type thing. And you know, it was the feeling that I needed, because,
okay, I’m a big girl and I never had a boyfriend and, you know, all of this made me feel
special, made me feel like I was actually wanted.]
A – e[You talk a little bit more about that in the next line. You say that, it makes you feel
“special inside,” like your in “your own little world” and “nothing to be afraid of because
the person isn’t judging you for your looks just solely on how you interact online.”
R – Exactly.
A – Does that capture the meaning for you? Is there anything else you would add to that?
R – No, that’s pretty much it.]
A – f[Afterwards, you went on to talk about “sense of humor online.” You said, “ . . .
usually that goes through.” Then you mention, “Sarcasm is a big one though. I can’t
really tell whether the person is just being mean or sarcastic.”
R – Yeah. Right.
A – Are you referring to something about being online and it being difficult to tell the
difference?
R – Sometimes it is, because, I mean they’re just words on the screen and you have to
hope that the other person is hoping or thinking that your just being sarcastic. Or, vice
versa, the other person might be saying something kind of rude, but you know how
sarcasm can come off as rude, and vice versa. It’s kind of hard to distinguish between the
two online because they’re just words on the screen.
A – If you could add something else to the words on the screen to clarify the meaning of
sarcasm what would that be.

R – Actually there’s really nothing except to tell the person, “Oh by the way, I’m just

189
kidding (laughter).” You know, or a smiley face like a colon and, what do they call
them, a parentheses. You know, like the online faces (laughing).
A - The emoticons.
R – Right.]
A – g,h[Afterwards you said, “But back to the feelings. It’s a relief from everyday life,
because you can just be your . . .” and I presume you mean ‘yourself’ ( R – “Yeah) “. . .
and live in a fantasy world if you wanted to online. You could portray yourself anyway
you want . . . make a completely different life for yourself.” Can you talk about that
experience.
R – Actually, I was just generalizing because I’ve never done it. And, you know, I don’t
tell people automatically what I look like. So some people, you know, they’re all gung
ho about meeting me or whatever, so I either tell them what I look like or I send them a
picture and then they become a jerk and just stop talking to me automatically, or they say
a few words and then stop talking to me. I’ve though about it, you know, saying I’m
5’7”, blonde hair, big boobs and a wonderful body. But what’s the point? Because if you
really start to like this person, then they’re gonna find out eventually what you really look
like. So I’ve never actually done it. But, it’s a way of getting away and it could be a
fantasy for some people.
A – You were actually wanting to be known as who you were when you were online.
You wanted to portray yourself as accurately as possible.
R – Right. Yeah, I mean I didn’t tell them about everything. I’d tell them my age and,
you know, I’d give them a very, very, very vague description if they asked me what I
looked like. And, it just typed out automatically really because I was asked so many
times – 5 feet 6, auburn hair, blue eyes I would say constantly. I never said anything
about body type or anything like that. So some people, would you know, just look at it or
whatever, but . . . (garbled).
A – Rather then say false things about yourself, you would just leave things out about
yourself, describe some things and not others.
R – Right.
A – Speaking about “jerks,” You said, “If the real world was this easy, it’d be so nice,
you would get rid of the jerks right off the bat and not have to worry about anyone’s
feelings.” I believe you were talking about the blocking option.
R – Oh yeah (laughter). It would be so nice in real life (laughing).
A – So that’s actually something that the Internet added to the experience of social
interaction for you.
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R – Oh yeah, because on AOL it was very easy to block a certain screen name. Even if it
wasn’t just blocking, you could automatically know who this person was and you could
just hit quick cancel and you wouldn’t even have to talk to that person.
A – You didn’t have to deal with them. You just click the button and your done.
R – Right. Kind of like, I’ve had a work experience previously . . . just recently. There’s
some ugly people at work. Ugly, not ugly looking. There’s some mean hearted people
that are just out to get you for one reason or another that they have, that you have no idea
why. So if it was that easy to just click that person out, life would be so much easier
(laughing).
A – So the Internet becomes a buffer between you and others, a buffer that you don’t
have in every day life.
R – Oh yeah. Because I say my mind, but only to people that I know. Like, I hate
confrontations. I don’t like authority. Not that I don’t like authority, but it’s hard for me
to deal with authority if I have a problem with it. You know, like my boss, she
contradicted herself a lot. And, it just bugged the crap out of me and I kept it inside, and
I vented to other people, but not to her. I didn’t bring it to her attention because she’s my
superior, and I guess to me, superiors are not the person to be wrong, so for whatever
reason, I didn’t bring it to her attention. So it would eat me at work.
A – I think I’m hearing you say it’s easier to be assertive online.
R – Oh very (laugh).]
A - i[Speaking more about people who are “jerks” online, you mention, “I guess that’s
why it’s easy to be a jerk online, because they aren’t face to face with you, so hey just do
what hey want.” It sounds like you were coming to some conclusions about how the
online experience allows people to treat others.
R – Yeah, and also though, you can see what type of person they’ll be in person also,
because you know how it is, jerks are just everywhere – not everywhere, but there are
some. And, if they’re that type of person online, then they’re going to be that type of
person in person. And some may say things more outright and more bluntly, you know,
than in person, but they’re still that type of ugly person.
A – Even if they aren’t as direct in the offline world, they still have that capability to be
insensitive.
R – Yeah right, because if they’re not saying it to me, they’re probably saying it to a
friend, you know, something indirectly, not directly to me? They’d still be that type of
person, not just directly.
A – So, to you it seemed as if the use of the Internet allowed them to be more direct.
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R – Oh yeah.]
A – j[You went on to say, even “if your behind a computer screen, it hurts just the same.”
Could you tell me a little bit about that.
R – Well you know, your just typing words. And, you know, people say words don’t hurt
but it’s true words do hurt (laughing). And, regardless if you know this person or not it’s
still takes a little hit to you. And, of course you get up and, you know – “forget about this
person, they’re just not worth it” – but at that point in time you get mad or you get
emotions. You get emotional. And, instead of just sitting there typing words, there is
emotion behind it.
A – So even without the person being present, the words can have an emotional impact.
R – Oh yeah. I remember getting in fights in chatrooms (laughing) over what people
would say. It was pretty stupid stuff that you’d think that they’d get over by the time . . .
because of how old they were. You know, you’d think they’d get over it, but that’s why
some people don’t grow up (laughing).]
A – k[Then you move into the third paragraph, and you start to talk about “rendezvous” .
..
R – Hmmm (laughing).
A – . . . and you mentioned your parents, “It took some convincing but they let me as
long as they met him first.” Could you talk some about the “convincing” that it took.
R – Well it was pretty much just them telling me what I can and could not do to meet this
person. Like my very, very, very first date, I was 16 going on 17 and he was like 18. I
had met him online and we were just going to go to a movie or whatever, but parents had
to meet them first. I couldn’t just go out and meet them. You know, even in a public
place they would have to meet them first. And then like gradually I started meeting
people behind there backs, like when I started driving (laughing). I’d you know set up
meetings – “Well I can do this after work or after school.” - and my mom wouldn’t know
blah, blah, blah. I started meeting people behind my mom’s back so they wouldn’t know
or whatever.
A – It was important not to have your parents meet them.
R – Depending on what our intentions were, both me and the person I was meeting.
Depending on what the intentions were. Like my longest relationship, he picked me up
from school. My mom didn’t know. And, we met and everything and I took him back to
my house. We’d been talking for a month and a half online and on the phone, and finally
had met in person. My mom didn’t meet him first. So I met him first, and we kind of
went back out.]
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A – l[A little bit later, you went on to say, “Out of all the guys I met, there weren’t too
many “nice” guys.” I wonder if you could talk about that.
R – Well, you know online they would sweet-talk you. I guess it’s no different than guys
in real life. I wouldn’t generalize all guys and be all “They’re jerks,” or whatever, but
there are some guys that, yeah, they sweet talk you and you know, say the right things to
get you to do what they want you to do. And that’s what they did. They, you know, “I
can’t wait to meet you, I enjoy talking to you.” And they’d either meet me and have their
way with me pretty much and then they’d never call me again. Or , you know, yeah
they’d never call me again.
A – And in that sense the lack of follow-up was inconsiderate and unkind in your eyes.
R – Right.]
A – m[A little later in that paragraph, you talked about one person you met. You said, “It
was almost as if we knew each other. We had a lot in common” I wonder if you could
talk about the experience of being online and feeling as if you knew each other – getting
that feeling even though you were communicating through the Internet medium.
R – Well pretty much he had the same sense of humor I did. So I didn’t have to worry
about saying something sarcastically or kind of off-the-wall and him not getting because,
you know, there are some people who just don’t get it, and he got it. We’d make fun,
poke fun, you know, just like poke fun at each other, you know, just back and forth, and
you know, he had a good sense of humor. It was like mine and kind of sarcastic but you
know, funny in the same way, and we’d just bounce off each other. You know, I’d say
something, he’d say something back and we’d go back and forth at it.
A – On the one hand, he understood your meanings, and on the other hand he seemed to
think in the same way and respond in a way that was familiar or easy for you to relate to.
R – Right.]
A – n[You go on and talk about another person. You mention, “You had to be 18 in
order to place an add, so I told a white lie, but in my second e-mail to him, I did tell him
that I was only 17.” I wonder if you could talk about that.
R – Okay. I just felt I needed to be straightforward and let him know just in case he was
older than he said he was, you know; and, to let him know just in general. I think it was
November or December when he responded to my add, and my birthday was in January,
so I wasn’t to far away form 18, but I just figured I should tell him up front and let him
know instead of lead him on.
A – Somehow, you made a decision that at some point you should let him know.
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R - Oh yeah. I think I told every body that responded to my ads that I was 18, I mean 17
instead of 18.
A – You would do that with anyone you started chatting with.
R – Oh yeah.]
A – o[You go on to say, “We hit it off even on the phone.” I wonder if you could talk
about how you got the sense you were hitting it off on the phone.
R – The sense we’re hitting it off on the phone is that we’re having a good conversation.
There’s energy there instead of, “Okay, what do I talk about now.” You know, there’s a
good conversation going. He makes me laugh, and I in return make him laugh. So that’s
a good conversation for me.]
A – p[You then went on to talk about the longest relationship you had been in at that
point. You mentioned that in the phone conversation, “For some reason though, I
thought he was too ‘shady.’ Like he was hiding something or he really wasn’t into the
conversation.” I wonder if you could talk about how you were picking that up over the
telephone.
R – He wasn’t really talking and that could mean – you know, if he’s interested in me, if
we’re interested in each other, then there’s going be more to talk about than just asking
me questions like, “So, what do you do for work?” – just very, very vague questions.
And, actually I think we only talked once, but we were talking online on the phone and I
wasn’t really interested. I think I accidentally on purpose lost his phone number and I
never called him again and he never called me. So I lost contact with him in that way,
and then we met in a club (laughs).]
A – q[At the end of the paragraph you say, “So I guess it goes to show that even if we hit
it off online, doesn’t mean we will hit it off in person, and vice versa.” Can you tell me a
little bit more about coming to that conclusion?
R - Well, like the two longest relationships I’ve had, you grow to learn about a person
both online, or on the phone, or in person, and you know, you can hit it off really well
with a person online. But then you meet them, and there’s just nothing to talk about.
You know, you just have nothing in common. But you meet a person you thought you
had nothing in common with and you hit it off greatly. You know, you just find
something and go with it (laugh). You run with it actually (laughing).
A - The rapport you develop can be really different online and offline.
R – Right. That’s how I ended up with my boyfriend now. I wasn’t really interested with
him online and on the phone. And that’s why I kind of backed off. He got in trouble at
work for having AOL and instant messaging and stuff, so that was are only way of
communication, so that kind of ended. So six months later we met in person, and we
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didn’t realize who each other was until I introduced myself. Then we started dating in
person, and it just went from there. I found out that being shady is part of his character.
He’s very cautious; I guess you’d say not shady, cautious.]
A – r[As you go into the next paragraph, you described talking in chatrooms as “fun,” but
“depends on the kind of people you actually engage in conversation with.” You then add,
“The whole problem I had was just talking to a people who were mature.” I wonder if
you can tell me a little more about that.
R – Yeah (laughing). You could always tell the mentality of a person by what they say
online, how they act online, and what they do online. You know, they have their stupid
little games, or stupid little things where you can scroll. That’s what they call it, scrolling
in the chatrooms where they put up stupid pictures or print things over and over and over
again and take up the whole screen. It would interrupt people actually trying to talk in
the chatroom, so I viewed those people as being immature because they’re just doing it
for the hell of it. You know, they’re not there to chat. And also, people in general, what
they would say. If you make a comment in the chatroom and they say something really
stupid, you could generally tell that they’re a teenager or that they’re stupid (laughing).]
A – s[In the next few sentences, you talk about not posting your picture. You said, “Who
knows, so I very rarely gave out my picture and when I did I had to prepare myself
mentally.” I wonder if you can talk about that need to prepare yourself.
R – I’d just have to wait, you know, in the few seconds of waiting for them to actually get
the picture in their email and then wait for their reaction. So it’s kind of anticipation.
And then, the whole time your anticipating what they’re going say you have to be
prepared for a come back. Because if their going to say, “Oh your fat and ugly,”
sometimes if they say that, I’d just cancel and never talk to them again. Other times I’d
be really mad and I’d fight back with them. And I actually made a friend doing that
(laughing). I was really feisty at the time and I started fighting with him. He was like, he
made a comment about my weight and I don’t exactly remember the conversation, but I
just remember that after yelling at him back and forth we actually just calmed down and
we actually just started talking s people and we started talking online. Never met him,
never talked to him on the phone or anything, he was just an online chat buddy.
A – So how you responded made a difference.
R – Yeah
A – It sound s like there is a moment of anticipating approval or disapproval when
communication moves from text to image.
R – Oh yeah.]
A – t[We’re in the last paragraph right now. You talked about posting the personal ads.
You said, “ . . . I did have my picture on there, but that wasn’t as bad as the chat rooms,
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because of people had a problem with the way that I looked they wouldn’t tell you right
then and there. If they didn’t like you then they wouldn’t respond to your ad.”
R – Yeah.
A – That made it easier.
R – Oh yeah. Because, I mean, if your looking through pictures, you know, say, just
hanging on your wall, and you pick up one and your interested, so - we’re back to the
adds – so you reply and then it’s great. But if you don’t, then you know, whatever. So if
your looking through something if your not interested, then you don’t have to bother that
person. You don’t have to tell them or give them, you know, insults or anything. It’s just
passed on, go to the next one. So it’s spared feelings (slight laugh). Really spared
(laughing).]
A – u[Well, then you go on in the next line and say something interesting. You said,
“After a few years of that I got tough, or bitter, either way you look at it I learned how
people really are, and I didn’t want to associate with people who were judgmental . . .”
Could you say more about that.
R – Well, you have a type of person that you want to be friends with, that you want to
hang out with, that you wanna just be around. And, just, there are a lot of people online
that I particularly do not want to be around. So, you know, I guess it made me realize
that if I stopped going on there I could actually spare my feelings; get some of my self
confidence back because, you know, actually go on with life and meet people in a
different way. And just going to work or whatever, you can feel out people that way too.
I didn’t have to rely on being in chatrooms, being online, checking my email every five
minutes. I didn’t have to rely on that. There’s actually a real world out there, and I
realized that (laugh).]
A – v[You go on to say, “In most cases I just wanted someone to talk to, to converse in
an interesting conversation . . . I’m sure the guys had a different frame of mind, but I
wasn’t going to play their games anymore.” I wonder if you could talk about the kinds of
games you perceived were going on.
R – That’s like I said earlier. Like, guys want to talk to you and get you interested and
then meet you and then have other things in mind. And, that’s pretty much what I meant
by playing their games. Because, it’s you know, it’s a cycle really. Because you meet a
person, you start talking to them, your interested, you meet them, you know. They call,
they don’t call; and then if they don’t call your back at starting to talk to people again,
you know. So it could be just a cycle.
A – It sounds like you were becoming clearer that they had a different agenda than you
had.
R – Oh yeah. Unfortunately, it became clearer too late (laugh).
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A – You wish you had picked it up sooner.
R – Oh yeah. But I give people benefits of doubt. So if it’s a new person, okay, maybe
your different. You know, and it’s a different situation. You know, your not as tall, your
not as old, your not as young; either way, I’d give people the benefit of the doubt, but it
would always come back and kick me in the ass (laugh).]
A – x[A little later, you say, “. . . you do find someone who may look good online, but
then you get them on the phone and they are completely different, it’s a real letdown.” I
wonder if you could talk more about perceiving that difference between how they look
online and how they are coming across offline.
R – You know something, you look good on paper (laughing). That’s pretty much what
it was. You know and then in reality it just doesn’t pan out the way you want it to.
That’s pretty much what I’m saying there. It looks all good on paper, but you get it and
it’s just doesn’t work out for ya.
A – How they were offline seemed like reality.
R – Well it’s a wake up call (laugh). You get to talk to somebody online of course you
know, they may be very book smart, but when it comes down to it, if they don’t have any
common sense and they don’t know what your talking about, then it’s just a kind of an
end right there. Because, they’re not going to understand what your talking about,
common sense or no common sense. You know, I have more common sense, than I do
book smarts, but I still understand stuff. And so, I understood their book smarts online,
but when it comes to talking to a person in real life, it’s common sense and sense of
humor that was pretty much lacking on the computer that I didn’t pick up.
A – Was it possible to pick that up online?
R – Umm, common sense is actually pretty hard because there’s a lot of smart people out
there but when it comes down to it, you can’t really tell until you actually meet the person
or talk to the person on the phone. And, you know common sense is just a big turn off
for me. If I didn’t see it or hear it on the phone (laugh), I wasn’t really interested.]
A – y[Among the last few sentences, you said, “You can be yourself, or you can be
anyone you want to be really. You can live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are
really looking for true love, don’t falsify anything . . .” I wonder if you could talk more
about that.
R – Well yeah, you can post a picture – I can cut and post a picture from any magazine
and some people will actually respond to that add and actually spark a conversation. Of
course, they’re talking to you as a person, or not you know. You can go with whatever
image you pick. When it comes down to it, they’re eventually gonna want to meet you.
If it comes to that point, then they’re gonna be disappointed and your probably gonna be
more disappointed in yourself for doing that in the first place (laugh) because you’re not
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going to be that person at all. There’s really no point in falsifying anything. If anything,
the biggest thing I can think of is maybe age. That’s not a big deal, at least that’s not a
big deal for me. Whether they were older or younger, I preferred older, not that if they
were older or younger it didn’t matter. As long as they could talk to me as a person, not a
piece of meet or whatever. So falsifying isn’t really what I suggested to do online
(laugh). Especially if you play games with people, that’s a totally different story.
A – It sounds like you were more interested in the quality of the interaction.
R – Oh yeah. I mean, I’m not going to say I’m a loner, but I have moved a lot. I don’t
have a lot of long-term friends. I’ve gone to fourteen schools in ten years and you know
every year I had to make new friends and new friends, so I don’t have a lot of friends. In
general, I just want friends to hang out with, to go do stuff with. In general, online, it’s
pretty much male talking to female, or female talking to male. There’s no same sex
conversations going on, and if there were, that’s a different ball game too. I was just
looking for a conversation, for friends, for anything. I pretty much got into the wrong
crowd – a crowd, quote unquote online. So I got into that habit and it just took off from
there.]
A – z[In the last lines, you talk about meeting your boyfriend of one and a half years, and
being happy ever since. You close out the description you sent me by saying, “I still use
to Internet to play games, but I don’t go into chat rooms. There is no need to, I have
every thing I need in a person.” I wonder if you could talk more about the significance of
those lines.
R – Now I have a friend, I have somebody to do stuff with and in the chatroom it’s pretty
much a meat market. Even if you talk to some person, they’re eventually going to want
to meet you and start dating you or whatever. So, you have this intention when you go
into a chat room to meet somebody. It’s a dating scene. It’s not a chatting, “Let’s all be
friends” type thing. It’s a chatting, I mean, a dating game. Like in the Provo chat I told
you about, everybody dated everybody else. Everybody knew who everybody else was
because everybody had dated one of them at one time or another. It sounds like a love
triangle, but it’s more like a love octagon (laughing) type thing; because this person is
this person’s ex-boyfriend, girlfriend, whatever, but this person also knows this person
because they dated and you know it just goes on. I don’t do that any more because
there’s no need to. I have no need to fill that void that I had when I first started chatting.
A – It sounds like you were using the Internet to try and have meaningful conversations
all along.
R – Right. At the time, I probably didn’t know (laughing). At sixteen or seventeen you
don’t know what you’re doing. You’re just – “This is cool, it’s a new thing,” you know.
And then as it goes, you still don’t know what the hell you’re doing, but once you find it,
it all comes together – “Oh, that’s what I was doing (laughing).”
A – It became clearer over time.
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R – Right, right. Of course, “This is fun, I’m chatting with lots of different people,”
(coughing) – excuse me – but now that I have what I was looking for apparently, I don’t
need to go look for it some more. The initial reason I was online was to find somebody.
So I had fun chatting while I was online, but in that process I was still looking.]
A – Thank you Rochelle.
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Appendix F
Questionnaire – Bryce
For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In
order to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen
name.
1) Female ____ Male X Other ____ (check one)
2) Age 27
3) Ethnic background African-American
4) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful
relationships? 1998-2001
5) Windows user X Macintosh user ____ (check one)
6) What is your Internet provider name? Verizon
7) What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address
of the site where your encounter took place? AOL Instant Messenger
8) Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an
intimate connection with another person on the Internet. Include in your
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person. Also,
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships
with others.
(See Appendix G)
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Appendix G
Written Protocol #2 – Bryce
In this section, the second research participant’s experiential protocol will be
quoted verbatim. Any typographical or grammatical errors will again be printed, without
revision, in order to preserve the potential significance of “errors” contained in the
protocol. Within the text of this protocol, numbers and brackets have been employed as a
way to highlight sentences suggesting distinct units of meaning. A thematic analysis of
each grouping of highlighted sentences will immediately follow the protocol printed
below. Where the same theme recurs within the same protocol, a superscripted number
will indicate how many times the theme recurs. For instance, the designation “52”
signifies that the fifth theme appears twice within the same protocol. If a theme was
hermeneutically modified by research participant interview material, an alphabetic letter
will follow each number (e.g., 1a, 2b). The alphabetic letter will correspond to alphabetic
letters placed in the transcript of each research participant’s audio taped interview (See
Appendixes E, H, and K).

Protocol #2 – Bryce, 27 y.o., African-American, male
1a-[I first started meeting people by going into chatrooms, using my yahoo messenger to
communicate. It was fun, and exciting, and innovative to me.] 22b-[I am a shy person at
first, so it is hard for me to meet new people but, the Internet gave me an outlet in which
to communicate. I could say almost anything without feeling odd. I could ask questions
I wouldn’t normally ask someone if they were standing before me.] 3c-[I would talk
about sex, politics, and other things that appealed to me.] 4d-[I found that the Internet
made it easy for me to be acquainted with someone.] 5e-[My first experience to meet
someone new on the Internet was horrible because, the person lied about his age and
appearances. When that happened, I immediately stop using the Internet as a way to
meet a partner.] 6f-[A few months past and I weren’t meeting people on my own so, I
decided to go back to the Internet.] 7g-[I met a really nice guy; we would instant
message each other all day until the day we met. I learned many things about him
through the Internet so by the time we met I knew many things about him. That meeting
on the Internet involved into a three-year relationship. That relationship was my longest.]
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22h-[I’ve found that socializing on the internet has impacted my personal growth by
giving me more opportunities to meet people that I wouldn’t normally talk to, or be able
to talk to because, of my shyness.] 8-[The Internet also gave me more places such as
clubs, groups, bars, nightclubs and sporting events, to meet people.] 9i-[It has also given
me more courage and confidence in my off-line relationships because; I now know the
types of people that are attracted to me, and how to approach them.]
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Appendix H
Interview Transcript #2 – Bryce
Andrew (A) – Okay. The tape recorder is on.
a[In the first paragraph, you mention that you are using Instant Messenger to
communicate. In the second sentence you say, “It was fun, and exciting, and innovative
to me.” I wondered if you could say more about that.
Bryce (B) – At that time it was new to me. It was new. I was experiencing someone
talking to me and I’m not, let me see . . . It was fun having someone talk to me and I not
know what they look like, you know, not knowing anything about them. Just talking,
being very frank with them about anything – my personal life and other things.
The technology was exciting to me also because at that time I became more
educated on computers. It was also a learning process for me – how to download things
how to talk, how to use all the symbols that you can use like smiley faces and different
stuff.
A – The learning process intrigued you. ( B – Yeah.). And if I understand you, not
knowing what they looked like made it fun. Also having online others not know anything
about you made it interesting.
B – Yeah.]
A – b[Right after that third sentence you say, “I am a shy person at first, so it is hard for
me to meet new people but, the Internet gave me an outlet in which to communicate.” I
wonder if you could talk more about the kind of outlet the Internet provided you with.
B – I would say, because, in person me meeting people was hard because of rejection;
because I think I’m basically like any other person, but I was very shy. I didn’t grow up
going out, hanging out with a lot of people. Being on the computer where I could be
myself, or not myself, and being out of my character was fun and it was something new
for me, and talking with people. You know there are all kinds of things on the Internet.
That was pretty much it. I was shy in person, but on the computer, I wasn’t shy at all.
A – Somehow you weren’t shy at all. You go on to say, “I could say almost anything
without feeling odd. I could ask questions I wouldn’t normally ask someone if they were
standing before me.” I wonder if you could talk about what it was that allowed you to
talk in these ways.
B – Because I wasn’t in the person’s face. I wasn’t looking into their eyes. They weren’t
hearing me talk. I wasn’t hearing them talk. They couldn’t tell or sense nervousness in
me. I couldn’t sense it in them. It was just . . . that was basically it. Just being able to
not stand in front of someone looking into their eyes. That was the thing that would
make me nervous the most; when I would stand in front of people and look into their eyes
talking.
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A – Something about not being seen (B – Yeah) and almost hidden was important.
B- Yes!]
A – c[In the next line you say, “I would talk about sex, politics, and other things that
appealed to me.”
B – Yup! Well, I would talk about sex – the kinds of things they like and I like when it
comes to sex. We basically were just talking about sexual fantasies and things that I
would normally not talk about when you first meet someone and you can do that on the
computer because they’re not in front of you. You can ask the questions you really want
to ask when there’s someone in front of you – and you don’t want to ask those questions
because it seems odd to talk about that when you first meet someone.
With politics, just talking about politics in general, I mean, that wasn’t a big thing
because I can talk about politics with just about anyone whether I’m in front of them or
not. But that was something, another outlet. But sex was a main factor in that.
A – In a way, you felt less inhibited. You could talk about things a bit sooner than you
would face-to-face (B – Yes.)] d[In the next line, you say, “I found that the Internet
made it easy for me to be acquainted with someone.” Would you add anything more to
that?
B – The only thing I would add to that would probably be that I repeated myself because
it was easier for me to meet people because you had more choices of people on the
Internet. You had all these screen names of people who are interested in meeting or
hooking up or whatever. Whereas if you go out to a bar to meet people, it’s much harder
or difficult to strike up a conversation and all of this stuff.
A - In a sense, you knew there were people there looking for someone to chat with.
B – Yeah, looking for someone to chat with. Where in the bar someone could just be
having drinks with friends, they don’t really want to be bothered with other people or
they could be there by themselves just having a drink. In the chatroom, people want to
talk. They want to talk, want to meet people, want to talk about things, about politics,
sex, music, whatever.
A – The intentions of others were clearer to you online as opposed to offline (B – Yes.).]
e[In the next sentence you say, “My first experience to meet someone new on the Internet
was horrible because the person lied about his age and appearances.”
B – Yeah, that was true. I had a very bad experience. Even though that was a bad
experience it wasn’t so bad, but it wasn’t . . . I don’t know how I’m trying to say this. It
was a bad experience, but I kept moving forward because I still met other people and it
wasn’t that bad. On top of that, I tried it one more time and I met people that I liked;
whereas that time it was a bad experience. Now I’ve had one bad experience about
coming up on the street or anything. I just can’t give up with one bad experience.
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A - Can you say more about what was “bad” about your online experience?
B – The only thing about meeting people on the Internet, if you don’t have pictures a lot
of people will lie about their age or the way they appear – their appearances. It’s just so
many things they can lie about because nobody can see you. They don’t know you. I
think everybody has done it before, maybe not to such an extreme. I know most people
have done it, at least once. When you’re in front of someone you can’t lie about your
experience. You may be able to lie about your age. That’s only if you look good. But, if
you look old, you just can’t really lie about that.]
A –f[In the next line, you say, “A few months past and I weren’t meeting people on my
own, so I decided to go back to the Internet.”
B – Yeah, I stayed away, but people told me I wouldn’t meet anyone. They told me that
not everyone would do that if I changed my approach. So I started asking for pictures.
It’s hard to lie about your appearance with pictures.]
A – g[In the next line you say, “I met a really nice guy, we would instant message each
other all day until the day we met.”
B – Yeah, that’s been my longest relationship to date. He talked to me different than
other people on the Internet. Um, online people wanted to, would just want to talk to me,
and a lot of them just wanted to, you know, just hook-up. And, even if they would talk
and didn’t like you, they would, you know, keep talking even if they didn’t want to get to
know you. They would still want to have sex and whatever. He talked to me differently.
He wasn’t about what the others wanted.
A – Something about the way he chatted with you conveyed that he was a “nice guy.”
B – Yeah – he chatted to me. Even after a while, he would still want to continue chatting.
We’d talk for long periods and even IM each other. He wasn’t someone I would
normally talk to. He was southern, you know, not city (slick? sheek?). If he was in front
of me, he’s not someone I would normally talk to. He’s from the south.]
A – h[In the next line you say, “I’ve found that socializing on the internet has impacted
my personal growth by giving me more opportunities to meet people that I wouldn’t
normally talk to, or be able to talk to because, of my shyness.” I wonder if you could
elaborate further.
B – The Internet helped me get to meet people I wouldn’t normally meet. I like to travel
so I get to meet people. On the Internet I could talk to people in Australia or Ireland. I’m
a pilot, and I’m going to Australia to meet friends I’ve known or never would have met
without the Internet. Um, the Internet has been a bridge, for me, to people who I couldn’t
have connected with because of geography, or because of my shyness. The Internet is
like this place full of people wanting to meet others. It makes it easier for me to
overcome my shyness.]
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A – i[You seem to accentuate that point by saying, “It has also given me more courage
and confidence in my off-line relationships . . .”
B – Yeah, that’s because I didn’t used to approach people at all. That was my no-no
thing to do. I would not approach anyone. And recently, I’ve been approaching people,
just going up to them, dancing with them, or doing whatever. But, I’m still shy, I don’t
do it all the time, but when I get my moments I can do it. And like, I used to be unable to
do it in the past.
A – Something about the Internet empowered you to approach people more often than
you normally would.
B – Yeah, because I could see the type of people that I could draw. I was shy before and
I would say, “Well, they would never like me.” And then I saw the kind of people that
liked me – then maybe I could go up and say, “Hey” or whatever.
A – You learned what kind of people might be more accepting (B – Yeah) or interested
(B – Yeah) in you (B – Yeah). In the next line you say, “I now know the types of people
that are attracted to me (B- Yeah) and how to approach them (B – Yeah).” I wonder if
you could elaborate more on what you learned about “how” to approach others.
B - Let me see. Some people like aggressiveness and some people like the little shy kind
of thing. And, I would know which kind of role to play. In meeting a certain person,
should I be the overbearing person or should I be the quiet shy kind of person. And that’s
how I knew that with people.]
A – This is where your description ended. Thank you very much.
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Appendix I
Questionnaire – Dawn
For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In
order to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen
name.
6) Female X Male ____ Other ____ (check one)
7) Age 29
8) Ethnic background African-American
9) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful
relationships? Several years now
10) Windows user X Macintosh user ____ (check one)
6) What is your Internet provider name? AOL
7) What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address
of the site where your encounter took place? IMS on AOL
Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an
intimate connection with another person on the Internet. Include in your
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person. Also,
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships
with others.
(See Appendix J)
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Appendix J
Written Protocol #3 - Dawn
In this section, the third research participant’s experiential protocol will be quoted
verbatim. Any typographical or grammatical errors will again be printed, without
revision, in order to preserve the potential significance of “errors” contained in the
protocol. Within the text of this protocol, numbers and brackets have been employed as a
way to highlight sentences suggesting distinct units of meaning. A thematic analysis of
each grouping of highlighted sentences will immediately follow the protocol printed
below. Where the same theme recurs within the same protocol, a superscripted number
will indicate how many times the theme recurs. For instance, the designation “52”
signifies that the fifth theme appears twice within the same protocol. If a theme was
hermeneutically modified by research participant interview material, an alphabetic letter
will follow each number (e.g., 1a, 2b). The alphabetic letter will correspond to alphabetic
letters placed in the transcript of each research participant’s audio taped interview (See
Appendixes E, H, and K).
Protocol #3 – Dawn, 29 y. o., African-American, female
1a-[Well due to job training updates, I had to interact with my significant other using
other means of communication. The long distance telephone call became a bit of an
expense. So using the Internet was the next option.] 2b-[For a while emails were
exchanged. I found the emails to be very cold and impersonal. I would assume one thing
and something else was implied. This happened on both of us. Using emails over a
period of time lead to miscommunication. Although people can write their expressions,
verbal communication (i.e. tone and voice inflections) makes words come alive and more
meaningful.]
3c-[With that in mind, Instant Message (IM) was agreed upon both of us to get
back some of what verbal communication offered. IM offered a psuedo-telephone call.]
4d-[So this worked for a while, until an incident happened and made using IM a task. IM
started to become tedious. To list one’s complaints became tedious due to the loss of
verbal communication. The complaints were not expressed in a heart-felt compassionate
way. When using IM one has to now write from a different perspective. I was writing

208
like I spoke and not how I wrote. I found writing one has to calculate on how to present
information to give readers a clear and concise view of their world or perspective.]
5e-[On one particular IM, I felt that my significant other could have handled a
situation with a co-worker in a different manner than escalating an argument (sparing
details due to irrelevancy). I Imed him stating ‘I am surprised at you’. This statement
was interpreted as ‘How dare you judge me. You were not there to see how this person
reacted. You are making it seem as if I was totally irrational. Is this what you think of
me? If you feel this way, why are you in a relationship with me?’ I looked at the
computer screen in complete horror. He was lashing out at me. He questioned our entire
relationship over my simple statement. All I meant by the statement was how I was
surprised he got into a confrontation with his coworker because he is usually a jovial
person.] 6f-[But before I Imed him back a response, I scrolled up to view the beginning
of the IM where he sated how stressed he was with the training program. We also briefly
discussed stress. So when I Imed him with what I meant by the statement, he apologized
and reiterated how stressed he was.] 7g-[My example only implied a fraction of how the
Internet can handicap social interactions with people.] 8h-[Many time after using the
Internet, many people assumed whatever they wanted to conversation to be without
actually listening to what the conversation is about. Assuming and hearing has taking
social skills be it verbal or written out of the art of conversing. Allowing the world to
listen with a deafening ear.]
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Appendix K
Interview Transcript #3 – Dawn
Andrew (A) – I am turning the tape recorder on. a[In the first few lines you say “ . . . I
had to interact with my significant other using other means of communication. The long
distance telephone call became a bit of an expense. So using the Internet was the next
option.” I wonder if you might say more about the Internet as “the next option.”
Dawn (D) – Well to cut costs really. That’s what that was about – being the next option.
Because of the hours we both worked, it was kind of hard to pin each other down at
certain times of the day.
A – Cost and convenience were considerations.
D – Yes.]
A – b[In the next line you say, “For awhile emails were exchanged. I found the emails to
be very cold and impersonal.” I wonder if you might talk more about the “cold and
impersonal” aspects of the email exchanges.
D – Well, I mean because with emails you kind of interpret them any way you want to
interpret them as opposed to what is actually going on. You can kind of feed your own
emotions or whatever – you know, does that help you? Am I elaborating enough?
A – It seems as if you’re saying there is something about – (interruption)
D – Well I just think it’s a cold thing because it lacks emotion. I mean, no matter how
many smiley faces and you know the thousand and . . . million-and-one icons for
different emotions, it doesn’t take the place of what someone says, you know. A word
that’s printed and how it’s said is two different things, has two different connotations.]
A – A couple of sentences later you said, “Using emails over a period of lime lead to
miscommunication.” I wonder if you have any recollections about what kind of
miscommunication.
D – Well, it depends on what kind of day someone was having, and um, saying one thing
and saying something like “I need more time” and then that other person might be having
a real stressful day or something – “Well I can’t give you anymore time. What do you
expect? Why would you send me that?” You know?
A – There is something about the time to devote - (interruption)
D – I mean because if you say something that’s really open, people can kind of judge that
any way they want to. Like for instance, there was one email, it was like, “Well, I need
to see you. I need to talk to you about something.” It was like, “Well, you need to be
patient.”
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“Well I thought that’s what I was being.”
A – Being patient in terms of availability to communicate?
D – Yes. Or even, ‘cause you know, being patient in terms of being able to communicate
period - via email or phone conversation.
A – You weren’t always readily available.
D – Right.]
A – In the next line you say, “Although people can write their expressions, verbal
communication (i.e. tone and voice inflections) makes words come alive and more
meaningful.” I wonder if you could talk about how tone and voice inflection make
communication more meaningful.
D – I think just because of the way how things are said - -just in general. That’s what I
meant by that.]
A – c[Then you go into the second paragraph, and you say, “With that in mind, Instant
Message (IM) was agreed upon both of us to get back some of what verbal
communication offered. IM offered a psuedo-telephone call.” I wonder if – (interrupted)
D – (Laughing) Could you read that statement again?
A – Sure. “With that in mind, Instant Message (IM) was agreed upon both of us to get
back some of what verbal communication offered. IM offered a psuedo-telephone call.”
D – Well that’s what I think Instant Messages are. You get that opportunity to
communicate back and forth almost instantaneously; as if you were talking but it still has
that email appeal to it. That’s why I call it pseudo. It’s not really telephone call but it’s
kind of like a telephone call.
A – You get to respond in real time to each other – (interrupted)
D – Exactly. Instead of waiting for somebody to process that thought and send it to you
like a day later or an hour later.
A – You get more of the immediacy (D – Yes). And it’s pseudo because it lacks the
voice (D – Yes.)] d[ In the next line you go on to say, “So this worked for awhile, until
an incident happened and made using IM a task. IM started to become tedious. To list
one’s complaints became tedious due to the loss of verbal communication.” I wonder if
you could talk about the tedious aspect – (interrupted)
D – I mean, it’s kind of hard – well, it’s easier to say everything that’s bothering you, or
you know, to say it. But to type it down so that person gets the same feel, as if you’re
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saying it, because sometimes people talk different than what they write. So there’s a
miscommunication in that.
A – They talk different than what they can write.
D – Yes. They explain in work language or business jargon or whatever.
A - So the written language is a little more formal.
D - It could be. Well cause a lot of times I feel people are so structured to make sure
what they say comes across, as opposed to just saying it sometimes. And sometimes
when you just say it your like, “Ha, I don’t get it.”
A – When it’s more structured, it can be less spontaneous – (interrupted)
D – Exactly, as a telephone conversation can be.]
A – You seem to describe this a little more when writing, “The complaints were not
expressed in a heart-felt compassionate way. When using IM one has to now write from
a different perspective. I was writing like I spoke and not how I wrote. I found writing
one has to calculate how to present information to give readers a clear and concise view
of their world or perspective.” Can you talk about those statements a little more?
D – I don’t even know what I meant right now.
A – Would you like me to read that back again?
D – Yes.
A - “The complaints were not expressed in a heart-felt compassionate way. When using
IM one has to now write from a different perspective. I was writing like I spoke and not
how I wrote. I found writing one has to calculate how to present information to give
readers a clear and concise view of their world or perspective.”
D – I still don’t know where I was going with that statement. I think that still goes back
to the whole slang thing – how you speak and how you talk and how you write. Um, I
don’t know (laughing). I’m sorry, I think I just had a brain freeze.
A – That’s okay. The point seems t to be that there was a difference for you.
D – Oh definitely.
A – You seem to be contrasting the heart felt compassionate way of expression with –
(interruption)
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D - As opposed . . . right. It’s just like when you write and you just say, “This is how this
goes. This is how I felt.” With the lack of emotion, you can only feel but so much
through Instant Message.
A – So it’s hard for the person to really feel things even though you are putting thins in
words.
D – Exactly. And feeling is a part of communication.]
A – e[You go on and describe an incident in the third paragraph – “On one particular IM,
I felt that my significant other could have handled a situation with a co-worker in a
different manner than escalating an argument. I Imed him stating, ‘I am surprised at
you’. This statement was interpreted as ‘How dare you judge me. You were not there to
see how this person reacted. You were making it seem as if I was totally irrational.” As
you close out this section, you said, “I looked at the computer screen in horror.” I
wonder if you could talk about the horror you experienced.
D – Well I think because I felt as if we’re in this together, and we’re just talking – it’s
called conversation. It’s not to say one person is right and one person is wrong, but if I
say that “Well, you know, I’m surprised you responded that way,” meaning because I
know you as a different person, I can see you as a different person from that. Like, I
thought we knew each other and we don’t.
A – You were kind of relying on him to understand what you meant beyond –
(interrupted)
D – Right. I assumed that part because we had a repertoire together, but that’s not what it
was.
A – With that kind of repertoire, you didn’t feel as if you had to be more explanatory –
(interrupted)
D – Exactly. Because your treating it as if it’s a telephone conversation. I mean, it’s the
same thing, it’s just in a different mode. We’re still communicating.]
A – And then you said, “I looked at the computer screen in complete horror.”
D – Well, it’s because I felt as if I was being put on defense mode when I shouldn’t be.
If we’re on the same team, and you know, I have this opinion, then let’s just discuss it.
Let’s not jump to the opinion, “Well you wasn’t there, you don’t know what went on and
that wasn’t what happened.” But I think on his part as well, I didn’t get everything from
him and he didn’t get everything from me.
A – The information was incomplete on both sides.
D – Right. Yes.]
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A – f[Next, you say, “But before I Imed him back a response, I scrolled up to view the
beginning of the IM where he stated how stressed he was with the training program.” I
wonder if you could talk about your decision to scroll back.
D - Umm, I think it was in context to what we were saying, I think. Because for him to
say that like, for me to be like in horror of him not understanding where I was coming
from, or maybe I wasn’t understanding where he was coming from. I figured I’d scroll
back and see if I was on the same track. It’s like, almost like if you have a phone
conversation with somebody and then you try to remember what you said in case you
offended somebody. But then here, I actually had the words that I said. I didn’t have to
think about it. I could just scroll back and look at it.]
A – “So when I Imed him with what I meant by the statement, he apologized and
reiterated how stressed he was.”
D – Exactly. So it’s just like, you said it but then you forgot for a minute how stressed
you was and now you remember all over again. You know. And this was just a phone
conversation it wouldn’t have been this intense.]
A – g[Next line, “My example only implied a fraction of how the Internet can handicap
social interactions with people.” I wonder if you could just – (interrupted)
D - . . . elaborate on that fraction? What other areas could possibly . . . ? Well, I think
for one, umm, not just a conversation via telephone, via in person, or in the flesh I should
say, but umm, it’s just humorous because I think people will become so accommodated
or used to talking to people one way. Like if this is how we’re gonna do things, then
we’re gonna communicate via email. So when I see you, I’m gonna kind of be like,
“Okay, what do I say?” You know. You kind of shy away because you’ve had that
barrier, that computer in between you. I know a couple of people personally that found it
kind of hard to assimilate back into real life without having to deal with IM. Because I
think people can say things and write things, but they can’t verbally say it to a person.
And then it’s like, well, it’s almost like dating all over again.
A – Because it feels awkward again?
D – Yeah (laughing). “Oh my God, say the right thing.” You know?]
A – h[In the next line you say, “Many time after using the Internet, many people assumed
whatever they wanted to conversation to be without actually listening to what the
conversation is about. Assuming and hearing has taken social skills be it verbal or
written out of the art of conversing.”
D – Let’s see. I’m trying to think of a specific thing. Just assuming umm, that maybe a
person will either say, “I feel very alone.” No that’s not going to work.
A lot of times people don’t say what’s on their mind. They assume that the person
already knows certain things. It’s something that we take for granted. I think just in
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general, like with the Internet thing, you have to spell everything out just to make sure
everybody’s on the same wavelength. And that’s a lot of work at one time because you
have to be detailed oriented sometimes. If your receiving the text, you can’t very well
think like that person. So if you had a stressful day, and you know, and you go and check
your emails, and it’s just like, “What does this mean?” You know. It’s like you already
have all this aggression going on within you. And to see something that you really don’t
understand kind of puts it on a whole other plane. So you automatically are defensive.
A – You sometimes base your understanding on what’s going on with you because –
(interruption)
D - . . . because that’s a part of you and you can’t turn that off and on.
A – In your understanding, that is more likely to happen with words on the screen than it
is when face-to-face.
D – Yes. Because when your face-to-face you can’t hide everything. I think your body
language insinuates what’s, you know, really going on.]
A – I’m going to read the last two lines (D – Okay). You say, “Assuming and hearing
have taken social skills be it verbal or written out of the art of conversing. Allowing the
world to listen with a deafening ear.”
D – (Laughing) Oh God, I was being really philosophical right there. I think a lot of
times people hear what they want to hear or read what they want to read and they take
whatever experience they want from that. But not actually what it is. And to me, it leads
to one big miscommunication.
A – That seems more likely on the Internet than off the Internet?
D – Yes. Because when your face-to-face, when you say something to somebody, you
kind of have an idea whether they agree with you, don’t agree with you; understand what
your talking about, or don’t understand – just by body movements, facial expressions.
A – You miss the opportunity to recalibrate what your saying (D – Laughing) based upon
how the other person is reacting.
D – Yes. Because, I mean, sometimes when people say things and your like – I might
say, “I don’t like what your wearing.” And somebody might take offence to that instead
of saying, “I don’t like that color on you but I like that style.” You know, and it’s a
different way of saying the same thing. Just one way has negative connotation.
A – And you wouldn’t know to make that adjustment.
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D – Right. I wouldn’t know to make that adjustment if I wasn’t there. You know.
Because a lot of times people think of about how they say things to people. That’s just
the way it works. It’s a hard thing to do.]
A – The last line seemed to address the perspective of the listener – “Allowing the world
to listen with a deafening ear.”
D – It’s in your interpretation. It’s like I can hear you but I can’t hear you. I understand
what you’re saying, but I’m not comprehending what your saying.]
A – Thank you very much.
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Appendix L
Local Internet Site Data #1: America Online (AOL) Analysis
. Below, Lawrence Lessig’s description and analysis of the broad domain of AOL
is reproduced verbatim.

1-[“As a member of AOL you can be any one of five people. This is just one
amazing feature of the space. When you start an account on AOL, you have the right to
establish up to five identities, through five different “screen names” that in effect
establish five different accounts. Some users, of course, use the five screen names to give
other family members access to AOL. But not everyone uses an AOL account like this.
Think about the single woman, signing up for her first AOL account. AOL gives her up
to five identities that she can define as she wishes – five different personae she can use in
cyberspace . . . .
So in AOL you are given a fantastic power of pseudonymity that the “code
writers” of real space simply do not give . . .
That is a first feature of the constitution of AOL – a feature constituted by the
code.]
2-[A second is tied to speech – what you can say, and where.
Within the limits of decency, and so long as you are in the proper place, you can
say what you want on AOL.] 3-[But beyond these limits, speech on AOL is constituted
in a more interesting way. Not the constraint of rules. My point instead is about the
range of permissible speech governed by the character of the potential audience. There
are places in AOL where people can gather; there are places where people can go and
read messages posted by others. But there is no space where everyone gathers at one
time, or even a space that everyone must sooner or later pass through. There is no space
where you could address all members of AOL. There is no town hall or town meeting
where people can complain in public and have their complaints heard by others. There is
no space large enough for citizens to create a riot. The owners of AOL, however, can
speak to all. Steve Case, the “town mayor,” writes “chatty” letters to members. AOL
advertises to all its members and can send everyone an e-mail. But only owners and
those they authorize can do so. The rest of the members of AOL can speak to crowds
only where they notice a crowd. And never a crowd greater than twenty-three.
This is another feature of the constitution of the space that AOL is, and it too is a
feature defined by code. That only twenty-three people can be in a chat room at once is a
choice of the code engineers. While their reasons could be many, the effect is clear. One
can’t imagine easily exciting members if AOL into public action. One can’t imagine
easily picketing the latest pricing policy. There is no place where members can complain
en masse . . . .]
42-[A third feature of AOL’s constitution also comes from its code. This is
traceability. While members are within the exclusive AOL content area (in other words,
when they’re not using AOL as a gateway to the Internet), AOL can (and no doubt does)
trace your activities and collect information about them. What files you download, what
areas you frequent, who your “buddies” are – all this is available to AOL. These data are
extremely valuable; they help AOL structure its space to fit customer demand . . .]
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5-[AOL is not exclusive in this enabling capacity. It shares the power. One
wonderful feature of the online space is something called “buddy lists.” Add someone to
your list, and when he [sic] comes online you hear the sound of a creaking door and are
notified he is online. (The “buddy” need not know he is being watched, though he can, if
he knows, block the watching.) If that person goes into a chat area and you “locate” him,
you will be told in what chat area he is . . . ]
42—[Consider one final feature of the constitution of AOL, closely linked to the
last: commerce. In AOL you can buy things. You can buy things and download them,
or buy things and have them sent to your home. When you buy, you buy with a screen
name, AOL knows (even if no one else does) just who you are. It knows who you are, it
knows where you live in real space . . .
AOL knows who you are – this is a feature of its design. All your behavior on
AOL is watched; all of it is monitored and tracked back to you as a user. . . And with this
[data], and the link it provides to you, AOL is a space that can better, and more
efficiently, sell to you” (Lessig, 1999, pp.67-70).]
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Appendix M
Local Internet Site Data #2 – America Online Instant Messaging (AIM) Description
Local Internet Site Data #2: America Online Instant Messaging (AIM) Description
The AIM interface window will be described below based upon the AOL.Instant
Messenger™: Get AIM® (2004) Web page description. The AIM buttons described in the
description below are AIM Expressions™, Buddy Icons, AIM Remote, Smiley
Dictionary, Acronym Dictionary, AIM Express, encrypted AIM, AIM Chat Rooms, Send
IMs to Mobile Phones, and IM Forwarding. Keystroke functions such as bolding,
italicizing, font size, and font color options are not addressed on the AIM Web page since
they are standard functions. AOL’s discussion of the AIM Developer Programs, AIM
Bots and Enhanced File Transfer portions of the AIM windows will not be addressed here
since they do not directly pertain to communication practices on AOL. That said, the
AIM description is as follows:
14-[“Connect with your friends and family – anytime, anywhere! AIM® 5.2 for
Windows, Download Now! Already an AIM member? Upgrade Now!]
22-[Fun with AIM. Put Tom Cruise on your Desktop! Download “The Last
Samurai” Expression . . . AIM Expressions™ is the exciting new way to personalize your
AIM® client and instant messages! System Requirements: In order to use AIM
Expressions™, you will need to install the latest version of the AIM® software. Click
here to download now.]
Buddy Icons . . . Make your IMs display your online personality. Choose a cool
Buddy Icon . . .
Choose form hundreds of cool Buddy Icons:
2 Fast 2 Furious, AM. Symbols, American Wedding, Analyze That, Angels, AOL
Inside, Brittney Cleary, Brother Bear, Bubble Gum, Bugs, Cartoon Network, ‘The
Cat in the Hat,’ Charmed, Charlie’s Angels, Classic Movies, Eight Crazy Nights,
8 Mile, Elf, Final Fantasy XI, Finding Nemo, Flags, Flowers, Freaky Friday,
Friday After Next, Gilmore Girls, ‘Gothika,’ Grind, Halloween, Hanukkah, Harry
Potter, Holiday, ‘Honey,’ How To Deal, Hulk, Humor, ‘Intolerable Cruelty,’ JayZ, Johnny English, Kangaroo Jack, Knockaround Guys, ‘The Last Samurai,’
Limp Bizkit, Looney Tunes, ‘Love Actually,’ ‘Love Doesn’t Cost a Thing,’
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Marine Life, Moods, Music, Music Alt., Music Artists, Nature, NBA, New Year,
Office, Open Range, Patriotic, ‘Peter Pan,’ ‘Return of the King,’ The Ring,
Romantic, ‘The Rundown,’ Science Fiction,’ Seasons, Smileys, Sports, SWAT,
TBS, Tell Them To…, Terminator 3, ‘The Texas Chainsaw Massacre,’ The Two
Towers, Verb, The WB’s Best Series, Zodiac Symbols.]
14-[You can add AIM Remote to your Web site!
AIM Remote™ [buttons]:
{I am Online. Send me an IM.}
{Add me to your Buddy List.}
{Join my Chat Room.}
{Send me E-Mail,}
It’s simple and fast to add AIM Remote to your Web site. Our helpful wizard will
guide you through six easy steps that take less than five minutes to complete. Click the
Start button below. Start. AIM Remote works with AOL Instant Messenger 2.0 or
higher. Need to get the latest version? Click here for the latest AIM version].
22-[Smiley Dictionary: Ever wonder what people are saying on AIM? Use the
handy Smiley Dictionary to keep up! Once you’ve got it down, go join a Chat to give it a
try.
Note: You can also use the Smiley pull down menu in your Instant Messenger
window.
Smiling (Ctrl+1), Frowning (Ctrl+2), Winking (Ctrl+3), Sticking-out-tongue
(Ctrl+4), Surprised (Ctrl+5), Kissing (Ctrl+6), Yelling (Ctrl+7), Cool (Ctrl+8),
Money-mouth (Ctrl=Shift+1), Foot-in-mouth (Ctrl+Shift+2), Embarrassed
(Ctrl+Shift+3), Innocent (Ctrl+Shift+4), Undecided (Ctrl+Shift+5), Crying
(Ctrl+Shift+6), Lips-are-sealed (Ctrl+Shift+7), Laughing (Ctrl+Shift+8)]
3-[Acronym Dictionary: Get your message across quickly and save yourself
some
keystrokes, too. Refer to this handy chart for the most commonly used acronyms among
AIM users and before long, you’ll be communicating faster than ever with friends,
family, and colleagues.
AFAIK
AFK
AIM
ASAP
A/S/L
ATM
B
BBS

As far as I know
Away from computer keyboard (for wireless users)
AOL Instant Messenger, also verb for FTPing files via AIM
As soon as possible
Age/Sex/Location
At the moment
Back
Be back soon

220
BC
BCNU
BFN

Because
Be Seein’ You
Bye for now . . .]

14-[AIM Express: How do you get in touch with your online buddies when you
are away from your home computer? How can you send instant messages when you
can’t download the AIM software? The answer is simple – AIM Express! Simply by
clicking on the button below, you can use this FREE tool to view your own personalized
list of buddies and send them IMs. Thanks to AIM Express, it’s never been easier to stay
in touch!
Click on the start button below to try AIM Express. Then, either enter your
Screen name and password, or click on the register button to sign up for a free account
today!
Start . . .
AIM Express Features: AIM Express lets you send instant messages directly
from a Web browser, such as Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer, to
anyone who has registered for AIM or who uses the America Online service. AIM
Express respects your privacy and, best of all, its FREE. To use AIM Express, you must
be a registered AIM user or subscribe to America Online . . .
Key AIM features include:
• Send instant messages
• See who’s online in your buddy list window
• Start of join buddy chats]
• 42-[Block members who misbehave]
4
1 -[Any computer with a Web browser that is connected to the Internet can run
AIM Express . . .]
5-[Encrypted IM: Now you can send and receive encrypted IMs! AIM 5.2
introduces the ability for AIM members to send and receive end-to-end encrypted
messages – IM, Chat and File Transfer – allowing for message privacy and member
identification. Messages are encrypted and decrypted using industry-standard encryption
methods – messages sent between AIM members can be digitally encrypted and signed.
For more information on using encryption with AIM, click here (See Appendix O for
Extended AIM Encryption Description).]
62-[AIM Chat Rooms: Before you chat you must first have AOL Instant
Messenger (AIM) on your computer. Click here for AIM.
42-[Please keep in mind that these chat rooms are NOT monitored.
Please review our chat rules and guidelines (See Appendix N for AIM Chat Room
Rules and Guidelines) to make the most of your chat experience.]
62-[Hot Chats
TV Computers & Science
Family & Home
Health & Wellness
Hobbies & Interests
International
Lifestyles
Local
Love & Romance
More Chats
News
Personal Finance
Sports & Recreation
Travel]
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7-[Send IMs to Mobile Phones: Sending IMs to mobile phones just got easier.
Now you can create nicknames for your Buddies’ mobile numbers, making it easy to find
them at a glance. Just enter an easy-to-remember nickname, when you add a mobile
phone number to your buddy list.
IM Forwarding: Have Instant Messages delivered to your cell phone, when you’re
away from your PC! With AIM 5.2, you can be online, all the time, anywhere. Register
your cell phone with IM Forwarding, and you’ll continue to receive your IMs after you
sign out of AIM. To activate or deactivate IM Forwarding for your Screen Name, click
the IM Forwarding button in IM/Chat Preferences.”]
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Appendix N
AIM Chat Room Rules and Guidelines
“AIM Chat Room Rules and Guidelines
We encourage you to be responsible and to respect our community as well as
others participating within the community. Your conduct should be guided by common
sense, basic “netiquette”, and these chat guidelines.
AIM/Web Chat is not intended for use by individuals under the age of 13.

We discourage any of the following activity that:
• Repeatedly uses language inconsistent with the community standards of the
area from which the chat originated.
• Impedes or otherwise prohibits communication; disrupts the discussion
including, without limitation, using screen names in topical chats that are
offensive to the topic and repeatedly posting off-topic comments in a topical
chat.
• Contains vulgarities directed toward another individual or group.
• Depicts violence in gratuitous manner, without journalistic or artistic merit,
primarily intended to agitate or cause emotional distress.
• Is intended to victimize, harass, degrade or intimidate an individual or group of
individuals on the basis of age, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, religion or
sexual orientation. Hate speech is unacceptable anywhere on the service.
• Solicits personal information from a minor (under 18 years old). Personal
information includes full name, home address, home telephone number, or
other identifying information that would enable “offline” contact.
• Contains or facilitates the transfer of software viruses or any other computer
code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality
of any computer software or hardware or telecommunications equipment.
• Contains material that defames, abuses, threatens, promotes, or instigates
physical harm or death to others or oneself.
• Solicits for exchange, sale or purchase of sexually explicit images, and/or
material harmful to minors; including but not limited to, any photograph, film,
video, or picture or computer generated image or picture (actual or simulated).
• Infringes anyone else’s intellectual property rights, including, but not limited to,
any copyright trademark rights of publicity, rights of privacy, or other propriety
rights.
• Attempts to harvest or collect member information, including screen names.
• Impersonates or represents any person or entity in an attempt to deceive, harass
or otherwise mislead another member. You may not pretend to be an employee
or representative of AOL, or any of the America Online, Inc. family of
companies, or affiliates.
• Attempts to get a password, or other private information from a user.
Remember: AOL employees will NEVER ask for your password.
• Links to and/or references content not allowed under these guidelines.
• Otherwise uses the service in a manner deemed inappropriate by AOL.

223
Note: It is important to remember safety while online. Always use caution when
providing any personal information about yourself anywhere online. It’s also a good
rule-of-thumb to check the Privacy Policies of any unfamiliar or new web sites you visit.
When communicating in a chat room be mindful that many people will be able to view it
and the inclusion of information such as your name, your address or telephone number is
never recommended.
Take advantage of AIM’s IGNORE feature.
AIM Chat is provided with an IGNORE button. To stop receiving messages
from someone in a chat room, select the person’s screen name in the field that lists
everyone in the chat room and click Ignore. An X appears next to the selected person’s
screen name and their text will no longer appear on your screen. You might consider
using blocking or filtering software for chat environments like AIM chat, and instant
messaging, available through sites like www.getnetwise.org.”
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Appendix O
Extended AIM Encryption Description
“Encrypted Instant Messaging
AIM users can now send and receive messages, participate in chats and send files using
industry-standard digital encryption using AIM (version 5.2.3211 or higher, Windows
operating systems).
Messages sent between AIM users with security credentials are digitally signed and
encrypted and remain encrypted during message transmission. Referred to as “end-toend encryption,” the AIM encryption protocol is based on S/MIME e-mail cryptographic
standard.
Ferris Research Insight Bulletin
Ferris study looks at the Public Key Infrastructure PKI-based security in AOL’s
Enterprise AIM Services over SSL-based encryption (PDF)
Enterprise AIM Services
Our new Enterprise AIM Services™ offering provides businesses the services and tools
needed to manage AIM communications, ensure security and maintain consistent user
identities across e-mail and instant messaging. This includes:
AIM: Desktop communications tool with access to over 195 million registered members
AIM Enterprise Gateway: Enhances security, management and control for IT
professionals
AIM Private Domain Service: Maintains consistent user identities across corporate
communication tools
AIM Federated Authentication Service: Authenticates users to the AOL Network from
your Corporate Directory
AIM Security Credentials: Digital certificates can provide reasonable assurance of the
identity of users, and enable encryption exchanges between security-enabled clients.”

